USS Saufley (DD-465)

USS SAUFLEY - Rep Of AA Action, 8/15/43

AUG 24, 1943

1. The USS SAUFLEY in company with Task Unit 31.5.2 was engaged in covering the first echelon of LCIs landing at BARAKOMA, VELLA LAVELLA, in accordance with Commander Task Force THIRTY-ONE'S Operation Order A12-43. The Task Unit arrived at BARAKOMA at 0710, August 15, and LCIs commenced unloading. The SAUFLEY proceeded to WILSON STRAIT to assume radar guard. Own fighters were providing air coverage during operation. At 0753 bogies were picked up on SC radar coming in from northwest. At 0000 Japanese dive bombers dove on landing area and were taken under fire by destroyers in landing area. Planes appeared similar to Aichi 99's. Five inch antiaircraft fire appeared to be heavy but dispersed. Own fighters followed dive bombers through anti- aircraft fire.

2. One dive bomber going low over southern tip of VELLA LAVELLA was seen to go down in flames after a fighter dove on it. Another was seen heading up WILSON STRAIT with 4 or 5 of our fighters diving on him. SAUFLEY did not fire as none of the Japanese planes needed for ship and fighters seemed to have the situation well under control.

3. At 0910 the LOIS completed unloading and the Task Unit proceeded at 12 knots for GUADALCANAL, destroyers screening ahead.

4. At 2048, while southeast of VANGUNU ISLAND, the SAUFLEY had an SC radar contact bearing 300°(T), range 15 miles, range decreasing rapidly. Contact was reported to Commander Task Unit and ship went to full general quarters. SG radar picked up the contact at 13000 yards indicating the planes were flying very low. FD radar picked up planes at 7000 yards. SAUFLEY was screening on starboard bow of LCIs at this time.

5. Two planes were sighted coming in astern of the formation after passing over the PHILIP at an altitude of about 150 feet. Fire of 5" battery was withheld because planes were so low and own ships were between us and the target. One plane banked sharply and passed about 100 yards astern of this ship flashing a signal light as if to challenge. The other plane continued over the formation, decreasing altitude to about 50 feet and was seen to drop 6 torpedo close to the WALLER. This plane then circled to the right and passed abeam about 1000 yards and was taken under fire with the main battery. Bursts were low and astern of the plane. The signal light of the first plane caused some confusion as to whether or not the planes were friendly and for this reason the 40mm did not open fire. The planes were later identified as Mitsubishi type 97 as it was B clear moonlight night with excellent visibility.

6. On the second attack about 2103 a low flying plane picked up by the SG radar came in and passed about 300 yards astern of the ship heading across the formation and was taken under fire by SAUFLEY 40mm. As the plane crossed the formation the PHILIP took the plane under fire with her 40mm and it was seen to disappear in a streak of 40mm tracers followed by a dull red flash.

7. On the third attack about 2108 a low flying plane was picked up by SG radar on the port bow at a range of about 5000 yards and was taken under fire with the main battery.

8. About 2000, before the attack developed, a snooper plane had trailed the formation keeping at a range of about 10 miles. This together with the fact that the planes making the attacks made steady bearing approach from 15 miles seems to indicate the snooper was used to direct the attack.

9. It is estimated that from four to six planes took part in the attack although only two were seen at a time. Four to five separate attacks were made, all from the northwest, the destroyers being their main targets. A total of six underwater explosions were heard and felt although no damage was done.

10. The total ammunition expended on the three attacks within gun range was 8 rounds antiaircraft common, 32 rounds Mark 32 projectiles and 12 rounds of 40mm with no observed hits.

USS SAUFLEY - Rep of ops in the invasion of Basilan Is, Philippines on 3/16/45

18 March 1945

1. The action report of the USS SAUFLEY for the subject period is forwarded herewith in accordance with references (a) and (b).

U.S.S. SAUFLEY ACTION REPORT. LANDING ON BASILAN ISLAND

16 MARCH 1945

A. The period covered by this report includes the sortie from Zamboanga, Mindanao by the Basilan Attack Unit to the landing beach on Basilan Island on 16 March 1945.

B. The USS SAUFLEY's participation in this operation consisted of providing the prearranged initial bombardment, and action as the covering force for the other units involved while being available for call-fire support.

A. SAUFLEY was ordered to anchor in Santa Cruz Bank the morning of 16 March and the commanding officer to report at about 0700 to Commander Task Unit SEVENTY EIGHT POINT ONE POINT TWO (Commander Destroyer Squadron TWENTY TWO) for a conference preliminary to the operation at hand. During the conference the Officer in Tactical Command explained the details of the landing. The USS SAUFLEY was underway at 0845 and joined Commander Task Unit SEVENTY EIGHT POINT ONE POINT TWO in the USS WALLER, proceeding to the objective area at maximum speed to meet the bombardment schedule which was moved ahead twenty (20) minutes to make up for lack of air bombardment.

B. The SAUFLEY operated with the destroyer support unit which consisted of the USS WALLER (F), USS ROBINSON and USS SAUFLEY under the command of Captain R. H. SMITH, Commander Destroyer Squadron TWENTY TWO (Officer in Tactical Command).

C. SAUFLEY's targets for the initial prearranged bombardment prior to the landing were Lamitan Town and Buajan Hill on Basilan Island.

D. Own forces consisted of the destroyer support unit, the LCS support unit, the control units, and the small landing force. Motor Torpedo Boats were operating in the area but instructed to remain clear of tho objective area.

E. No enemy forces were encountered.

The chronological account of the action follows. All times are zone (-9) times; all bearings are true. The sky was clear and weather in general favored the operation. A moderate Southeasterly wind was deflected away from the objective area by the island itself. The SAUFLEY maintained Condition of Readiness I and Material Condition Able until the completion of the firing when Condition of Readiness I - Easy was set and Material Condition Able was modified for ventilation.

A. Performance of own ordnance material and equipment was highly satisfactory. Ammunition expended consisted of 198 rounds of 5"/38 AA Common and 10 rounds of 5"/38 white phosphorus smoke projectiles. Effectiveness of ships gunfire was not reported by spotting plane. Fifty percent of W.P. projectiles believed to have been duds. Enemy gunfire was not encountered.

This ship sustained no battle damage. No enemy units were encountered.

A. Radars were used for air and surface search station keeping and navigation. The bombardment was done with indirect fire, airplane spotting; the initial salvos was placed by visual navigation.

B. IFF performance was normal and radar performance in general was good. Fighter direction was not conducted from this ship.

C. Communications were good, some trouble was experienced in contacting the spotting plane for the initial bombardment on Basilan Island.

Personnel of this ship suffered no casualties and performed their duties in a capable and efficient manner.

The following comment concerning the Basilan landing is, while true, perhaps too severe considering the short time available for planning. The spotting plane was not on station and quite apparently was not familiar with his part in the landing. do had to be coaxed to COLO over the spot, and whom he had arrived forty (40) minutes late, was not familiar with the various targets assigned and desired demolished by Army intelligence as planned.

USS SAUFLEY - Rep of shore bombardment & A/S act in Ormoc Bay, Leyte Is, Philippines, night of 11/27-28/44

10 December 1944

1. Enclosures (A) and (B) are forwarded herewith in accordance with reference (a).

U.S.S. SAUFLEY REPORT OF ACTIONS ON 27 NOVEMBER 1944.

On November 27, 1944, the USS SAUFLEY in company with Destroyer Division FORTY THREE consisting of the USS WALLER (Captain R.H. Smith ComDesRon TWENTY TWO as OTC) plus USS SAUFLEY, USS RENSHAW, and USS PRINGLE, in that order, got underway at 1814(I) and stood out through Surigao Strait for Ormoc Bay via a predetermined route at 30 knots, in accordance with Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN Destroyer Operation Plan #7-44 and ComDesRon TWENTY TWO operation order #1-44 of 26 November. The mission as assigned was to bombard enemy installation in Ormoc Bay and to make a sweep through the Camotes Sea for the purpose of destroying enemy shipping which might be attempting to land reinforcements on the West Coast of Leyte. Motor torpedo boats in the northern Camotes Sea plus a PBY operating south and west of Ormoc Bay were assigned for the purpose of keeping Destroyer Division FORTY THREE informed of any enemy shipping approaching or in vicinity of Ormoc Bay. Visibility was extremely poor with rain accompanied by variable winds until about 2330 at which time the weather partially cleared with light and intermittent rain squalls.

At 2329(I) the Division changed course to 355 true, reduced speed to 20 knots, and formed in line of bearing, 125° relative. All ships in the Division were scheduled to fire on target Able. The SAUFLEY commenced firing at 2339 (I) with the range 9050 yards and bearing 013.5 true and ceased firing at 2346(I) at a range 7750 yards and bearing 0409 true. Results were not observed due to poor visibility. No counter battery fire was encountered. Ammunition expended, 120 rounds AA Common.

Course was changed to 2600 true and at 2352 (I) the SAUFLEY commenced firing on assigned target Easy, three gun emplacements and supply dump, at a range of 16,250 yards, bearing 351 true. Fired eight five gun salvos with results unobserved. After turning south and making a new approach SAUFLEY commenced firing at 0022 (I) on target Fox, enemy barge hideout. Fired four five gun salvos at range 12,250 yards, bearing 334 true. Another approach was made and three five gun salvos were fired on same target at 0037 (I) at a range of 9050 yards, bearing 348° true, with results unobserved.

Upon completion of bombardment mission the Division made a sweep to westward in the Camotes Sea. A PBY on patrol had reported an enemy submarine approaching Ormoc Bay at 2315(I) in Latitude 10-33' North, Longitude 124-25' East, on course 045 true, speed 12.0 knots. On returning to Ormoc Bay the USS RENSHAW reported a surface target bearing 149 true at a range of 15,000 yards from her. At 0125 (I) the SAUFLEY picked up same target at a range of 11,500 yards and commenced coaching the main battery on the target. The USS RENSHAW commenced firing first and the SAUFLEY second at 0132(I) at a range of 5,800 yards, bearing 142 true.

The submarine was undoubtedly surprised as he was maneuvering radically with a speed of about six knots. Starshell illumination was ordered and after good illumination the main battery shifted to optical control at a range of about 4000 yards as the radars were unable to distinguish the target from the numerous splashes of all ships firing at close ranges. The Division changed course to south and it appeared that the USS WALLER was going to ram the submarine. All ships commenced firing their 40MM guns. Numerous hits were seen on the submarine but the submarine crew was still firing back with their 3" and machine guns. The WALLER did not ram but passed close aboard to starboard circling the submarine. All ships ceased firing. Shortly after the USS WALLER circled the submarine the Division Commander reported the submarine sunk, stern first, and stopped to try to pick up survivors. From the SAUFLEY we observed several survivors in the water plus a small amount of unrecognizable debris. Ammunition expended was 245 rounds AA Common, 6 Starshells and 60 rounds 40MM.

Communications were good except for occasional rain static. The submarine reported by the PBY at 2315 (I) was sunk by Destroyer Division FORTY THREE at about 0144(I) in approximately Latitude 10°-48' N, Longitude 124° - 35'E. This seems to be an exceptional feat of rapid communications in addition to close coordination of all units concerned as only 2.5 hours elapsed between the reporting and sinking of the submarine. Navigation was accomplished entirely by radar. The bombardments were conducted by coaching the director on target from navigational fixes and the dead reckoning tracer.

It is interesting to note that, during the firing on the submarine, spotting could have been effected by means of the SG PPI, as definite indications of at least six straddles were observed around the targets echo. Between the times of firing at target Able and target Easy an echo appeared on the SG radar, having previously been reported by the USS RENSHAW. The SAUFLEY prepared to take this target under fire but upon tracking found the radar ranges and bearings to be extremely variable. No dead reckoning tracer or computer track could be obtained and the target finally disappeared from all radar screens. It is believed that this was a phantom radar target.

No casualties to personnel or material were experienced and both performed in an excellent manner.

1. Forwarded.

2. On the night of 27 - 28 November 1944 the subject bombardment mission was marked by the successful attack upon an enemy submarine by destroyers assigned to the mission.

3. Contact with the submarine was made by one of our patrol planes at 2315/I, in Latitude 10°-31'N, Longitude 124°- 25'E. The destroyers were directed to the target and after a surface action sank the submarine at about 0144/I in Latitude 10°-48'N, Longitude 124°-35'E.

4. This excellent cooperation between air and surface units, which resulted in destruction of the enemy submarine within two and one half hours after contact, is noted with approval.

5. By copy of this endorsement Commander Task Force Seventy-Three is requested to commend the pilot and crew of the PBY which made this important contact.

USS SAUFLEY - Rep Of Act During period of 8/16-19/43

AUG 24, 1943

1. The SAUFLEY in company with Task Group 31.6 was engaged in escorting and providing coverage to landing operations at BARAKOMA, Vella Lavella from 16 - 19 August in accordance with Commander Task Force THIRTY-ONE'S Operation Order A12-43. Fighter director unit from GUADALCANAL was aboard during these operations.

2. Bogies were picked up at 1900 on the 16th while the SAUFLEY in company with the WALLER and PHILIP was proceeding to rendezvous with LST's off the RUSSEL ISLANDS. At 1910 commenced firing 5" battery while off CAFE ESPERANCE, GUADALCANAL. No results were observed. Contact considered doubtful. During the night bogies were frequently reported but none came within gun range.

3. At 1850 on the 17th SC radar reported bogies 39 miles coming in from west of VELLA LAVELLA. At this time LST's were unloading on beach at BARAKOMA and destroyers were patrolling off shore. At 1910 several bombs landed on beach near LST's and LST's opened up with 20mm's. No results were observed. LST's then got underway and the task group proceeded down GIZO STRAIT at 9 knots, destroyers patrolling at 30 knots, laying smoke screens to cover LST'S. At 2142 a plane came in low over the formation at high speed. Only the flames from his exhaust could be seen and all ships opened up with 40 and 20mm's. The plane seemed to be encompassed by tracers but he apparently was not badly damaged. At 2144 commenced firing 5" and 40mm's at plane flying low down our port side at a range of about 1000 yards or less. Again no results were observed and only his exhaust could be seen. At 2245 the WALLER and PHILIP had collision. At 2347 stopped smoke. During the above period there were bogies on the screen almost continuously. Only the ones which made close approaches have been listed.

4. At 2345 the SAUFLEY and PHILIP left Task Group THIRTY-ONE POINT SIX to join Destroyer Division FORTY-ONE off KOLOMBANGARA end intercept four enemy destroyers and several barges. While proceeding through GIZO STRAIT at 34 knots an enemy plane was dropping green and white signal flares about 5 miles ahead. At 0026 on the 18th, Commander Destroyer Division FORTY-ONE was contacted by TBS and the SAUFLEY and PHILIP ordered to return to Task Group THIRTY-ONE POINT SIX. The SAUFLEY and PHILIP rejoined as 0155 and the Task Group changed course for VELLA LAVELLA at 0207. At 0221 a fire was seen to break out on LST 396. The fire spread quickly followed by several small explosions. Personal and life rafts were seen in the water. A landing boat was also seen in the water. The SAUFLEY closed to about 700 yards and lowered a boat and nets to recover survivors. During this time several bogies were in the area and were taken under fire by the WALLER. The flames illuminated the SAUFLEY and entire area. At 0235 a tremendous explosion throw debris near this ship. The LST sank at 0300, the SAUFLEY having recovered 93 survivors including 10 officers. SC 1266 also recovered 10 survivors. A thorough search was then made of the area for additional survivors. At 0408 the SAUFLEY proceeded to rejoin the Task Unit.

5. At 0520 the SAUFLEY returned to cover SO 1266 which was reported being attacked by aircraft. No further bogies came within gun range. At 0715 the SAUFLEY arrived at BARAKOMA and commenced patrolling area while LST'S unloaded. At 0740 SC radar reported bogie at 60 miles. At 0743 bombs were seen landing on beach near LST's and dive bombers were seen pulling out of their dives. Almost immediately dive bombers were seen diving on this ship from out of the sun. They were taken under fire by the 40mm's and 20mm's. Two bombs, apparently 500 pounds, landed about 15 - 20 yards from ship on starboard side, one by gun 12, the other well aft. ship was being maneuvered radically, at the time, at 32 knots, about 3 to 5 miles off shore. Planes were taken under fire by 5" battery after they had pulled out of dive. Later a plane approached from the north coming in low along the coast of VELLA LAVELLA. This was taken under fire by 5" battery and seen crash just off shore about 3 miles north of BARAKOMA. Planes were identified as Aichi 99's. Another plane was seen smoking as it disappeared to westward low over the hills of VELLA LAVELLA. This plane was reported to be an F4U by the WALLER. A parachute was seen to land near the beach shortly afterwards. 20mm gunners report hitting one of the previous group of dive bombers coming out of his dive and seeing him crash by southern tip of VELLA LAVELLA. The planes pulled out of their dives at between 400 and 1000 feet. About 8 - 10 planes participated in the raid.

6. At 0855 Commander Destroyer Squadron TWENTY-TWO came aboard and the WALLER departed as bow damage from collision limited her to 20 knots. At 1150 so radar reported bogies at 11 miles but they did not come in.

7. At 1305 weather closed in and own fighter planes returned to MUNDA. At 1437 radar reported a large group of planes distance 27 miles, northwest of VELLA LAVELLA and SAUFLEY commenced laying smoke screen at 30 knots in case of torpedo plane attack. Planes did not come in however, probably because of low ceiling over VELLA LAVELLA. At 1546 bombs were seen to land very near PHILIP and a plane diving on SAUFLEY was taken under fire by 20mm's and 40mm's. It is believed that it was hit in Give as it was thrown off its dive and began trailing smoke. Three bombs apparently one 500 pound and two 100 sound fell 300 yards off fantail. The plane pulled out of its dive and was taken under fire by the 5" battery also. 20mm's and 40mm's appeared to be close. The plane was losing altitude end appeared to be in trouble since it did not maneuver. Shortly after, fighter coverage arrived and reported seeing the plane burning near south shore of KOLOMBANGARA. The plane was an Aichi 99.

8. At 1600 the 40mm's opened fire on three planes coming in from southward low over hills of VELLA LAVELLA in a close formation. Range about 3000 yards. The 5" battery opened fire shortly afterwards. One plane was seen to fall and the other two turned and headed back overland. The 40mm gunners report that there were four planes in the group and that two of them went down.

9. At 1845 lookout reported 9 planes coming in low from GIZO ISLAND. Planes were never seen from bridge. Fighter director recalled four F4U's to give air coverage. Those planes were low on gas and on way to MUNDA but they returned and circled formation at 1500 feet. Torpedo planes, if in vicinity, never came in. At 2330 and again at 0230 on the 19th, SC radar reported bogies in vicinity but they never came within gun range. On each occasion screening destroyers laid heavy smoke screen around LST's at 25 knots. During these attacks a total of 424 rounds of 5"/38 caliber antiaircraft common, with MK. XVIII Mods. 2 and 3 fuzes, 800 rounds of 40mm, and 1600 rounds of 20mm was expended.

10. The ship was at modified general quarters during the entire operation, going to full general quarters each time bogies were picked up on radar or reported by other ships. The nights were clear and moonlight except for the time between sunset and moonrise, which was about from 1830 to 2000. on the 17th and, morning of the 18th the sky was 50% overcast with cloud formations giving ideal coverage to dive bombers.

USS SAUFLEY - Bombardment of Munda, 7/12/43 with Task Force 19

12 July 1943

1. The SAUFLEY proceeded in accordance with Commander Task Force NINETEEN Operation Orders 6-43 and 7-43 US second screening ship in column with orders to fire at targets of opportunity. At 0309 Love commenced firing on flashes apparently from a light and heavy anti-aircraft battery about one thousand (1000) yards north of Munda Point at a range of eighty-four hundred (8400) yards. Fixed approximately forty (40) rounds on this position before flashes stopped, at which time shifted target to what was believed to be a small boat. However, after tracking it was determined to be a small island, probably TATAPURAKA, and ceased firing.

2. At 0315 Love sighted flares from snooper plane on port quarter, range about five thousand (5000) yards. At 0325 Love commenced firing, tracking plane across formation to starboard until contact was lost on the starboard beam on the FOX DOG Radar at a range of about four thousand (4000) yards. It is probable that this plane was shot down as the ship's Supply officer, chief commissary steward, trainer of Gun #5 looking through his sight, the gun captain of 40mm #2, the gun captain of 20mm Gun #5 and the depth charge release man saw the plane and than a very large puff of white smoke just before cease firing was given. Then the plane disappeared.

3. Three (3) other flares were seen and three (3) other separate air targets were picked up by the FOX DOG Radar and taken under fire at the following times, 0321, 0330 and 0341 Love. Although no hits were observed, the planes were kept out to a rage of about nine thousand (9000) yards from the formation.

USS SAUFLEY - Action Report, initial landing on Treasury Is, 10/27/43

Nov 8, 1943

1. In accordance with Commander Task Group THIRTY ONE POINT ONE operation order No. A16-43, the SAUFLEY proceeded with Task Unit THIRTY ONE POINT ONE POINT Two from Kukum, Guadalcanal to the Treasury Islands to participate in the initial landing operations there at dawn, October 27, 1943. About 0745 the SAUFLEY in company with the USS WALLER (Commander Task Unit THIRTY ONE POINT ONE POINT TWO, Captain HURFF), USS PRINGLE, USS CONFLICT, USS DARING, USS ADROIT, LCI 220, LCI 330, LCI 334, LCI 336, LCI 24, LCI 61, LCI 67 and LCI 69, commenced return to Kukum.

2. At 1723, as directed by Commander Task Unit THIRTY ONE POINT ONE POINT Two's visual dispatch 270625. the SAUFLEY reversed course and left the formation to join and escort the USS CONY which had been damaged in an air attack, to Purvis Bay, Florida Island. At 1915, prior to joining the CONY, orders were received via T.B.S. from Commander Task Unit THIRTY ONE POINT ONE POINT TWO to continue in the direction of Treasury Islands, join the USS PHILIP, and escort LST 485, LST 999 and APC 37 to Kukum, Guadalcanal. This convey was joined at 2150. All ships steamed at 10 knot 8.

3. A bogey was picked up at 2214, bearing 290 degrees true, distance nineteen miles, closing slowly on various courses. By 2240 it became apparent from the plot of the bogey that he had probably detected the convoy, despite poor visibility due to scattered cloud coverage of approximately thirty percent, with no moon.

4. From about 2240 to 2245 the bogey orbited close astern of the formation and then made one dummy run up the wake of the formation. At 2245 the bogey made his second run over the formation from astern and dropped two 200 - 500 1b bombs off the quarter of LST399, the second ship in column, with slight effect. The bogey then retired to the northwest. At the time of the attack, the convoy was 45 miles, bearing 307 from Simbo Island of the New Georgia Group.

5. One unusual feature of this attack was the fact that not only was the bogey undetected audibly, but the flames from his exhaust, usually visible on the planes previously used were not seen at any time, indicating that Japs may be using exhaust shields on their night snoopers and bombers. The attack was made from an altitude of approximately 3400 feet. The bogey was apparently a small float plane, as indicated by his small radar pip and low speed, 120 knots. There was a period of ten minutes or more when he was too close to be picked up by the 80-1 radar with its minimum range of about 2000 yards, and turned too sharply for the FD radar to follow. During this time he operated freely immediately over the formation and was enabled to locate all targets and chose one in & very deliberate manor and with almost perfect immunity from attack. No ships of the formation fired at the plane due to the general instruction contained in the operation order not to fire at snoopers.

6. It is believed that this doctrine should be amplified, due to the difficulty of determining just when a snoopers ceases to be a snooper and becomes a bomber. During recent operations this ship has had bombs dropped close aboard, or torpedoes fired, on five separate occasions at night when they came within one hundred yards or less from the ship. on none of these occasions was there any clear cut distinction between snoopers and the bombers. It is therefore believed that after Initial discovery of the surface unit, as shown by dropping float Lights or parachute flares close aboard or by the bogies repeated circling or returning to the surface unit, any plane approaching within 4000 - 6000 yards should be fired on by 5" using flashless powder if a good truck can be obtained by the director. It is also believed that 20mm and 40mm machine guns without radar control should be fired only when the plane itself is clearly visible and within 500 yards of the ship and after initial discovery of the surface unit.

7. One other bogey was picked w at 0212 bearing 000 true, distance 14 miles. After closing to ten miles the bogey retired to the northwest and the convoy proceeded to Kukum, Guadalcanal without further incident.

USS SAUFLEY - A/S Act Rep, 9/15/43, Occup Of Vella Lavella

18 September 1943

1. This ship was proceeding as escort of Task Unit 32.4.19 composed of U.S.S. SAUFLEY, U.S.S. MONTGOMERY, S.S. JAMES H. MCCLINTOCK, and S.S. EDWIN T MEREDITH. The MONTGOMERY'S sound gear was disabled as a result of previous collision. The SAUFLEY was patrolling at 14 knots and about 4000 yards ahead of the leading freighter. Convoy speed 11 knots, zigzagging. At about 1058 Love, September 15, 1943, a torpedo was reported by the S.S. MCCLINTOCK to have passed close aboard. Search of the area was instituted by the SAUFLEY and a clear sharp oil slick located which was believed to be the torpedo wake. After about two hours of search at speed of 15 knots, a definite echo was heard at 1251 bearing 260 (T), distance 3000 yards. This echo became sharper as range decreased and was identified as as submarine contact at 2500 yards. As the approach developed it became evident that it was a stern chase since the relative speed was 10 knots, with pronounced "down doppler" and there was no change in target bearings which were narrow. For these reasons no lead angle was applied and at 1257 a nine charge deep pattern was dropped, firing ten seconds "late" on the recorder. Contact was lost at 200 yards and it was estimated that the target was at a depth of about 200 feet. No visible results were obtained from this attack.

2. Search was resumed and at about 1342 contact was re-established bearing 270° (T), range 1500 yards, on the port quarter of the SAUFLEY. At this time a large boll in the water was sighted on the bearing, distance about 1300 yards. The SAUFLEY reversed course to the right to take the approach and the submarine also circled to the right so that by the time sub was brought to SAUFLEY's bow the sub presented her stern, and then apparently continued to turn, to give a target angle of about 140. As the range closed to about 200 yards and contact was lost, it was apparent that the submarine was well to port. The starboard K guns were not fired on this attack. Six depth charges were dropped on this attack (second) at 1349. Since the submarine was still in the same position when contact was regained for the third attack and showed little motion while being tracked on that attack, It is evident that the second attack probably seriously injured it.

3. At about 1353 contact was made bearing about 340 (T), distance 1350 yards. The submarine's position as plotted on the DRT showed no change during the approach for this attack. At about 1356 a full nine charge shallow pattern (third attack) was dropped.

4. At 1412 contact was regained bearing 295° (T), distance 2000 yards. During this approach the submarine showed a very low speed through the water. At 1416 a five charge medium pattern was dropped (fourth attack). At 1419 a disturbance or boil was noted in the water in the vicinity of the spot the charges were dropped. This was separate and distinct from those caused by the five charges. At about 1435 contact was regained bearing about 300°, (T), distance about 1500 yards. A dry run was made over him using the fathometer to obtain the depth and a sounding of 33 fathoms was obtained. An air "boil" was noted in this position while passing over the sub.

5. At 1443 while the SAUFLEY was turning left to return for another attack the submarine surfaced. She had no way on and was on even trim. A small list was reported however, by the director rangefinder operator. The conning tower came up slowly but the submarine deck remained awash. When first sighted the conning tower was on SAUFLEY'S port beam. The SAUFLEY was steadied with the submarine bearing about 320 relative so that all guns would bear. Fire was begun by all batteries, the five inch firing the first salvo within about 30 seconds. Opening range was 1900 yards, rapid independent fire was used. The first few five inch shots were on in deflection and apparently short about fifty yards. Remaining shots appeared to hit on the base of the conning tower. After four or five shots the conning tower was hidden in the splashes. All five inch guns fired and they got off a total of 40 rounds before fire Was ceased, the conning tower having completely disappeared. A hole from one hit was observed in the upper part of the conning tower before 1t was completely hidden in the splashes.

6. While the five inch guns were firing, one of the two Catalina patrol planes present made a bombing run from aft of the submarine at about 100 feet altitude, barely clearing the five inch splashes. One of his depth charges appeared to land right on the conning tower's position and one about forty feet away, on submarine's bow. When the splash from the plane depth charges subsided the conning tower was no longer visible and gunfire was ceased. The conning tower was out of the water something between one and two minutes.

7. The SAUFLEY continued the approach, swinging to the left after ceasing fire and passed over the submarine's last position. About two minutes after fire was ceased an underwater explosion was heard by the sound gear. At the submarine's last position many wood fragments from the gun hits on the decks and parts of gratings were seen, several being from six to ten feet long. Large amounts of fresh oil were also seen on the surface, the oil having a very light color and a pronounced strong odor somewhat similar to our diesel oil.

8. At 1456 a weak contact was established bearing 230° (T), distance 2400 yards. As the approach developed it became evident from relative speed, bearings and ranges that the submarine was dead in the water. At about 1501 a five charge shallow pattern was dropped directly over the estimated position of the submarine, contact having been lost at 100 yards. At 1506 a large area of air bubbles was sighted near spot where charges were dropped. At 1514 wood and oil were again observed near the spot of the last two attacks as the SAUFLEY searched the area.

9. No further contacts were made although the SAUFLEY circled the area and fully covered all possible submarine positions. At 1735 as the SAUFLEY passed near the position of the last attacks, in an area covering about one mile, diesel oil was seen lying on the surface in patches and large globules were seen rising to the surface. The odor of diesel oil was very pronounced. During the afternoon and night the area was searched for fifteen hours after the last attack. The PBY Patrol Plane on station during the night, made no contacts.

10. At 0600 September 16, 1943, search was stopped and SAUFLEY proceeded through position of last attacks. For a distance of four or five miles downwind from the spot the sea was streaked with fresh light colored oil which appeared to be still rising. The odor of diesel oil was very strong.

11. Sound conditions were excellent although the effect of our own wake and depth charge disturbances were very persistent. This is believed probably due to the high gain permitted by the new T.V.G. (reverberation suppressor). The submarine took advantage of this by apparently making tight turns at high speed in the early attacks and, also by remaining in the immediate vicinity of the depth charge disturbance. It is believed the long time between the first attack and the next sound contact was caused by returning to the area of attack too soon.

12. on the first two attacks the submarine maneuvered to give a stern chase during the early stages of the approach. On the second attack as the range was closed to approximately six hundred yards, the submarine apparently turned in tight circles at a good speed. some time was lost after the first attack by searching more distant areas on the assumption that the submarine would attempt a high speed get-a-way after the attack.

FIRST ATTACK

ANTISUBMARINE ACTION BY SURFACE SHIP

• U.S.S. SAUFLEY
• Date: 15 September 1943
• Time 1st contact: 2358 GCT
• Lat: 10-57-155
• Long: 163-56-30
• Course: 140
• Speed: 15 kts
• Convoy Course: 140

1. CIRCUMSTANCES AT TIME OF CONTACT

• Employment of Ship: Escort of convoy No 1
• Sea: Smooth
• Wind: Force 2, Direction 090 T
• Sub First Reported By: Other ships
• Depth of Water: 2100 fathoms
• If in company of other units, position relative thereto: Ahead of leading merchant ship in convoy.
• Estimated Sound range of the day 3000 yds. Sound gear in use when contact was made: Echo ranging.
• Verification of Contact: Movement of target: Going Away, Type of Echo: Submarine, Doppler: Inclination opening
• Torpedo Sighted: Rel bearing: 180
• Ship Torpedoed: Rel bearing 180, Dist 3600
• First Sound Contact: Range 3000 yds, Bearing 260 T
• Remarks: One torpedo was reported fired at our convoy. This was seen by merchant ship. Search was made for one hour 50 minutes before contact by echo ranging was made.

2. ATTACK

• Relative Speed at loss of contact: 10 kts
• Range at loss of contact: 175 yds
• Time of dropping first charge: 1257
• At time of drop: Own co 300, spd 15 kts.
• Assumed sub speed: 5 kts
• Assumed sub course 300
• Estimated sub depth: Deep
• Was marker buoy dropped? Yes

Charge No.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Depth Setting	Deep	Deep	Deep	Deep	Deep	Deep	Deep	Deep	Deep
Size Impulse Charge	20	14	20	14	20	14	20	14	20

Time between first contact on this target and this attack: 1 hour 50 minutes

3. General Remarks

This attack was a definite stern chase as indicated by relative speed. This was further brought out by Doppler Effect which showed in echo of a very high pitch. The target may have turned slightly to the right as we passed over him. No lead angle was taken in this attack since the bearings, relative speed and doppler effect all indicated a stern chase.

2nd ATTACK

ANTISUBMARINE ACTION BY SURFACE SHIP

• U.S.S. SAUFLEY
• Date: 15 September 1943

1. CIRCUMSTANCES AT TIME OF CONTACT

• If in company of other units, position relative thereto: Other units proceeded to join with another friendly convoy nearby.
• Verification of Contact: Doppler: Inclination opening
• 2nd Sound Contact: Range 1500 yds, Bearing 000 T
• Remarks: See attached comments

2. ATTACK

• Relative Speed at loss of contact: 12 kts
• Range at loss of contact: 200 yds
• Time of dropping first charge: 1257
• At time of drop: spd 15 kts.
• Assumed sub speed: 4-5 kts
• Assumed sub course: SW to NW
• Estimated sub depth: Medium
• Was marker buoy dropped? DRT

Charge No.	1	2	3	4	5
Depth Setting	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med

Starboard "K" guns were not fired.

Evidence of Damage to Sub: After this attack the submarine apparently stopped and when contact was regained afterwards it was in the same location and nearly dead in the water.

THIRD ATTACK

ANTISUBMARINE ACTION BY SURFACE SHIP

• U.S.S. SAUFLEY
• Date: 15 September 1943

1. CIRCUMSTANCES AT TIME OF CONTACT

• Verification of Contact: Doppler: Inclination opening
• Remarks: See attached comments

2. ATTACK

• Assumed sub speed: 5 kts
• Was marker buoy dropped? DRT

Charge No.	1	2	3	4	5
Depth Setting	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med
Size Impulse Charge:	16	20	16	20	16

Evidence of Damage to Sub: Submarine made little way and failed to maneuver afterward. It was dead in the water.

FOURTH ATTACK

ANTISUBMARINE ACTION BY SURFACE SHIP

• U.S.S. SAUFLEY
• Date: 15 September 1943

1. CIRCUMSTANCES AT TIME OF CONTACT

• Verification of Contact: Doppler: Inclination None
• Remarks: See attached comments

2. ATTACK

• Relative speed at loss of contact: 15 kts
• At time of drop: 15 kts

Charge No.	1	2	3	4	5
Depth Setting	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med
Size Impulse Charge:	14	20	14	20	14

Submarine surfaced after this attack, on an even keel. Firing by 20MM, 40MM and 5"/38 was begun. Hits were observed from both machine guns and 5" fire, after which submarine disappeared. Underwater explosion was noted shortly thereafter. Large fragments of wood and deck gratings were found as well as large amount of fresh diesel oil.

FIFTH ATTACK

ANTISUBMARINE ACTION BY SURFACE SHIP

• U.S.S. SAUFLEY
• Date: 15 September 1943

1. CIRCUMSTANCES AT TIME OF CONTACT

• Type of Echo: very weak
• Doppler: Inclination None
• Remarks: See attached comments

2. ATTACK

• Relative Speed at loss of contact: 15 kts
• Range at loss of contact: 100 yds
• At time of drop: co 230, spd 15 kts.
• Assumed sub speed: 0 kts

Charge No.	1	2	3	4	5
Depth Setting	Shallow	Shallow	Shallow	Shallow	Shallow
Size Impulse Charge:	14	20	14	20	14

Oil and wooden debris were seen after this attack, some pieces as large as 10 feet in length. The following morning after daybreak an oil slick approximately 6000 to 8000 yards in length and 500 yards in width was observed. with much fresh oil still appearing with a strong odor of diesel.

USS SAUFLEY - AA Act Rep, 11/17/43, Empress Augusta Bay Area

19 November 1943

1. In accordance with Commander Task Force THIRTY ONE's dispatch 120124, the USS SAUFLEY, as part of Task Group THIRTY ONE POINT SIX, consisting of the USS WALLER (Commander Destroyer Squadron TWENTY TWO, Commander screen), USS SAUFLEY, USS PRINGLE, USS SIGOURNEY, USS CONWAY, and USS RENSHAW (Captain Carter, Commander Task Group THIRTY ONE POINT SIX), and LST354, LST395, LST339, LST207, LST70, LST353, LST488, LST341, was enroute from Kukum, Guadalcanal, to Empress Augusta Bay, Bougainville, as the fifth echelon on 16 November 1943. The primary fighter director unit was aboard the USS PRINGLE, the secondary unit being embarked in the USS SAUFLEY. The convoy was overtaken and joined shortly before dawn by Transport Division TWELVE, consisting of the USS STRINGHAM, USS MCKEAN, USS TALBOT, USS WATERS, and Transport Division TWENTY TWO, consisting of the USS KILTY, USS CROSBY, USS WARD, and the USS SCHLEY.

2. The first bogey of the evening was reported at 1630, when the convoy was four miles south of Treasury Island. Several additional bogies were reported to the north at a minimum of 31 miles prior to sunset. Between sunset and moonrise, about 2145, the visibility was very poor, approximately 2000 - 3000 yards. During this period no bogies were reported or detected.

3. From moonrise until 0250 on 17 November, during the approach to the beaches in Empress Augusta Bay, bogies were detected along the southern coast of Bougainville from Empress Augusta Bay to the Shortland Islands. It is assumed that these bogies were searching the east coast of Bougainville for our shipping.

4. At 2250, in accordance with written instructions from Commander Destroyer Squadron TWENTY TWO, the SAUFLEY pulled ahead of the formation to a distance of seven miles, for the purpose of obtaining an accurate navigational position at the earliest possible opportunity to provide a clear approach for the rest of the convoy.

5. About 0250, the seventeenth, anti-aircraft bursts were noted ahead over the ground positions at Cape Torokina, and about 0300 a bogey was detected closing the formation from the South. From this time until sunrise, the convoy was under constant observation by enemy snoopers, and subject to intermittent attacks by low flying torpedo planes. The first attack was made about 0320 when the USS PRINGLE reported via T.B.S. that a torpedo plane making a run on the formation had crashed in the water off her port bow. At this time the SAUFLEY was about seven miles, bearing 220° true from Puruata Island and about eight miles ahead of the formation. Despite a cloud coverage of from fifty to sixty percent, visibility was good, due to the presence of a nearly full moon.

6. The USS MCKEAN was reported by the TALBOT to have been torpedoed at 0348 during what was evidently the second attack coming in over the rear of the formation.

7. Enemy planes remained in the vicinity and about 0430 two planes approached the SAUFLEY from the northwest at an altitude of three thousand feet, speed 150 knots. When the range had closed to 2500 yards they were taken under fire with the SAUFLEY'S 5" battery, whereupon they immediately turned away and retired to the northwest. Fire was ceased, having expended 64 rounds of 5"/38 AA common. The planes were seen to be twin engines bombers,believed to be Mitsubishi 97s. They were flying in a tight formation and the gunnery officer believes that in spite of their direct approach they were unaware of the SAUFLEY'S presence. on the approach of these bogies the SAUFLEY turned towards them to present as small a torpedo target as possible.

8. About 0530, the LSTS and the APDs, with the exception of the USS TALBOT, who with the USS SIGOURNEY was engaged in rescuing survivors from the USS MCKEAN, were approaching the beach. The SAUFLEY was then directed by Commander Destroyer Squadron TWENTY TWO to proceed with the WALLER to assist the USS TALBOT and the USS SIGOURNEY with their rescue work. After screening these ships when the rescue operations had been completed, the WALLER and SAUFLEY proceeded to the vicinity of point Uncle, to patrol there until such time as the APDs and LSTs should stand out.

9. At 0731, while in the area of point Uncle, a large group of bogies was detected bearing 315° true, distance 58 miles, closing. This raid was tracked in to the vicinity of Cape Torokina. No attack was made on the ships in the immediate vicinity. Report of six enemy planes being shot down by our fighter cover was heard over the fighter director circuit.

10. The SAUFLEY joined up with the convoy standing out from the landing beaches about 1930. Numerous bogies were reported during the night, but no attacks were made on the convoy during the return trip.

11. Because of the marked differenced in the performances of the various types of search radars, it is recommended that Fighter Director units be assigned to ships with SC II radars. The reason for this recommendation is based on the fact that the SC II radar is the only one having directional IFF, which permits quicker discrimination between friendly and enemy units. The two other types of search radars installed in this squadron, are the SC I and the SA. The performance of the SC I is much superior to that of the SA.

The following air search radars are installed in ships of Destroyer Squadron TWENTY TWO:

12. The Fighter Director units with which we have worked have turned in excellent performances and have proven the value of these units during the current operations. In as much as four of these units have handled all the fighter direction since the beginning of the current operations and some of these units have made an average of twenty or more consecutive trips, it would seem highly desirable that additional units be employed to permit a system of rotation which will provide occasional periods of relaxation.

USS SAUFLEY - Rep of ops in support of the invaison of Zamboanga Peninsula, Mindanao Is, Philippines 3/10-16/45

18 March 1945

1. The action report of the U.S.S. SAUFLEY for the subject period is forwarded herewith in accordance with references (a) and (b).

U.S.S. SAUFLEY ACTION REPORT, 8 MARCH TO 0800, 16 MARCH 1945

A. The period covered by this report includes the sortie from Mangarin Bay, Mindoro to the objective area and the landing of the 41st Infantry Division on the Southern tip of Zamboanga Peninsula.

B. The USS SAUFLEY joined Task Unit SEVENTY EIGHT POINT ONE during tho sortie having completed repairs in Subic Bay the afternoon preceding. The USS SAUFLEY'S participation in this operation included screening of the attack group and transport unit enroute to and at the objective area in addition to standing by to provide fire support if called for.

A. The SAUFLEY was a unit of Task Unit SEVENTY EIGHT POINT ONE POINT TWO, the screen, which was under the command of Commander Destroyer Squadron Twenty TWO in tho USS WALLER and consisted or the USS WALLER, USS BANCROFT, USS ROBINSON, USS PHILIP, USS SIGOURNEY, USS SAUFLEY, USS BAILEY, USS CHAFFEE, USS RUDDEROW, USS PC 1134, USS PC 1133, USS SC 698 and USS SC 741. Destroyers of the screen provided such fire support at night as was necessary and requested.

B. Own forces consisted of the Cruiser Covering Group, the Motor Torpedo Boat Unit, the Transport Units, the Screen, the Support Craft Unit, the Landing Craft Control and Beachmaster Unit, the Service Unit and the Minesweeping Unit. Those operated in and around the objective area in accordance with the operation plan.

C. No enemy forces were encountered although due to the number of small craft operating in the area at night suspicion as to identity of radar targets occasionally arose. Small abandoned native craft were in a similar category.

A. Chronological account of the action. ll times are zone (-9) times.

0545

Arrived Mangarin Bay, Mindoro, fueled and reported to Commander Tack Group SEVENTY EIGHT POINT ONE U.S directed by dispatch.

0730

Joined screen of Task Group SEVENTY EIGHT POINT ONE.

0841

Took departure from Mindoro for Zamboanga in accordance with Commander Amphibious Group SIX Attack Order A602-45.

9 March 1945

Enroute to objective area.

0832

SAUFLEY took A/S screening station South of Great Santa Cruz Island.

1830

Rendezvoused with Task Group SEVENTY FOUR POINT THREE composed of USS ROCKY MOUNT (Commander Task Group Seventy LIGHT POINT ONE Rear Admiral ROYAL) USS PHOENIN, USS BOISE (Officer in Tactical Command Rear Admiral BERKEY) USS TAYLOR, USS NICHOL.S, USS USS FLETCHER, USS JENNINS, USS ABBOTT and USS PHILIP for night retirement to Westward of Zamboanga Peninsula.

0700

Returned to transport area and maneuvered more or less independently to clear other returning units. Ordered to report for station in I/S screen.

1800

Joined USS PHILIP and took station in outer fire support sector South of Little Santa Cruz Island for standby fire support mission. Made several radar contacts which, from their motions, were evaluated as PT'S or SC's and which had either remained in objective area or entered after dark. Voico challenge was not answered.

0100

Relieved USS PHILIP in inner fire support sector North of Little Santa Cruz Island. During this period drifting LCI's seriously embarrassed the movements of this vessel in this narrow channel.

0615

Relieved of Fire Support Duty, proceeded to join A/S screen.

1855

Ceased patrolling and rendezvoused with USS ROCKY MOUNT, USS ROBINSON, USS MCCALIA for night retirement to the West of Zamboanga Peninsula.

0753

Proceeded to station in fire support sector North of Groat Santa Cruz Island awaiting fire support mission. Used speeds of one to six knots to maintain station, depending on state of the tide. Maintained heading into the current.

1016

Enemy plane reported by USS PHILIP. went to battle stations.

1829

Joined USS ROCKY MOUNT, PHILIP ad MCCALI for night retirement to the westward of Zamboanga Peninsula.

0826

Fueled ship from ROCKY MOUNT.

1120

Commenced A/S patrol in Basilan Strait.

1725

Reported to Commander Task Group SEVENTY EIGHT POINT ONE for Fire Support Duty and resumed patrol off So :western and of Zamboanga Peninsula.

1750

Commenced taking on ammunition alongside LST 1026. Received 150 rounds M Common and 50 rounds illuminating projectiles.

1905

Resumed A/S patrol in Basilan Strait.

0157

During patrol radar and sound contacts were made on target bearing 320° T, distance 800 yards. Searched area with negative results.

0222

Illuminated target position with searchlights; result: were negative. Evaluated target as debris or abandoned native craft.

0703

Anchored in Santa Cruz Bank awaiting orders for bombardment prior to landing on Basilan Island.

B. On all fire support stations the ship was in Condition of Readiness I-E. Condition I was set each morning prior to sunrise and during actual firing. Material Condition A modified for ventilation was maintained at all times.

C. The weather favored the operation and at no time was visibility impaired duo to this source, The dark evenings made navigation on Fire Support Station in channel North of Santa Cruz Islands rather difficult.

A. The operation order made no mention of the 500 rounds of 5"/38 caliber MK 32 ammunition carried by destroyers. Lacking other orders, and as directed by the Commander Destroyer Squadron TWENTY TWO, the ammunition loading order was interpreted to mean retention of Mk 32 ammunition, and loading of other components in excess of allowance.

This ship sustained no battle damage. No enemy units were encountered.

A. IFF performance was normal and radar performance in general was good. Fighter direction was not conducted from this ship.

B. Between 1850 and 1915 on 13 March, when an enemy plane was reported to be in the area, this ship picked up occasional and short signals on the R.C.M. gear. The characteristic of the signals consisted of a 3 to 5 microsecond pulse length on a frequency of 155 megacycles. It is believed that the signal emanated from Japanese airborne radar.

C. Navigation in these areas was difficult due to the velocity of the current although useful information on this was contained in the operation order, Rad I fixes in many cases were not good and the small craft traffic as stated before was an additional hazard.

A. Personnel of this ship suffered no casualties and performed their duties in a capable and efficient manner.

1. The following comments, suggestions and recommendation are submitted based on difficulties encountered in this operation, and from the experience gained in present and previous assaults.

A. All shipping which can be spared retire at night to simplify target identification and defense by night fire support ships.

B. Ships remaining in the objective area have definite assigned stations to maintain. Ships remaining at the objective area, especially large ships, such as destroyers, be informed of all movements in the area, of all ships remaining and their assigned stations.

C. 11 ships remaining at the objective area at night report to the Senior Officer Present (for that night) and remain under his operational control. Any unscheduled movements, or movements into or out of the area be cleared first through the Senior Officer Present to prevent possible confusion with enemy small craft. It will be helpful if PT Captains report on board the destroyer Senior Officer Present to discuss their mutual movements.

D. Plans for night retirement be included in the operation order, or promulgated to all ships as early us possible. Times of retirement of several groups can be scheduled so that traffic difficulties in leaving the immediate objective are minimized. Similarly, and much easier to accomplish, returning groups be scheduled to arrive in succession to minimize mutual interlocking of screens, especially in the dark before dawn.

E. Small craft be assigned to intercept and interrogate small native craft which invariably approach an assault with "useful information". It is not considered advisable, when smaller units are available, for relatively largo, slow, destroyers to approach and examine native craft, anyone of which could possibly conceal a booby trap or Bangor Torpedo. PT boats are recommended for such work; they have the flexibility to approach and closely examine native small craft, and the power to got clear quickly if occasion demands. They are further more adaptable to closing the Officer in Tactical Command to deliver natives with useful information.

F. Small craft, LCI's, etc., be instructed to keep clear of destroyers and larger ships. During night fire support duty in the narrow channel North of Santa Cruz Islands SAUFLEY had three LCI's drift down, one ahead 50 yards, and one on either bow: SAUFLEY cleared the area by backing out of the assigned support area. another time SAUFLEY spent 15 minutes trying to got through an LCI screen across the channel North of Santa Cruz Islands; this was finally accomplished by getting as close as possible to the petrol and then going ahead flank. This is not considered good seamanship or safe at night in very restricted waters with a 6 knot current.

G. when possible, destroyers be stationed for night support in waters with adequate maneuvering room for case of navigation and action against enemy small boats. In the present case, it is believed that sufficiently accurate harassing fire could have boon delivered from the channel South of Santa Cruz Islands. Further destroyer night fire support missions usually are limited to starshell illumination. 5"/38 caliber starshells operate satisfactorily only at ranges greater than 6000 yards. For these reasons it is believed that the primary destroyer night fire support station would better have boon in the Basilan Straits South of Santa Cruz Islands.

2. While it is not usual to include such remarks in an action report, the Commanding Officer feels that the spirit of working together, with mutual support, was outstanding in this operation. Particularly noteworthy is the assistance rendered by both Staff and Ship's Company on the ROCKY MOUNT in installing and servicing now radio equipment.

USS SAUFLEY - Rep of AA Act in Leyte Gulf, Philippines on 11/24/44

9 December 1944

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith in accordance with reference (a).

REVISED FORM FOR REPORTING A.A. ACTION BY SURFACE SHIPS

• Location of ship (area): Leyte Gulf, Philippines
• U.S.S. SAUFLEY (DD465)
• Zone Time: (-9)
• Date: November 24, 1944
• 1. Surprise attack: No, Night
• 2. Method picking plane up: Radar SG-4
• 3. Range plane was picked up: 11.0 miles
• 4. Total number of planes observed: one
• 7. Speed and altitude of approach in knots and feed: 225 knots 1000 feet
• 8. Number of guns firing-by caliber: 4-5"/38
• 9. Ammunition expended-by caliber: 18 rds 5"/38
• 11. Method of Control: Radar, Method of Ranging: Range Finder, Method of firing: Automatic
• 12. Approximate time-tracking to first shot: 3 minutes
• 14. Approximate time first shot to last shot: 15 seconds
• 15. Approximate position angle open fire: 2
• 16. Approximate position angle cease fire: 1
• 17. Approximate bearing first shot: 120 Rel
• 18. Approximate bearing last shot: 190 Rel
• 19. Approximate range first shot: 5800, Altitude of Plane: 1000 Feet
• 20. Approximate minimum range aircraft approached: 4600 yds, Altitude: 850 ft
• 21. Approximate range last shot: 4700 yds, Altitude of Plane: 700 ft
• 28. Performance of ammunition: Good

USS SAUFLEY - Rep of AA Act in Leyte Gulf, Philippines on 11/27/44

9 December 1944

1. Enclosure (A) and (B) are forwarded herewith in accordance with reference (a).

REVISED FORM FOR REPORTING A.A. ACTION BY SURFACE SHIPS

• Location of ship (area): Leyte Gulf, Philippines
• U.S.S. SAUFLEY (DD465)
• Zone Time: (-9)
• Date: November 27, 1944
• 1. Surprise attack: No, Day
• 2. Method picking plane up: Radar (SC & SG) & Naked Eye
• 3. Range plane was picked up: #1 (5,000), #2 (20,000), #3 (20,000)
• 4. Total number of planes observed: 15 Enemy, Types: Zekes, Vals & Jills
• 5. Number of planes attacking own ship: Two, Type: 1 Zeke, 1 Jill
• 6. Number of planes taken under fire by own ship: Three
• 6. (a) Of those attacking own ship: Two, Types 1 Zeke, 1 Jill
• 6. (b) Others: Thirteen, Types: Zekes, Jills, & Vals
• 7. Speed and altitude of approach in knots and feet: #1 (140-3500), #2 (200-3500), #3 (180-150)
• 8. Number of guns firing-by caliber: #1 (2-40MM), #2 (5-5"/38-2-40MM), #3 (4-5"/38-3-40MM)
• 9. Ammunition expended-by caliber: 5"/38 (30 rds Special) (39 rd AA0) 480-40MM
• 10. Percent service allowance expended: 5% Special, 3% AAC, 2% 40MM
• 11. Method of Control: Mk 37-Mk 52, Method of spotting: optical, Method of ranging: Optical, Method of firing: Rapid continuous
• 12. Approximate time-tracking to first shot: #1-3 min, #2-2 Min, #3-3 Min
• 13. Approximate time of first hit: #1, #2, #3 shortly after open fire
• 14. Approximate time first shot to last shot: #1 30 sec, #2 20 sec, #3 30 sec
• 15. Approximate position angle open fire: #1 15, #2 7, #3 5
• 16. Approximate position angle cease fire: #1 12, #2 8, #3 8
• 17. Approximate bearing first shot: #1 035 Rel, #2 230 Rel, #3 235 Rel
• 18. Approximate bearing last shot: #1 070 Rel, #2 210 Rel, #3 245 Rel.
• 19. Approximate range first shot: #1 (3500), #2 (5000), #3 (7000), Altitude of Plane: #1 (?) #2 3500, #3 50
• 20. Approximate minimum range aircraft approached: 3000 yds, Altitude: 50 ft
• 21. Approximate range last shot: #1 (3500), #2 (5000), #3 (7000), Altitude of Plane: 50 ft
• 22. Approximate altitude of bomb release: None, Size of bomb: None
• 23. Approximate range torpedo release: No Observation, Size of torpedo: None
• 24. Number hits on ship by bombs: None, by torpedoes: None, Was ship strafed: No
• 25. Number near bomb misses damaging ship: None
• 26. Planes shot down
• 26. (a) Those attacking own ship: 1 SURE (by own ship alone), 2 SURE (Assist)
• 27. Best estimate of size of gun or guns responsible for each "Sure": #1 40MM, #2 & #3 5"/38
• 28. Performance of ammunition: Good
• 29. What failures in material occurred in this action? Jam in gun #3, Hydraulic failure in Gun #1

DESCRIPTION OF ACTION #1

One Japanese plane (believed to be a Val with retractable landing gear) came over the formation from ahead, starboard bow, and was taken under fire by 5" batteries of cruisers and destroyers who were forced to cease fire in order not to hit other ships. Two starboard 40MM directors commenced tracking when the plane bore 010°R at a range of about 5000 yards, and commenced firing when the plane bore 035°R at a range of about 4000 yards. Although hits were observed the plane appeared to be under control when it went into a small white cloud during which time it was kept under fire. As the plane came out of the cloud it turned toward the ship to commence a dive attack. Hits were still observed and shortly plane lost control and crashed into the sea at about 3000 yards bearing 070°R. Officers of this command observed that this ship was the only one firing on the plane when it lost control and crashed.

DESCRIPTION OF ACTION #2

While the 40MM were firing on the port side, the main battery director picked up a Zero on the starboard side from lookouts reports. This plane approached from the port bow then changed course to pass astern. This ship commenced firing at 1156 at 250°R in optical control range of 5000 yards with a solution of speed 200 knots, target angle 270°, altitude 3500 feet. The MARYLAND, directly astern, was also firing at this plane. This ship was firing 60% special fuzes and bursts were observed all around the target. This ship ceased fire when the plane was hit and crashed into the sea at 200°R, range 7000 yards.

DESCRIPTION OF ACTION #3

The third plane, a Jill was picked up by the SG radar at 20,000 yds and control commenced tracking immediately being already on the bearing having tracked a Tony out to boat that area. that area. This plane was coming directly in 50' above the Shortly thereafter the Jill was reported by a PT in surface of the water at 180 knots. The Minneapolis, directly at ahead, and the Maryland, directly astern, commenced firing about 12,000 yds. At 1220 with the range 7,000 yds this ship angle 0° speed 180 knots and continued firing until at plane about commenced firing in optical control with a solution of the target made a 50 turn to the left and crashed into the water fuses and all burst were observed. No observers saw ahead torpedo 3800 yds bearing 235 Rel. This ship was firing 60% special a launched although the Maryland reported a wake passed a few minutes later.

Observers on this ship counted fifteen enemy planes during the attack and observed nine crash in or near the formation.

USS SAUFLEY - Rep of AA Act in Leyte Gulf, Philippines on 11/29/44

9 December 1944

1. Enclosures (A), (B) and (c) are forwarded herewith in compliance with reference (a).

REVISED FORM FOR REPORTING A.A. ACTION BY SURFACE SHIPS

• Location of ship (area): Leyte Gulf, Philippines
• U.S.S. SAUFLEY (DD465)
• Zone Time: (-9)
• Date: November 27, 1944
• 1. Surprise attack: Yes, Day
• 2. Method picking plane up: Naked Eye
• 3. Range plane was picked up: Less than 5 miles
• 4. Total number of planes observed: Three, Types: 2 Vals, 1 Zeke
• 5. Number of planes attacking own ship: Three, Types: 2 Vals, 1 Zeke
• 6. Number of planes taken under fire by own ship: Three
• 6. (a) Of those attacking own ship: Three, Types 2 Vals, 1 Zeke
• 7. Speed and altitude of approach in knots and feet: #1 (200-800), #2 (250-800), #3 (200-800)
• 8. Number of guns firing-by caliber: #1 (2-40MM, 2-20MM), #2 (2-40MM, 3-20MM), #3 (2-40MM, 5-20MM)
• 9. Ammunition expended-by caliber: 284 40MM, 480 20MM
• 11. Method of Control: Local Mk 14 sighted, Method of spotting: tracer, Method of ranging: Estimation, Method of firing: Rapid continuous
• 12. Approximate time-tracking to first shot: #1 (none), #2 (none), #3 (none)
• 13. Approximate time of first hit: #1, #2, #3 (shortly after open fire)
• 14. Approximate time first shot to last shot: #1 (12 sec), #2 (12 sec), #3 (15 sec)
• 15. Approximate position angle open fire: #1 (45), #2 (60), #3 (30)
• 16. Approximate position angle cease fire: #1 (0), #2 (0), #3 (80)
• 17. Approximate bearing first shot: #1 (240 Rel), #2 (240 Rel), #3 (180 Rel)
• 18. Approximate bearing last shot: #1 (340 Rel), #2 (270 Rel), #3 (220 Rel)
• 19. Approximate range first shot: #1 & #2 (1000), #3 (1200), Altitude of Plane: #1, #2, #3 600 ft
• 20. Approximate minimum range aircraft approached: #1 (5yds), #2 (0), #3 (10), Altitude: #1 (30), #2 (10), #3 (120ft)
• 21. Approximate range last shot: #1 (40), #2 (30), #3 (40), Altitude of Plane: #1 (100 ft), #2 (20 ft), #3 (100 ft)
• 22. Approximate altitude of bomb release: #3 (100 ft), Estimate 200 lbs
• 23. Approximate range torpedo release: None, Size of torpedo: None
• 24. Number hits on ship by bombs: None, by torpedoes: None, Was ship strafed: #1, #2, #3 yes, Size gun: 12.7MM
• 25. Number near bomb misses damaging ship: #1 (suicide crash without bomb release, #3 (2)
• 26. Planes shot down
• 26. (a) Those attacking own ship: 3 SURE (by own ship alone)
• 27. Best estimate of size of gun or guns responsible for each "Sure": 20MM and 40MM
• 28. Performance of ammunition: Good
• 29. What failures in material occurred in this action? None

U.S.S. SAUFLEY DESCRIPTION OF ACTION OF 29 NOVEMBER 1944.

During the morning and afternoon of November 29th, 1944, the USS SAUFLEY under orders issued by the Screen Commander of Task Group SEVENTY SEVEN POINT TWO had been patrolling the northern sector of the Baker - Charlie patrol. The patrol line was established to seaward through a point one mile bearing 120° true from point REB. Point REB lay midway between the southern tip of Homonhon Island and the northern tip of Dinagat Island on the eastern side of Leyte Gulf, P.I. The line was patrolled in a figure eight making all turns to seaward at a speed of eighteen knots. The ship was in Condition of Readiness I-E and Material Condition Able with two boilers on the main steam line and steam in reserve for twenty eight knots. Numerous reports of a threatening air attack had been received through-out the day. An anti- submarine search as well as an anti-aircraft long and short scale search were being conducted. The USS AULICK was patrolling the southern sector of the same patrol line and Task Group SEVENTY SEVEN POINT TWO was steaming in Leyte Gulf. Visibility was hampered by low strato cumulus clouds which opened showing alto cumulus and high cirrus moving from 250° true. Intermittent rain and a four knot wind from 250 true were accompanied by a calm sea with low swells from the southwest. Enemy forces encountered were two Japanese Vals and one Japanese Zero. No enemy surface forces were sighted.

At 1702(I) on November twenty ninth the SAUFLEY set Condition of Readiness I-E, after a "Flash White" had been put out on the Air Warning Circuit. The ship had been at General Quarters during a "Flash Red" in Leyte Gulf. The ship was headed on true course 217° true approaching the southern end of the assigned patrol. The air search radar screen was clear of all but friendly planes and was for the most part land-locked.

At 1752(I) it was reported that the USS AULICK was firing her AA battery, and subsequently the Commanding officer observed a plane approaching from the west through a break in the low hanging clouds. This plane, identified as Japanese, crossed to eastward as the ship turned with full right rudder and rapidly accelerated to flank speed. Battle stations were manned; rudder was put amidships. The plane circled left and commenced its run from the port bow apparently heading for the bridge. During this approach the ship was turned hard left in an effort to force the plane to cross ahead. This deception, in addition to the fact that the plane had been hit by the ships gunfire, resulted in the plane with bomb load intact crashing in flames close aboard to starboard at 1755(I). As this plane, identified as a Japanese Val, struck the water its bomb load exploded and the vibration of the crash and bomb concussion caused considerable damage to be inflicted to the ships structure, starboard side forward.

Both engines were stopped to prevent further damage to the hull in case of flooding. When the wreckage had drifted clear it was believed that the hull plating had not been too seriously damaged, and as a Japanese Zero was seen to commence a strafing run from the port quarter, flank speed and full right rudder were ordered. Good headway had been attained prior to 1756 (I) at which time the Zero, having been hit by the full force of the port machine gun battery, made C. steep left bank and crashed into the ships port side a few feet under the forward boat davit. Glancing off the side it burst into flames close aboard on the port bow.

About three minutes later another Val, observed approaching from 190° relative, was taken under fire by the after machine guns. The SAUFLEY was making flank speed and turning left to unmask all port machine guns. The plane banked left at the same time releasing its bombs, which flew between the stacks exploding on contact with the water close aboard to starboard. The resulting explosion covered the starboard weather decks with green water causing damage to personnel in that vicinity. The Val is believed to have been hit by ships gun fire, as following its left bank it leveled out, flew over the ship and caught fire as it crashed about fifty yards on the starboard bow.

The SAUFLEY'S attack was reported to the Commander Task Group SEVENTY SEVEN POINT TWO following the attack by the first Val. At approximately 1810 (I) it was reported that Task Group SEVENTY SEVEN POINT TWO was under heavy air attack. Subsequent to the attack by the third plane a burst of flame was observed coming from the forward superstructure of the USS AULICK. At 1830 the condition watch was set, speed reduced to 18.0 knots as the USS AULICK fell in astern having suffered considerable damage. The two ships steamed the patrol line under cover of a heavy rain cloud until the USS AULICK was relieved on station and the SAUFLEY resumed her normal patrol.

At no time could the five inch battery be brought to bear on any of the three targets. The time interval was such that tracking with the computer was out of the question. The fire control radar and optical range finder were put out of commission by the first explosion, the shock of which jarred the director to the extent of damaging the roller path. Gun number one was recoiled by the force of the explosion shearing off the housing bolts. The machine gun battery took the burden of all three attacks and performed in an excellent and most effective manner. Enemy aircraft gunnery was considered weak and ineffective as both bombs and machine guns missed their mark; there being no evidence of strafing damage to the ship or its personnel.

Battle damage upon examination revealed the following:

DAMAGE TO HULL AND EQUIPMENT

• 1. Frame #71 port life line stanchion missing.
• 2. Frames 55 to 58, port, life raft stanchions badly bent.
• 3. Forward leading davit brace, port side, sheared from deck.
• 4. Frame #72 to #74, port side, bulwark buckled and torn loose.
• 5. Hatch #1=20 and W.T. doors, /1-43-1, #1-43-2 and #1-44-1 sprung.
• 6. #43 40MM mount, splinter shield has eight feet of shield removed.
• 7. Six inch hole in port waterline strake of gig. Port fuel tank leaks in gig.

• 1. Two CPO head stools cracked.
• 2. Sprinkler valve #2-37 jammed.

• 1. #30 and #42 transverse W.T. bulkhead buckled on starboard side.
• 2. Deck buckled from frame #30 to #44 from shield plating to six feet inboard.
• 3. Four inch rupture in deck at frame #38, starboard three feet inboard from shell plating.
• 4. Frames #32 to #43 bent.
• 5. W.T. door 3-40-1 sprung.

• 1. Transverse W.T. bulkheads 30, 34, and 42 bulkhead on starboard side from shell plating to approximately four feet inboard. Transverse bulkhead #34 has eight inch horizontal rupture, five feet off deck, three feet inboard from starboard shell plating.
• 2. Hatch 14-36, hatch closing wheel broken beyond repair.
• 3. Probable damage to sprinkler systems in A-406M, A-407M, and A-408M.
• 4. Projectile rack stowage A-40718 and A-408M damaged.

• 1. Transverse frames /29 to 42 badly bent.
• 2. Frames 36. 38, 39, 40 broken loose from starboard side.

DAMAGE TO ORDNANCE EQUIPMENT

• 1. The force of the impact caused five inch gun number one to recoil over the 15.5 inches. The holding screw on the back of the housing was sheared off and all threads stripped; two holding screws on top of the housing were loosened.
• 2. Hydraulic and electric system of dredger type hoist in #1 magazine. All hydraulic leads and electric leads were broken when the entire unit was moved 4th off its base by the force of the explosion.
• 3. Dredger type hoist in #2 magazine was set off center by the force of the explosion.
• 4. The Gyro in the Stable element was stopped by the force of the explosion. Electric leads were not broken.
• 5. Force of explosion caused excess play in elevation of level linkage on 100 12 radar.
• 6. One 40MM barrel was damaged by debris.
• 7. Original 40MM open sight was damaged by debris.
• 8. The main battery director roller path upon inspection was revealed to have at least 4 rough spots. Shock is believed to have loosened or weakened the holding down bolts.

Damage to the enemy consisted of the complete destruction of three planes together with their crows. The Zero which crashed into the portside was strewn in small pieces from the forward 40MM mount to the Midships mount. Various parts of the pilots body were found on the port side of the superstructure together with his parachute pack and fragments of a life jacket.

Communications on every circuit were somewhat garbled by rain static although the report of the SAUFLEY'S attack was receipted for by Commander Task Group SEVENTY SEVEN POINT TWO whose report of being under air attack was distinctly heard.

The air search radar as previously stated was almost entirely land looked, partially due to its abnormally large side lobe. All radars were put out of commission by the shock of the first explosion. Operation on all three was resumed within ten minutes after the third attack. Ship handling played & large part in the deception of all three planes. Well timed hard turns and changes in speed contributed in large measure towards upsetting the plan of attack and timing of each pilot. Persistent machine gun crows and a baffling change of pace on the pert of the conn resulted in complete destruction of all three attacks.

In conclusion it might be stated that little if any warning was given of these attacks. Radar detection of enemy planes in this area was restricted by large bodies of land to the North and South. It was known, however, that enemy planes were in the area and the weather was definitely in their favor. The question arises as to whether or not the Japanese "Suicide Squadron" was involved in this encounter. If such was the case the attempts of crash diving the ship were complete failures. Two planes crashed in the water seemingly out of control either because they were forced to alter their tactics due to the ships maneuvers or because they had already been rendered inoperative by gunfire. The Zero which crashed into the portside was obviously making en attempt to veer away from the ship in 8. tight left turn.

Personnel casualties were light considering the weight and strength of the attack. One man was blown over the side by the explosion and twenty others sustained minor cuts and fractures. None of these required hospitalization. For the most part the performance of personnel was of a high standard both under fire and in handling subsequent damage.

USS SAUFLEY - Rep of AA Act in Surigao Straits, Phillipines on 11/22/44

9 December 1944

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith in accordance with reference (a).

REVISED FORM FOR REPORTING A.A. ACTION BY SURFACE SHIPS

• Location of ship (area): "Dog" Surigao, Philippines
• U.S.S. SAUFLEY (DD465)
• Zone Time: (-9)
• Date: November 22, 1944
• 1. Surprise attack: Yes, Day
• 2. Method picking plane up: Radar
• 3. Range plane was picked up: 5.5 miles
• 4. Total number of planes observed: One, Type: Kate
• 5. Number of planes attacking own ship: One, Type: Kate
• 6. Number of planes taken under fire by own ship: One
• 7. Speed and altitude of approach in knots and feet: 180 knots 2000 feet
• 8. Number of guns firing-by caliber: 5-5"/38, 3-40MM
• 9. Ammunition expended-by caliber: 16 5"/38 Mk 18, 40 - 40MM HET
• 11. Method of Control: Director, Method of spotting: Optical control, Method of ranging: Optics and Radar, Method of firing: Optical control
• 12. Approximate time-tracking to first shot: 1.5 minutes
• 14. Approximate time first shot to last shot: 1506-20, 1506-40
• 15. Approximate position angle open fire: 20
• 16. Approximate position angle cease fire: 10
• 17. Approximate bearing first shot: 010 Relative
• 18. Approximate bearing last shot: 060
• 19. Approximate range first shot: 2400 yds, Altitude of Plane: 2000 ft
• 20. Approximate minimum range aircraft approached: 2400 yds, Altitude: 2000 ft
• 21. Approximate range last shot: 3400 yds, Altitude of Plane: 2000 ft
• 28. Performance of ammunition: Good
• 29. What failures in material occurred in this action? None

USS SAUFLEY - Rep of Bombardments & Harassing Fire Missions Against Tinian Is During the Period 7/16-20/44, Marianas

26 July 1944

USS SAUFLEY - Report of Bombardments and Starshell Illumination of Tinian Island, Marianas - Period 7/27/44 to 8/5/44

10 August 1944

1. Subject report is forwarded herewith.

2. In compliance with references (c) and (a), this report has been forwarded direct to the following:

• The Commander Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet.
• The Commander Task Force FIFTY TWO.
• The Commander Task Force FIFTY SIX.

USS SAUFLEY NIGHT HARASSING FIRS MISSION ON TINIAN ISLAND, 27-28 JULY 1944.

On the afternoon of July 27, 1944 the USS SAUFLEY was standing by awaiting orders in the Transport area, Saipan Island. At 1523 on that date orders were received for the SAUFLEY to be in Fire Support Sector Three off Tinian Island at 1900 for a fire support mission. At 1849 the ship joined the USS PATTERSON in sector Three and went to General Quarters. Instructions to both the SAUFLEY and the PATTERSON had been received as follows in plain language:

FIRE MISSION TONIGHT SUNSET TO DAWN X ACTION ADEES ALTERNATE IN DELIVERY HARASSING FIRES FROM RANGE BAND BAKER IN SECTOR THREE ON FOLLOWING TARGETS 548-R, 560-L, 549-U, 536-H, 534-I X SAFETY LINE RUNS FROM 599-G to 569-F TO 574-H X FOX SUGAR NOT FIRING REMAIN ALERT FOR COUNTER BATTERY FIRE ON ENEMY BATTERY SOUTH OF SAFETY LINE X AMMO ALLOWANCE ONE FIFTY ABLE ABLE COMMON.

It was decided that the SAUFLEY would take station in column 1000 yards astern of the PATTERSON and that the two ships would make firing runs every two hours throughout the night until 0430. The non-firing ship would become counter battery fire ship when the other commenced firing. Shore based or airborne observation was not available.

The sea was calm and was accompanied by gentle Masterly breezes as this sector was to leeward of the island.

On the first run at 1936 two rounds were fired into target area 548-R. Successive runs were made at intervals until down of July 28 without incident except at 2145 when the SAUFLEY was ordered to deliver counter battery fire into target area 531-U. Forty Two rounds including one white phosphorous shell were expended in this area. At 0435 the last run was made on target area 531-U after which an ammunition report was made to Commander Task Force FIFTY TWO and the SAUFLEY reported to the Transport Screen Commander for duty.

There were no material failures. The entire allowance of one hundred fifty rounds of AA Common was expended on the harassing fire mission in addition to forty two rounds which were expended for counter battery fire. The effectiveness of the ship's gunfire is unknown.

No battle damage was sustained by this vessel. Damage to the enemy is unknown.

Communication by radio was not necessary as no observation was provided for the mission. The Sail George radar was used for navigation through out.

There were no casualties to personnel.

STATISTICAL RECORD OF FIRES, EIGHT OF JULY 27-28, 1944.

Time From	Time To	Target	Average Range	Caliber Firing	Rounds Allowed	Rounds Expended	Proj Fuze
1936	1938	548-R	11,150	5"/38	150 AAC	2 AAC	Mk 18
2003	2014	536-H	8,800	"	"	10 AAC	"
2026	2045	548-R	12,100	"	"	10 AAC	"
2048	2055	534-I	7,950	"	"	10 AAC	"
2100	2109	549-U	11,500	"	"	12 AAC	"
2145	2203	531-U	11,400	"	"	41 AAC	"
				"	"	& 1 WP	"
2248	2253	560-L	10,600	"	"	12 AAC	"
2258	2301	549-U	11,850	"	"	8 AAC	"
0022	0025	510-H	8,750	"	"	8 AAC	"
0028	0041	531-U	8,200	"	"	20 AAC	"
0217	0220	548-R	9,150	"	"	8 AAC	"
0223	0227	536-H	7,150	"	"	10 AAC	"
0231	0234	534-I	5,550	"	"	10 AAC	"
0417	0420	560-U	8,500	"	"	10 AAC	"
0423	0426	549-U	9,500	"	"	10 AAC	"
0435	0436	531-U	8,950	"	"	10 AAC	"

USS SAUFLEY NIGHT STARSHELL ILLUMINATION AND BOMBARDMENT OF TINIAN ISLAND, 30-31 JULY 1944.

Prior to the assigned mission the USS SAUFLEY had been fueling ship in the Transport area off Saipan Island. Orders were received from Commander Task Force FIFTY TWO to proceed to Fire Support Sector Five off Tinian Island, and to standby for fire mission as requested by Naval Gunfire Liaison Officers 21 and 22, together with Shore Fire Control Party 21.

The sea was calm and accompanied by the prevailing Easterly breeze. Visibility was good except during intermittent rain squalls on July 31.

At 1100 on July 30, the SAUFLEY commenced patrolling on various courses in Fire Support Sector Five awaiting instructions from the Fire Control Parties. At 1850 Navel Gunfire Liaison officer requested illumination in Target Area 540-U at the rate of four per hour with an elevation of 1500 to 2000 feet. Battle stations were manned at 1652 and after adjusting position the first starshell was fixed at 1947 from gun 44. At 1953 a firing rate of six stars per hour was requested. This was carried out throughout the night until 0540 on the morning of July 31, when the SAUFLEY was ordered by Shore Fire Control Party 21 to standby for a bombardment mission. This was reported together with an ammunition report to Commander Task Force FIFTY TWO. The ship was subsequently requested to lie to in grid position 025-99, and was given troop front line data for the purpose of maintaining fire in a safe area.

At 0655 Shore Fire Control Party 21 requested two gun salvos of AA Common with an elevation of 200 feet in Target Area 524-X, Battle stations were manned at 0658, but the ship was unable to commence firing due to a foul range caused by two larger ships firing in the save area. A change of position to clear this range would have resulted in firing from en angle such as to endanger our ORB front lines ashore. At 0811 the first salvo was fired into the assigned area. The smoke from a concentration of fire in approximately the same area prevented all observation. At 1824 the area was covered and three rapid fire full salvos were requested. At 0829 the target area was shifted and at 0838 the ship commenced firing into target area 524-N. One white phosphorous shell was requested on the last salvo which was fired at 0855. The SAUFLEY was then instructed to standby for B new target designation. At 1230 Commander Task Force FIFTY TWO ordered the USS CONY to relieve the SAUFLEY on this mission. At 1320 the CONT stood into the area and relieved the SAUFLEY on station. The condition II watch was set and the SAUFLEY proceeded to screening station 14 Able as ordered.

Ammunition was expended as listed in the following statistical record of fires.

Time From	Time To	Target	Average Range	Caliber Firing	Rounds Allowed	Rounds Expended	Proj Fuze
1947	0540	540-U	10,000	5"/38		61 Ill	Mk 18
0811	0825	524-X	9,175	"		23 AA C	"
0838	0855	524-N	8,600	"		11 AA C	"
						1& 1 WP

The effectiveness of the ships gunnery was not observed. There was no counter battery fire.

No damage was sustained by this vessel. Damage to the enemy is unknown.

Communications were good with the exception of the usual fading experienced on high frequencies during the early hours of the morning. Radar navigation was employed to obtain ships position and for putting control on the target.

There were no casualties to personnel.

RADIO LOG

• FREQ: 3800 KCS
• DATE: JULY 30, 1944

0230 SET WATCH ON 4165 KCS VOICE CIRCUIT. (COMPLETE LOG)

1850	VOXPOP V OBOE 21	ILLUMINATE (PJF)U AT ABOUT 2000 TO 1500 FEET ELEVATION AT 4 PER HOUR. POSITION 025-025
1852	WILCO V VOXPOP
1900	VOXPOP V OBOE 21	ILLUMINATION WILL BEGIN AT1930. WILL GIVE YOU CALL WHEN READY.
1902	ROGER V VOXPOP
1942	VOXPOP V OBOE 21	YOU MAY COMMENCE ILLUMINATION
1943	WILCO V VOXPOP
1945	OBOE 21 V VOXPOP	WILL YOU REQUIRE "SALVO" AND "SPLASH"
1945	VOXPOP V OBOE 21	AFFIRMATIVE
1947	OBOE 21 V VOXPOP	SALVO P SPLASH
1948	VOXPOP V OBOE 21	FUZE RANGE OUT 2010 RIGHT 200. LOWER ELEVATION 500 FEET.
1948	WILCO V VOXPOP
1953	VOXPOP V OBOE 21	GIVE ME A SALVO NOW AND WE WILL ADJUST AND COULD YOU FIRE SIX PER HOUR.
1953	WILCO V VOXPOP
1953	SALVO V VOXPOP
1955	SPLASH
1959	VOXPOP V OBOE 21	NO CHANGE, NO CHANGE - LOWER BURST 500 FEET AND FIRE ME ANOTHER SALVO NOW
1959	WILCO V VOXPOP
2000	OBOE 21 V VOXPOP	WE HAVE TO KEEP UNDERWAY NOW BECAUSE OF LACK OF SCREENING VESSELS. WE ARE ADJUSTING OUR POSITION AND WILL GIVE YOU A SALVO IN ONE MINUTE.
2000	ROGER V OBOE 21
2008	OBOE 21 V VOXPOP	SALVO - SPLASH
2009	VOXPOP V OBOE 21	NO CHANGE - RIGHT 500 - LOWER BURST 800 FEET. GIVE ME ANOTHER ONE.
2011	VOXPOP V OBOE 23	WE ARE STANDING BY ON THIS FREQUENCY CASE OF EMERGENCY. WILL YOU ADVISE BUCKEYE OF THIS FACT.
2011	WILCO V VOXPOP
2013	OBOE 21 V VOXPOP	SALVO - SPLASH
2013	VOXPOP V OBOE 21	ILLUMINATION SATISFACTORY - CONTINUE IT AT RATE OF six PER HOUR. WE WILL NOT SPOT AFTER EACH SALVO, IF ANY CHANGE IS NEEDED WE WILL BREAK IN AND GIVE IT.
2013	ROGER V VOXPOP
2014	VOXPOP V OBOE 21	YOUR FIRST SALVOS WERE RIGHT IN THERE BUT I DECIDED TO MOVE IT OVER A LITTLE
2014	ROGER V VOXPOP
2021	OBOE 21 V VOXPOP	SALVO - SPLASH
2021	VOXPOP V OBOE 21	NO CHANGE, NO CHANGE.
2030	OBOE 21 V VOXPOP	SALVO - FLASH
2032	VOXPOP V OBOE 21	IN 500, LEFT 300, RAISE BURST 400
2032	WILCO V VOXPOP
2045	VOXPOP V CHARLIE 23	COME IN PLEASE.
2045	CHARLIE 23 V VOXPOP	OVER
2045	VOXPOP V CHARLIE 23	IS OBOE 21 ON THIS CIRCUIT.
2046	CHARLIE 23 V VOXPOP	AFFIRMATIVE OVER.
2047	VOXPOP V CHARLIE 23	WE ARE SECURING OUR SET, BUT WE CAN BE REACHED THROUGH CHARLIE 21 IN CASE OF EMERGENCY - RELAY TO OBOE 21
2048	ROGER V VOXPOP
2049	OBOE 21 V VOXPOP	CHARLIE 23 IS SECURING HIS SET, BUT CAN BE REACHED THROUGH CHARLIE 21 IN CASE OF EMERGENCY
2049	ROGER V OBOE 21
2139	OBOE 21 V VOXPOP	SALVO - FLASH
2139	VOXPOP V OBOE 21	NO CHANGE, LEFT 200

JULY 31, 1944

0205	VOXPOP V OBOE 21	LOWER BURSTS 300 FEET. RIGHT 300 FEET.
0230	VOXPOP V OBOE 21	LOWER BURST 500 FEET, CUT RANGE SPOT 500 FEET.
0235	VOXPOP V OBOE 21	WERE YOU FIRING INTO OUR AREA.
0235	NEGATIVE V VOXPOP	WE APPLIED YOUR LAST SPOT. WE WILL GIVE YOU ANOTHER STAR IN A MOMENT AND YOU CAN CHECK ON FIRE.
0235	ROGER V OBOE 21
0239	OBOE 21 V VOXPOP	OUR RANGE IS FOULED BY ANOTHER SHIP. WE WILL HAVE TO WAIT A MOMENT.
0239	ROGER V OBOE 21
0246	VOXPOP V OBOE 21	NO CHANGE - OUT 300
0247	OBOE 21 V VOXPOP	WE DID NOT FIRE THAT STAR. IT WAS SOMEONE ELSE'S FIRE.
0247	ROGER V OBOE 21
0251	VOXPOP V OBOE 21	NO CHANGE - LOWER THE BURST 500 FEET
0254	OBOE 21 V VOXPOP	SALVO -FLASH
0258	VOXPOP V OBOE 21	RANGE IN 200
0315		TROUBLE WITH TRANSMISSIONS WITH OBOE21
0338	VOXPOP V OBOE 21	NO CHANGE, LEFT 200
0349	VOXPOP V OBOE 21	LOWER BURSTS 300. NO CHANGE, LEFT 200
0408	VOXPOP V OBOE 21	CUT 300, RIGHT 200
0416	VOXPOP V OBOE 21	PERFECT
0426	VOXPOP V OBOE 21	RAISE 300 FEET OUT 200 FEET
0439	VOXPOP V OBOE 21	OUT 400 FEET, NO CHANGE. NO CHANGE
0540	VOXPOP V OBOE 21	YOU MAY CEASE ILLUMINATION NOW
0540	OBOE 21 V VOXPOP	ROGER
0543	VOXPOP V OBOE 21	PLEASE STANDBY ON THIS CIRCUIT BECAUSE NO DOUBT THIS MORNING WE WILL HAVE A FIRING MISSION FOR YOU.
0543	OBOE 21 V VOXPOP	WILCO
0555	VOXPOP V OBOE 21	CAN YOU TAKE POSITION 025-99 AND LIE TO? WE WILL GIVE YOU AREA AND FRONT LINES SHORTLY.
0556	ROGER V VOXPOP
0600	VOXPOP V OBOE 21	OUR POSITION IS AS FOLLOWS 540 1HA TO 539 C TO F AND THEN TO 530 A
0600	ROGER V VOXPOP
0605	VOXPOP V OBOE 21	IT IS VERY IMPORTANT TO CHART THESE POSITIONS AND KEEP IN MIND FOR FIRING TO PREVENT FIRING IN OR OVER OUR OWN POSITIONS AND TO KEEP SHELLS FROM RICOCHETING IN THEM.
0605	OBOE 21 V VOXPOP	WE KEEP A CONTINUAL PLOT OF FRONT LINES.
0606	VOXPOP V OBOE 21	ROGER
0655	VOXPOP V CHARLIE 21	I HAVE A TARGET FOR YOU. 524X, ELEVATION 200 FEET -RIDGE- 2 GUN SALVOS COMMENCE FIRING.
0655	ROGER V VOXPOP	IT WILL BE A FEW MINUTES BEFORE WE CAN START FIRING.
0656	ROGER V CHARLIE 21	LET US KNOW WHEN YOU CAN START.
0702	CHARLIE 21 V VOXPOP	WE ARE MOVING INTO POSITION. WE HAVE TO KEEP CLEAR OF KILLERS.
0702	ROGER V CHARLIE 21
0715	CHARLIE 21 V VOXPOP	DO NOT FIRE UNTIL I GIVE YOU THE WORD.
0715	ROGER V VOXPOP
0715	VOXPOP V OBOE 21	CAN YOU MOVE INTO POSITION NOW AND BE CLEAR OF KILLER'S FIRE. IF YOU WOULD GO FARTHER OUT AND STILL BE IN POSITION WOULD YOU BE CLEAR OF BIG BOYS.
0747	NEGATIVE FROM VOXPOP
0748	VOXPOP V OBOE 21	WE WILL START SHOOTING SHORTLY NOW, A LOT OF SHOTS IN A SHORT TIME.
0748	ROGER V VOXPOP
0752	OBOE 21 V VOXPOP	WE HAVE TO MAINTAIN APPROXIMATE BEARING THAT WE ARE NOW OR TO BE SURE THAT OUR SHELLS DO NOT FALL INTO OUR OWN LINES. TWO OF THE BIG BOYS ARE FOULING OUR BEARING AND WE WILL LET YOU KNOW WHEN WE ARE CLEAR.
0753	ROGER V OBOE 21
0804	VOXPOP V CHARLIE 21	COMMENCE FIRING WHEN IN POSITION. TARGET 524X. ALTITUDE 200 FEET.
0805	ROGER V VOXPOP
0811	CHARLIE 21 V VOXPOP	WE WILL BE READY TO FIRE IN TWO MINUTES.
0811	ROGER V CHARLIE 21
0812	VOXPOP V CHARLIE 21	DOWN 300 N.C.
0812	CHARLIE 21 V VOXPOP	NOT OUR SALVOS AS OURS LANDED IN THE WATER.
0818	CHARLIE 21 V OBOE 21	VOXPOP GAVE YOU A SPLASH AS YOU FINISHED TRANSMITTING - WHY DON'T YOU GIVE HIM A NO CHANGE, NO CHANGE AND TAKE IT FROM THERE.
0819	ROGER V CHARLIE 21
0819	SALVO-SPLASH V VOXPOP	NO CHANGE, NO CHANCE V CHARLIE 21
0822	SALVO - SPLASH V VOXPOP	UP 500 LEFT 200 V CHARLIE 21
0824	SALVO - SPLASH V VOXPOP	NO CHANGE, NO CHANGE, RAPID FIRE THREE FULL SALVOS V CHARLIE21
0826	VOXPOP V CHARLIE 21	CEASE FIRE STAND BY FOR NEW TARGET.
0826	WILCO V VOXPOP
0827	VOXPOP V CHARLIE 21	NEW TARGET 524N - ELEVATION 200
0827	ROGER V VOXPOP
0828	VOXPOP V CHARLIE 21	YOUR FIRE IS SAFE BUT IF YOU CAN SEE SHIP THAT PUT SALVO IN WATER ABOUT 540R OR N, TELL HIM TO KNOCK IT OFF.
0829	CHARLIE V VOXPOP	WE BELIEVE SPLASH YOU SAW CAME FROM 0 OTHER SIDE OF THE ISLAND.
	ROGER V CHARLIE 21
0830	VOXPOP V CHARLIE	YOU HAVE OTHER MEANS OF WARNING BUCKEYE - WILL YOU DO S0 IMMEDIATELY.
	WILCO V VOXPOP
0833	CHARLIE 21 V VOXPOP	BUCKEYE HAS YOUR MESSAGE
	ROGER V CHARLIE 21
	CHARLIE 21 V VOXPOP	WE ARE DOWN A LITTLE TOO FAR NOW. AND WE ARE MOVING BACK INTO OUR SAFETY LANE.
	ROGER V CHARLIE 21
0836	VOXPOP V CHARLIE 21	COMMENCE FIRING WHEN READY.
	WILCO v VOXPOP
0837	VOXPOP V CHARLIE 21	WHAT IS THE DELAY?
0837	SALVO - SPLASH V VOXPOP	UP 200 LEFT 200 V CHARLIE 21
0839	SALVO - SPLASH V VOXPOP	CEASE FIRE - CEASE FIRE V CHARLIE 21
	WILCO V VOXPOP
0842	VOXPOP V CHARLIE 21	RESUME FIRE - 524N WAS TARGET. BELIEVE YOU'VE TAKEN IT OFF COMPUTER SO SET IT UP AGAIN.
	WILCO V VOXPOP
0846	SALVO - SPLASH V VOXPOP	UP 330 LEFT 300 V CHARLIE 21
0849	SALVO - SPLASH V VOXPOP
	UP 500 NO CHANGE V CHARLIE 21
0851	SALVO SPLASH V VOXPOP
	UP 500 - NO CHANGE - WE CAN OBSERVE SPLASH V CHARLIE 21
0853	SALVO - SPLASH V VOXPOP
	UP 700 - NO CHANGE - FIRE ON W.P. V CHARLIE 21
0855	VOXPOP V CHARLIE	CEASE FIRE AND STANDBY
	WILCO V VOXPOP
0856	VOXPOP V OBOE 21	PLEASE GIVE ME COORDINATES OF PRESENT POSITION AND PLEASE BE READY TO ADVISE ME ON SHORT NOTICE IF YOU CHANGE ANY.
	ROGER V VOXPOP
	OBOE 21 V VOXPOP	OUR COORDINATE POSITION IS 075-985
	ROGER V OBOE 21
1131	VOXPOP V OBOE 21	RADIO CHECK - HOW DO YOU HEAR ME?
	OBOE 21 V VOXPOP	5X5 - HOW DO YOU HEAR ME?
	VOXPOP V OBOE 21	HEAR YOU 5x5 - OUT.
1211	VOXPOP V OBOE 21	WILL BE OFF THE AIR FOR ABOUT 15 MINUTES
	ROGER V VOXPOP

USS SAUFLEY NIGHT STARSHELL ILLUMINATION OF TINIAN ISLAND, 4-5 AUGUST 1944

Prior to this mission the USS SAUFLEY had been patrolling on screening station #5 until relieved by the USS WADLEIGH at 1837 on August 4th. At this time orders were received from Commander Task Force FIFTY TWO for the SAUFLEY to take station in Fire Support Sector #3, southwest of Tinian Town and to await target assignment from Naval Gunfire Liaison officer #81.

The sea was calm and was accompanied by variable winds. Visibility varied with intermittent rain squalls throughout the night and the following morning.

Battle stations were manned at 1925, after communications had been established with Naval Gunfire Liaison Officers #81, #82, and #83. Oboe #82 implied that he would not require fire support unless a counter attack developed. At 1941 a modified condition I watch was set and this ship stood by patrolling the area on various courses at reduced speeds. At 2040 instructions were received from Oboe #81 to commence illuminating Target Area 512-F. The first starshell was fired at 2048. A firing rate of six starshells per hour was maintained until 2147, when Oboe 183 requested illumination. He was informed that the amount of starshells on board would not permit illuminating two targets at the rate of six per hour for each. At 2200 it was agreed that each target would be alternately Illuminated at a rate of four starshells per hour. Oboe #83 assigned Target Area 525-P, and illumination was commenced at 2202. Spots were applied after each salvo by the observers until satisfactory illumination was being provided in both areas. At 0543 Oboe 83 requested the SAUFLEY to cease illumination, and reported that it had been very good throughout the night. Permission to cease illuminating for Oboe #81 was requested, and subsequently granted at 0545. An ammunition report was then sent to Commander Task Force FIFTY THO. The SAUFLEY continued patrolling in Fire Support Sector #3 until ordered to proceed to the Transport Area off Saipan.

Ammunition was expended as listed in the following statistical record of fires:

Time From	Time To	Target	Average Range	Caliber Firing	Rounds Allowed	Rounds Expended	Proj Fuze
2048	2202	512-F	6,650	5"/38		13 Ill	Mk 18
2202	0540	512-F	7,100	5"/38		30 Ill	"
2202	0540	525-F	8,000	5"/38		30 Ill	"

The illumination was considered by the observers to be good. There were no material failures. There was no counter battery fire.

No damage was sustained by this vessel.

Communications were hampered intermittently by rain static in addition to the usual early morning fading experienced with frequencies OR the 3000 Kilocycle band.

Radar navigation USS employed to determine own ship's position and to coach gun control on the target area.

There were no casualties to personnel.

RADIO LOG

• FREQ: 3800 KCS
• DATE: AUGUST 4, 1944

1853	VOXPOP V NLO 81	RADIO CHECK - HOW DO YOU HEAR ME?
	NLO 81 V VOXPOP	HEAR YOU 5X5 - HOW DO YOU HEAR ME?
	VOXPOP V NLO 81	HEAR YOU THE SAME - OUT.
1855	VOXPOP V NLO 81	HAVE YOU BEEN ASSIGNED TO US BY BUCKEYE?
	NLO 81 V VOXPOP	AFFIRMATIVE
	VOXPOP V NLO 81	PLEASE STANDBY IN AREA #3 AND WE WILL TELL YOU WHEN TO ILLUMINATE THE TARGET AREA.
	ROGER V VOXPOP
1913	VOXPOP V OBOE 82	WE PROBABLY WILL NOT NEED YOU FOR ILLUMINATION EXCEPT FOR EMERGENCY
	ROGER V VOXPOP
1915	VOXPOP V OBOE 83	WE ARE CHECKING INTO THE NET, WE PROBABLY WONT NEED YOU FOR A WHILE BUT WILL GIVE YOU RADIO CHECK.
	ROGER V VOXPOP
1932	VOXPOP V OBOE 250	WILL YOU CALL CHARLIE 253 FOR ME YOU SEE WE ARE ON ONE ISLAND AND HE IS ON THE OTHER AND WE CAN'T GET THROUGH THIS HEAVY "CW" THANK YOU FOR TRYING IF HE SHOULD CALL YOU - WILL YOU LET US KNOW?
	WILCO V VOXPOP
1937	VOXPOP V OBOE 81	TARGET IS 512 "F"
	ROGER V VOXPOP
	SALVO - SPLASH V VOXPOP
1942	VOXPOP V OBOE 81	CHECK FIRE - OUR TROOPS ARE MOVING IN THAT SECTOR AND WE DO NOT WISH TO ILLUMINATE THEM STANDBY FOR 30 TO 40 MINUTES AND WE WILL GIVE YOU THE WORD TO FIRE WHEN IT IS CLEAR.
	ROGER V VOXPOP
1950	VOXPOP V NLO 83	HOW DO YOU HEAR ME
	NLO 83 V VOXPOP	HEAR YOU 5X5 - HOW DO YOU HEAR ME?
	VOXPOP V NLO 83	HEAR YOU 5X5 - THANK YOU AND OUT.
	VOXPOP V OBOE 253	IS YOUR OBOE IN CONTACT WITH MERCURY BY WIRE.
	OBOE 253 V VOXPOP	WAIT
	OBOE 82 V VOXPOP	ARE YOU IN CONTACT WITH MERCURY BY WIRE.
	VOXPOP V OBOE 81	NEGATIVE
	OBOE 253 V VOXPOP	YOUR LAST TRANSMISSION - NEGATIVE
	VOXPOP V OBOE 253	ROGER - SUGGEST HE CALL SHANTUNG
	ROGER V VOXPOP
	OBOE 81 V VOXPOP	IF YOU ARE NOT IN TOUCH WITH MERCURY BY WIRE OBOE 253 SUGGESTS YOU CALL SHANTUNG
	ROGER V OBOE 81
2040	VOXPOP V OBOE 81	ARE YOU READY TO COMMENCE ILLUMINATION
	AFFIRMATIVE V VOXPOP
	VOXPOP V OBOE 81	TARGET 51.2F -COMMENCE ILLUMINATION
	WILCO V VOXPOP
2045	SALVO - FLASH V VOXPOP
	VOXPOP V OBOE 81	CHECK YOUR SET UP. THAT WAS A DUD THAT LANDED 1000 YARDS BEHIND US.
	WILCO V VOXPOP
2052	SALVO FLASH V VOXPOP
	UP 1000 - NO CHANGE
2054	SALVO FLASH V VOXPOP
	NO CHANGE - LEFT 600 V OBOE 81
2056	SALVO FLASH V VOXPOP
	UP 500 NO CHANGE V OBOE 81
2059	SALVO FLASH V VOXPOP
	NO CHANGE - RIGHT 500 V OBOE 81
	WHAT IS YOUR POSITION BY COORDINATE
2059	THIS IS VOXPOP	OUR POSITION IS 993-990
2059	ROGER V OBOE 81
2113	OBOE 81 V VOXPOP	CORRECT ION ON POSIT REPORT 930-910 IS OUR CORRECT POSIT.
2114	ROGER V OBOE 81
2120	VOXPOP V OBOE 80	COME IN
2120	OBOE 80 V VOXPOP	GO AHEAD
2120	VOXPOP V OBOE 80	HOW MANY STARS HAVE YOU ON HAND.
2121	OBOE 80 V VOXPOP	WE HAVE SHACKLE CKI UNSHACKLE STARS ON HAND.
2125	SALVO - FLASH V VOXPOP
2125	VOXPOP V OBOE 81	NO CHANGE, NO CHANGE, FIRE DEN MORE SALVO AND WE'RE READY.
2126	SALVO - FLASH V VOXPOP
2126	VOXPOP V OBOE 81	STANDBY FOR A SPOT.
2128	VOXPOP V OBOE 81	NO CHANGE NO CHANGE, COMMENCE FIRING AT REGULAR RATE.
2137	SALVO V VOXPOP
2138	OBOE 81 V VOXPOP	WE THINK THAT WAS A DUD. THERE ARE CLOUDS OUT THERE AND WE COULDN'T SEE IT.
2138	VOXPOP V OBOE 81	WE WERE JUST GOING TO CALL YOU. THERE WAS NO FLASH. GIVE ME ANOTHER SALVO.
2138	WILCO V VOXPOP
2138	SALVO - FLASH V VOXPOP
2139	UP 200 RIGHT 200 V OBOE 81
2142	SALVO P FLASH V VOXPOP
2142	VOXPOP V OBOE 83	CAN YOU ILLUMINATE FOR 2 OF US.
2143	NEGATIVE V VOXPOP, UNLESS YOU CAN INCREASE OUR ALLOWANCE OF STARS.
2143	VOXPOP V CHARLIE 83	UNDERSTAND YOU HAVE 700 STARS.
2143	NEGATIVE V VOXPOP	LESS THAN 200
2144	VOXPOP V OBOE 81	YOUR SHACKLE IS WRONG.
2144	OBOE 81 V VOXPOP	YOUR SHACKLE IS WRONG.
2145	VOXPOP V OBOE 81	OUR SHACKLE IS WRONG.
2156	OBOE 81 V VOXPOP	WE'LL ILLUMINATE FOR BOTH OF YOU AT 4 EACH PER HOUR.
2200	VOXPOP V CHARLIE 83	ROGER - STANDBY FOR ILLUMINATION TARGET.
2201	ROGER V VOXPOP
2204	VOXPOP V CHARLIE 83	TARGET IS 525 P
2204	ROGER V VOXPOP.
2206	SALVO - FLASH V VOXPOP
2206	NO CHANGE - NO CHANGE V CHARLIE 83
2207	SALVO V VOXPOP
2207	UP 600 NO CHANGE V CHARLIE 83
2208	CHARLIE 83 V VOXPOP	DO YOU MEAN OUT 500 OR RAISE BURST 500
2209	OUT 500 NO CHANGE V CHARLIE 83
2209	ROGER V VOXPOP
2215	OBOE 81 V VOXPOP	SALVO - FLASH
	NO CHANGE - NO CHANGE V OBOE 81
	VOXPOP V OBOE 81	BELAY LAST SPOT - SPOT UP 400 NO CHANGE
2220	WILCO V VOXPOP
2222	SALVO - FLASH V VOXPOP
	VOXPOP V OBOE 83	THAT WAS FOR US I PRESUME
2223	NEGATIVE - FOR OBOE 81
	ROGER V OBOE 83
2224	OBOE 81 V VOXPOP	WAS THERE ANY SPOT ON THAT ONE ?
	WAIT V OBOE 81
	VOXPOP V 080E 81	UP 200 NO CHANGE
2225	WILCO V VOXPOP
2228	SALVO TO OBOE 83 FLASH V VOXPOP
2229	VOXPOP V OBOE 83	OUT 800 RIGHT 300 IS THAT CORRECT?
2234	SALVO TO OBOE 81 FLASH V VOXPOP
	VOXPOP V OBOE 81	SPOT FOR NEXT SALVO
2238	UP 400 - NO CHANGE
2243	SALVO TO OBOE 83 V VOXPOP - FLASH
2246	VOXPOP V OBOE 83	OUT 300 NO CHANGE
	WILCO V VOXPOP
2249	SALVO TO OBOE 81 FLASH V VOXPOP
2254	VOXPOP V OBOE 81	SPOT FOR MY NEXT SALVO - UP 200 NO CHANGE
	WILCO V VOXPOP
2256	SALVO TO OBOE 83 SPLASH V VOXPOP
2258	VOXPOP V CHARLIE 83	OUT 100 - NO CHANGE
2303	SALVO TO OBOE 81 SPLASH V VOXPOP
	OBOE 81 V VOXPOP	WHAT IS WIND DIRECTION AND FORCE WHERE YOU ARE? WE HAVE BEEN SPOTTED OUT AND OUT AND NOW FIND OUR WIND CORRECTION INACCURATE
	VOXPOP V OBOE 81	MODERATELY STRONG TO EAST - CANNOT GIVE GOOD ESTIMATE SOMETIMES WIND IS STRONG AND OTHER TIMES IT IS CALM. EVERYTHING IS O.K. NOW, AND SPOT IS NO CHANGE - NO CHANGE WIND IS TO WEST.
2309	VOXPOP V OBOE 83	DO YOU WANT WINDAGE FROM US OR WILL YOU CORRECT FOR IT?
	OBOE 83 V VOXPOP	WE WILL IF YOU'LL SPOT AS YOU WANT THEM
	ROGER V OBOE 83
2312	SALVO TO OBOE 83 FLASH V VOXPOP
	VOXPOP V OBOE 83	NO CHANGE - NO CHANGE
	OBOE 83 V VOXPOP	WILCO
2317	SALVO V VOXPOP SPLASH TO OBOE 81 V VOXPOP
2318	NO CHANGE - NO CHANGE V OBOE 81
2323	SALVO TO OBOE 83 FLASH V VOXPOP
2324	VOXPOP v OBOE 83	NO CHANGE - NO CHANGE
	WILCO V VOXPOP
2330	SALVO TO OBOE 81 FLASH V VOXPOP
2332	VOXPOP V OBOE 81	NO CHANGE - NO CHANGE FOR NEXT SALVO
	WILCO V VOXPOP
2340	SALVO TO OBOE 83 FLASH V VOXPOP
	VOXPOP V OBOE 83	NO CHANGE - RIGHT 100
2345	SALVO TO OBOE 81 FLASH V VOXPOP
2345	NO CHANGE - NO CHANGE V OBOE 81
2346	WILCO V VOXPOP
2354	SALVO TO OBOE 83 FLASH V VOXPOP
2356	LOWER BURST 50
2404	SALVO TO OBOE 81 FLASH V VOXPOP
2404	NO CHANGE - V OBOE 81
2418	SALVO TO OBOE 83 FLASH V VOXPOP
2418	NO CHANGE - NO CHANGE - LOWER BURST 100 FEET V OBOE 83
2424	SALVO TO OBOE 81 FLASH V VOXPOP
	NO CHANGE - RIGHT 400
2433	SALVO TO OBOE 83 FLASH V VOXPOP
	OUT 400 RIGHT 300 V OBOE 83
2441	SALVO TO OBOE 81 FLASH V VOXPOP
	NO CHANGE - RIGHT 100
2449	SALVO TO 080E 83 FLASH V VOXPOP
	NO CHANGE - NO CHANGE
0100	SALVO TO OBOE 81 FLASH V VOXPOP
	NO CHANGE - NO CHANGE
0107	SALVO TO OBOE 83 FLASH V VOXPOP
	NO CHANGE - RIGHT 100
0114	SALVO TO OBOE 81 FLASH V VOXPOP
	NO CHANGE - NO CHANGE
0122	SALVO TO OBOE 83 FLASH V VOXPOP
	NO CHANGE - NO CHANGE
0130	SALVO TO OBOE 81 FLASH V VOXPOP
	NO CHANGE - NO CHANGE
0140	SALVO TO OBOE 83 FLASH V VOXPOP
	NO CHANGE - RIGHT 200
0149	SALVO TO OBOE 81 FLASH V VOXPOP
	NO CHANGE - NO CHANGE
0159	SALVO TO 080E 83 FLASH V VOXPOP
	NO CHANGE - NO CHANGE
0209	SALVO TO OBOE 81 FLASH V VOXPOP
	NO CHANGE - NO CHANGE
0214	SALVO TO 080E 83 FLASH V VOXPOP
	NO CHANGE - NO CHANGE
0225	SALVO TO OBOE 81 FLASH V VOXPOP
	NO CHANGE - NO CHANGE
0233	SALVO TO OBOE 83 FLASH V VOXPOP
	(NO OBSERVATION-NO IN COMMUNICATION WITH OBOE 83)
0243	SALVO TO OBOE 81 FLASH V VOXPOP
	NO CHANGE - NO CHANGE
0251	SALVO TO OBOE 83
	NO CHANGE - NO CHANGE IN COMMUNICATION WITH OBOE 83) (R5-S2)
0255	SALVO TO OBOE 81 FLASH V VOXPOP
	NO CHANGE - NO CHANGE
0301	SALVO TO OBOE 83 FLASH V VOXPOP
	NO CHANGE - NO CHANGE
0306	SALVO TO OBOE 81 FLASH V VOXPOP
	NO CHANGE - NO CHANGE
0316	SALVO TO OBOE 83 FLASH V VOXPOP
	NO CHANGE - NO CHANGE
0325	SALVO TO OBOE 81 FLASH V VOXPOP
	NO CHANGE - NO CHANGE
0329	SALVO TO OBOE 83 FLASH V VOXPOP
	NO CHANGE - NO CHANGE
0337	SALVO TO OBOE 81 FLASH V VOXPOP
	NO CHANGE - NO CHANGE
0345	SALVO TO OBOE 83 FLASH V VOXPOP
	NO CHANCE - NO CHANGE
0354	SALVO TO OBOE 81 FLASH V VOXPOP
	NO CHANGE - NO CHANGE
0359	SALVO TO OBOE 83 FLASH V VOXPOP
	NO CHANGE - RIGHT 300
0407	SALVO TO OBOE 81 FLASH V VOXPOP
	NO CHANGE - NO CHANGE
0418	SALVO TO OBOE 83 FLASH V VOXPOP
	NO CHANGE - NO CHANGE
0422	SALVO TO OBOE 81 FLASH V VOXPOP
	NO CHANGE - LEFT 500
0428	SALVO TO OBOE 83 FLASH V VOXPOP
	NO CHANGE - NO CHANGE
0437	SALVO TO OBOE 81 FLASH V VOXPOP
	NO CHANGE - NO CHANGE
0446	SALVO TO OBOE 83 FLASH V VOXPOP
	NO CHANGE - NO CHANGE
0453	SALVO TO OBOE 81 FLASH V VOXPOP
	NO CHANGE - NO CHANGE
0459	SALVO TO OBOE 83 FLASH V VOXPOP
	NO CHANGE - NO CHANGE
0507	SALVO TO OBOE 81 FLASH V VOXPOP
	NO CHANGE - NO CHANGE
0516	SALVO TO OBOE 83 FLASH V VOXPOP
	NO CHANGE - NO CHANGE
0523	SALVO TO OBOE 81 FLASH V VOXPOP
	NO CHANGE LEFT 100
0529	SALVO TO OBOE 83 FLASH V VOXPOP
	NO CHANGE - NO CHANGE
0536	SALVO TO OBOE 81 FLASH V VOXPOP
	NO CHANGE - LEFT 100
0543	SALVO TO OBOE 83 FLASH V VOXPOP
0543	VOXPOP V OBOE 83	CEASE ILLUMINATION ILLUMINATION - ILLUMINATION WAS VERY VERY GOOD ALL NIGHT LONG
0543	ROGER V VOXPOP
0545	OBOE 81 V VOXPOP	DO YOU REQUIRE ANY MORE ILLUMINATION?
	VOXPOP V OBOE 81	CEASE ILLUMINATION
	OBOE 81 - OBOE 83 V VOXPOP	THANK YOU FOR YOUR FINE COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE AND YOUR PATIENCE DURING OUR IRREGULAR FIRING DUE TO THE RAIN SQUALL.

USS SAUFLEY - Report of Operations, Period 6/11/44 to 7/9/44-Invasion of Saipan Island, Marianas

11 July 1944

1. Subject report is forwarded herewith.

2. A copy of subject report has been forwarded to the Commander Task Force FIFTY SIX in compliance with reference (c).

ENCLOSURE (A)

1. AS 0600 Victor William, 2 June 1944, this ship made sortie from Pearl Harbor, T.H., as part of Task Group FIFTY ONE POINT EIGHTEEN (Rear Admiral W.H.P. BLANDY, officer in Tactical Command), and set course for Kwajalein Atoll, Marshall Islands in accordance with Operation Order A258-44. This group arrived at Kwajalein Atoll on 9 June 1944, sad after fulfilling logistic requirements got underway on 11 June 1944, and net course for Saipan, Marianas Islands.

2. On 11 June 1944, at 1915 Love while on course 260 (T), and in station 5.5075 of a six ship screen this ship made sound contact bearing 285 (T), distance 1,000 yards, position, Latitude 08-59-30 North, Longitude 167-12-00 East. (USS SAUFLEY, ASH-1, dated 11 June 1944). At 2,320 this ship was relieved at the scene of contact by the USS FRANKS, and proceeded to rejoin Task Group FIFTY ONE POINT EIGHTEEN.

3. The convey arrived at Saipan on 16 June 1944, and at 0600 Ling, 17 June 1944, the UBS SAUFLEY, USS WALLER, and USS PRINGLE complied with orders to report to Commander Task Group FIFTY TWO POINT SEVENTEEN in USS LOUISVILLE (Rear Admiral J.B. OLDENDORF) for shore fire support missions.

4. The first fire support mission assigned the SAUFLEY was the bombardment of Aslito Airfield. This vessel proceeded to Fife Support Sector 16, and at 0825 commenced bombardment, employing slow harassing fire as directed. Bombardment was conducted at a mean range of about 6,500 yards. When directed by Shore Fire Control Party at 0849 ceased firing on airfield. Area was reported effectively covered. One hundred-three rounds of AA Common ammunition and one WP projectile were expended on this mission.

5. At 1757, on the same day while this vessel was patrolling in Fire Support Sector 26, all ships were called to General Quarters to repel air attacks. At 1907 the SAUFLEY took two Tonys under fire with her 40MM batteries. (USS SAUFLEY AA Action Report dated 17 June 1944).

6. On 18 June 1944, at 0120 commenced illumination of ares 140 Able with starshells, having been directed to do so by Shore Fire Control Party. Illumination was maintained to harass the enemy throughout the night, firing starshells at irregular intervals over the designated ares from a mesa range of about 7,500 yards. Total expenditure of ammunition was 22 rounds of starshells.

7. At 1757 on 18 June 1944, while patrolling in Fire Support Sector 16, the SAUFLEY went to General Quarters to repel air attacks. Three Japanese Tonys were taken under fire at 1618 by the 5 inch and 40mm batteries (USS SAUFLEY AA Action Report, dated 18 June 1944). During this action two pilots were seen to descend in parachutes over Magicienne Bay and to land in the water. One landed south of Nafutan Point and the other about half way between Saipan and Tinian. An attempt was made to recover the latter pilot who was identified to be Japanese. As there were still bogies on the radar screen it was not thought advisable so stop the ship and make a determined effort to recover the Jap pilot. Due to this fact, the darkness, and his unwillingness to cooperate, the Jay was not recovered.

8. Area 131 Dog was assigned to this ship for illumination during the night of June 18, 1944, and at 2251 commenced firing starshells over designated area. The same procedure was used as on the previous night. A moss range of 8,500 yards was used. Starshell expenditure for this mission was 32 rounds.

9. The USS SAUFLEY want to General Quarters at 0913, 19 June 1944, while patrolling in Fire Support Sector #6 to repel possible air attacks. At 0921 opened fire on one Zero crossing astern of the ship with 5th and 40mm batteries, (USS SAUFLEY AA Action Report, dated 15 June 1944).

10. At 1540, on the same day, this vessel received orders to bombard an enemy troop concentration in area 115 Roger, and at 1551 commenced firing in designated area. Ceased firing as 1624 as the SAUFLEY had been previously assigned a special mission in Fire Support Sector #7. Total expenditure of ammunition was 48 rounds of AA Common.

11. The special mission assigned this ship was the bombardment of the New Airfield and revetment area on Tinian west of Gurguan Point, using slow harassing fire. In addition to this task a barge sweep was to be made along the west coast of Tinian giving particular attention to the barge concentration in Tinian Harbor, This mission was to be divided into two periods; first period to start at 1700 end last until 1900, and the second period to start at 0400 the next morning and last until 0600. AD 1707 commenced bombardment of airfield, and at 1721 made first barge sweep. Many small craft were seen in Tinian Harbor, and the bay north of it. Total number was estimated to be about thirty, the largest of which appeared to be small corvettes. The group of greatest concentration was taken under fire at a mean range of about 11,000 yards. Although the pattern appeared to straddle most of the targets fired upon, results were not as good as expected. It is estimated that about three barges were sunk in this phase. At 1746 commenced bombardment of she airfield again. On this phase the rangefinder operator reported that he saw what appeared to be two Bettys concealed in the revetment area to the west and south of the airstrip. Two or three salvos were please in this area without observed results. Another barge away was made into Tinian Harbor within 4,500 yards of the beach at 1840, and the 40MM battery, as well as the 5" battery was used. On large barge tied up alongside the dock was set fire and when last seen was burning vigorously. Again many salvos of the 5" battery were seen to straddle small barges without sinking them. Total expenditure of ammunition on the airfield was 63 rounds of AA Common. 325 rounds of 40MM were expended on the barge sweeps. At 1911 commenced patrol off west coast of Tinian on northerly and southerly courses keeping a strict watch for any barges which might attempt to leave Tinian Harbor.

12. At 2250 orders were received to return to Fire support Sector 6 until time for second period or special mission, and at 0055 on 20 June 1944, commenced illumination of area 152 How as directed by Shore Fire Control Party. Later in the evening area was shifted to 163 Yoke. Illumination of this area was maintained until the SAUFLEY was relieved on station by the USS NORMAN SCOTT at 0230, 12 rounds of starshells having been expended. After being relieved this ship set course for Fire Support Sector #7 so complete second period of special mission previously assigned to her.

13. At 0415 commenced bombardment of New Airfield on Tinian for second period of special mission. Commenced barge sweep along coast lice at 0525. It and been decided after firing at barges the previous evening to employ a different control procedure on the 5" battery for this phase. It was decided to act fuzes on projectiles end to apply an up spot until about 50% of the projectiles were air bursts and the reminder detonating on impact. Much better results were obtained using this procedure, as is was practically impossible for the small craft to be straddled without receiving some damage from the fragmentation of the air bursts. The barge concentration area in Tinian Harbor was thoroughly covered and when this ship ceased firing the barges that were still able to maneuver were making frantic gestures toward the beach for concealment. At 0550 the airstrip was again bombarded for ten minutes. The two Bettys which were thought to have been present the evening before could not be seen on or near the airstrip during this last phase. At 0600 returned to Fire Support Sector #6 for assignment, having expended 40 rounds of AA Common on the airstrip and 57 rounds of AA Common on the barge sweep.

14. At 1235 received fire support assignment to bombard area 164 Peter, essay troop concentration. Fire was continued as called for by the Shore Fire Control Party until an air strike on the same area started at 1310. At which time the SAUFLEY was directed to cease firing. 92 rounds of AA Common were expended.

15. At 1409 commenced bombardment of area 165 Charlie. Ceased firing at 1420 having expended 28 rounds of AA Common and 2 rounds of Common, and having knocked out an enemy gun emplacement.

16. Area 166 Nan was bombarded commencing at 1435. A spotting plane was furnished for this mission. After expending 86 rounds of A4 Common and 18 rounds of Common, spotting plane reported enemy gun emplacement destroyed and designated another target to be taken under fire.

17. The new target was an enemy blockhouse in area 166 George. Commenced firing on this target at 1510 and continued firing for seventeen minutes. At the end of which time the spotting plane ordered cease firing and reported that direct hits had been made on the target. Expended 62 rounds of AA Common and 24 rounds of Common on this mission.

18. on the morning of 21 June 1944, ship was assigned to bombard as enemy gun emplacement in area 108 George, but before the SAUFLEY could get into position to fire on this area, without crossing fire with another destroyer, the target was changed to 108 Love, enemy gun emplacement firing into our troops. This target was quickly located as the smoke from each shot rose above the green foliage and disclosed its position. Control took this target under direct fire at 0902 and destroyed it after firing 70 rounds of AA Common and 11 rounds of Common.

19. After completion of mission in 108 Love, Shore Fire Control Party reassigned target 108 George which was taken under fire at 1019 and was also destroyed. 50 rounds of AA Common were expended.

20. After completion of mission described in paragraph 19, the SAUFLEY was directed to report to the screen commander fur screening assignments.

21. On 26 June 1944, at 2208, while patrolling in transport area screening station #19, the SAUFLEY went to General Quarters to repel air attacks. At 2239 and at 2244 the [] opened fire at a low flying plane making runs on this vessel [] (USS SAUFLEY Action Report, dated 26 June 1944).

22. In compliance with orders the SAUFLEY left the transport area at 1730 on 27 June 1944, and took station in Fire Support Sector #7 to conduct harassing illumination and fire on Tinian Town and surrounding area during the night. After the first air raid the ship commenced assigned mission at 2033. Mission was interrupted at intervals throughout the evening as bogies closed this area. 42 rounds of starshells, 35 rounds of AA Common, and one W.P. projectile were expended on this mission and three large fires were started in area.

23. On the afternoon of 29 June 1944, the SAUFLEY was directed to report to Shore Fire Control Party in Fire Support Sector 46. Mission assigned was the illumination with starshells of the area 220 King as on previous missions of this kind. After test firing at 1815 for the Shore Fire Control Party to spot stars to desired location, the ship commenced illumination at 1915, and maintained Illumination throughout the sight. Expended 76 starshells on this mission.

24. At 1515 on 1 July 1944, the SAUFLEY relieved the USS STOCKHAM in Fire Support Sector #5, and stood-by for Fire Support missions. The ship was assigned mission to illuminate area 251 Peter, and at 2024 commenced illumination as called for by Shore Fire Control Party. Only eight stars were requested during the night.

25. On the morning of 2 July 1944, the ship commenced bombardment of area 221 Roger as directed by Shore Fire Control Party. At 0900 fire was shifted to area 239 mean points of concentration Love and George and at 0925 fire was shifted to area 238 Xray, completing bombardment at 1110. 554 rounds of AA Common were expended. Shore Fire Control Party reported one ammunition dump blown-up and all areas of enemy troop concentrations very effectively covered. The explosion of the ammunition dump took place on about the third salvo, while firing in area 221 Roger, raising a large column of smoke.

26. At 1720 on 5 July 1944, the SAUFLEY took station in Fire Support Sector #5 and stood-by for fire support assignment. Later that evening the ship was directed to work with Shore Fire Control Party 251 and 252 during the night, furnishing illumination as directed. Considerable difficulty was experienced by the two fire control parties in reaching an agreement as to which area or areas this ship was to illuminate, but it was finally decided that the ship would alternate illuminating area 262 Jig for Shore Fire Control Party 251 and area 253 Victor for Shore Fire Control Party 252. Illumination was commenced at 1922 and was spotted to area 269 William by Shore Fire Control Party 251 and to area 267 Non by Shore Fire Control Party 252. Immediately thereafter Shore Fire Control Party 252 reported that he would not require illumination until 0100. At 1245 he was given a test call but did not respond. Efforts were made to contact aim at about 20 minute intervals throughout the night without success. At about 0600 the next morning be was given a test at which time he came in loud and clear. Due to the fact that this ship was unable to communicate with Shore Fire Control Party 252 it illuminated for Shore Fire Control Party 251 only, and maintained illumination as directed until 0530. 53 rounds of starshells were expended.

27. That same morning the SAUFLEY was again directed to work with Shore Fire Control Party 252. Area 262 Easy was designated and this ship commenced firing at 0842 At 0915 the area was changed to 262 Charlie and the SAUFLEY opened fire on that area. At 0952 area 270 Peter was designated and fired upon. After expending 340 rounds of AA Common on those areas the ship was ordered to cease firing at 1015. At 1316 exercises were resumed with this ship opening fire upon designated ares, 270 Able. Target area was changed to 270 Fox at 1326 and then back to area 270 Able at 1410. Area 269 Easy was then designated, and after firing one salvo in this area, 270 Able was re-designated at 1422. By this time the ship bad been set in dangerously close to the beach. The Shore Fire Control Party was informed that it would be necessary for the ship to cease firing for a above period of time in order to take station farther out from the benefit on receiving this information the Store Fire Control released the any from present exercises. 497 rounds of AA Common were expended.

28. On the afternoon a of 8 July 1944. the SAUFLEY relieved the USS MUGFORD is Fire Support Sector #4, and stood-by for assignment. This ship was directed to work with Shore Fire Party 242 during the night illuminating the area designated by him. Shore Fire Control Party 242 reported that the expired illumination along the ridge line extending through areas 279 Yoke; 280 Fox, Able and Tare; 266 Victor, Roger and Man. the first starshell was fired at 1930 and was spotted to area 286 Roger as illumination over this area was considered to be sufficient to illuminate the entire ridge. It was decided that six starshells per hour would be satisfactory. At 2235 the SAUFLEY received orders to illuminate for Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer 80, expending not more then eight starshells per hour. It might be added that the number of starshells on board would not permit firing at a greater rate than eight per hour if illumination was to be maintained throughout the night. At 0051 Shore Fire Control Party 82 came up on the circuit and directed the ship to illuminate area 248 Jig. It was agreeable with Shore Fire Control Party 242 to give him three stare per hour and Shore Fire Control Party 82 five, so the ship proceeded to comply. Shortly thereafter, Shore Fire Control Party 83 came in on the circuit and requested immediate illumination in area 259 Item. He was told that the ship could furnish only eight stars per hour and that the three of them would have to reach an agreement. Chore Fire Control Party 82 decided to give his stars to Shore Fire Control Party 83 during his emergency. The ship commenced illuminating area designates by chore Fire Control Party 83 at 0132. A short time later Naval Liaison officer 240 case in on the circuit and requested illumination. The situation was explained to him and be withdrew his request. At 0340 it was announced that empty illuminating projectile cases were falling in area 233 Able and endangering our own troops. The chart was checked and it was determined that these cases were coming from this ship when illuminating for Shore Fire Control Party 83. After reporting this fact and receiving instructions the ship ceased illumination at 0350 and took station on the east side of the island, commencing illumination again at 0405. Illumination was maintained until 0530 at which time the ship was released by Shore Fire Control Party 83 and Shore Fire Control Party 242. 71 starshells were expended.

29. At 0800 the morning of 9 July 1944, the USS SAUFLEY was directed by Shore Fire Control Party 242 to take station to the eastward of Marpi Point, Saipan Island, Marianas Group to standby for a fire support mission. AS 0823 this vessel was lying to on a northerly heading on assigned station. At 0824 upon being assigned target area 292 Victor, the ship went to General quarters and at 0840 the first salvo was fired. From that point it was the purpose of the Shore Fire Control Party to rake the eastern section of the beach from the assigned area southward. This was accomplished by left deflection spots. Results of this supporting fire were unobserved by this vessel due to the point of impact being placed on & reversed slops. AS 0918 upon order of Shore Fire Control Party 242 fire was ceased. This ship was told fire would be resumed after the scheduled air strike. At 0959 Shore Fire Control Party 242 reported that the planes would make one more run on the area before firing would be commenced. at 1004 a new target area 288 Oboe, was designated by Shore Fire Control Party 242 and the order to commence firing was given. Fire was withheld by this vessel as unidentified troops were observed in the vicinity of the assigned area. This observation was reported to Shore Fire Control Party 242, and the order to proceed with firing was given at 1012. At 1019 this ship informed Shore Fire Control Party 242 of instructions, relayed by USS CONYNGHAM from Shore Fire Control Party 252, to cease fire as it would endanger friendly troops advancing to erect a flag upon the airfield. At 1023 Shore Fire Control Party 242 reported that they were investigating this report. At 1130 the ship was informed by Shore Fire Control Party 242 that firing was completed for the day but the ship was to remain in that area on a standby status in the event of an emergency. The condition of readiness II watch was set. It is concluded that these troops and those observed from this vessel were one and the same. At 1205 the ship went to General Quarters on the order of Shore Fire Control Party 242 to move into area 290 for the purpose of utilizing automatic weapons against escaping enemy troops. Such action was to be undertaken only upon order of the Shore Fire Control Party and when it was determined that the friendly troops were not in danger of being subjected to this fire. Fire was held by this ship on numerous enemy troops scattered along the lower edges of the cliffs in the area as friendly troops were stationed along the upper ledges. The enemy troops scattered throughout various crevices and caves along the cliffs provided excellent targets for the resigned type of fire. Friendly troops, however, seemed to save control of the situation by means of smell arms and grenade fire. At 1345 this ship was relieved of its assigned mission by the was CONT and subsequently reported to the screen commander for further assignment, having expended 109 rounds of AA Common.

30. The capture and occupation of Saipan marks the conclusion of this report. This vessel sustained no damage to personnel or material with the exception of one five inch gun, gun 14, being rendered inoperative in automatic train due to a broken outboard coupling linkage and shaft connecting valve. Coordination between CIC, gun control and plot was smooth throughout. The usual difficulties in communications were experienced, mainly the breaking up of voice transmissions by other stations on the same circuit. High frequencies seemed to produce greater voice level at night, thereby making communications with Shore Fire Control Parties for the most part more difficult at that time than during daylight hours. Personnel performed their duties capably and efficiently and in such manner as to make it possible for the ship to respond readily to all tasks it was called upon to perform.

STATISTICAL RECORD OF FIRES

Date	Time From	Time To	Targets	Average Range	Caliber Firing	Rounds Allowed	Rounds Expended	Proj Fuze	Reference Para. No. Act. Rept.
6/17/44	0825	0848	Aslito Airfield	6500	5"/38		103 AA C	Mk 18	4
6/18/44	0120	0410	140-A	7500	"		22 Ill	"	6
6/18-19/44	2251	0502	151-D	8500	"		32 Ill	"	8
6/19/44	1540	1524	115-R	6100	"		48 AA C	"	10
6/19/44	1707	1911	New Airfield		"		63 AA C	"	11
			Tinian and Barge sweep Tinian Town		40MM		325 H.E.
6/20/44	0055	0230	152-M, 163-Y	8700	5"/38		12 Ill	Mk 18	12
6/20/44	0415	0554	New Airfield		"		97 AA C	"	13
			Tinian and Barge sweep Tinian Town
6/20/44	1241	1310	164-F	8000	"		92 AA C	"	14
6/20/44	1409	1420	165-C	7000	"		28 AA C, 2 Com.	"	15
6/20/44	1435	1500	166-M	4950	"		86 AA C, 18 Com.	"	16
6/20/44	1510	1527	166-C	4150	"		62 AA C, 24 Com.	"	17
6/21/44	0902	1019	108-L	3775	"		70 AA C, 11 Com.	"	18
6/21/44	1019	1029	108-G	5300	5"/38		50 AA C	Mk 18	19
6/27-28/44	2033	0547	Tinian Town		"		35 AA C, 1 W.P.	"	22
6/29-30/44	1915	0530	220-K	7200	"		76 Ill	"	23
7/1-2/44	2024	0005	251-F	9000	"		8 Ill	"	24
7/1-2/44	0818	1110	221-R	7100	"		554 AA C	"	25
			239-L & G	6500	"			"
			238-X	6300	"			"
7/5-6/44	1720	0530	262-J, 253-Y	6000	"		53 Ill	"	26
7/6/44	0842	0915	262-E	3500	"		151 AA C	"	27
	0915	0952	262-C	4000	"		93 AA C	"	27
	0952	1015	270-F	4000	"		96 AA C	"	27
	1316	1326	270-F	4350	"		49 AA C	"	27
	1326	1336	270-F & A	3750	"		28 AA C	"	27
	1340		269-E	3800	"		5 AA C	"	27
	1348	1416	270-A	3400	"		75 AA C	"	27
7/8-9/44	1928	0530	286-R	5500	"		34 Ill	"	28
			248-J	8000	"		5 Ill	"	28
			259-I	8000	"		32 Ill	"	28
7/9/44	0840	1004	292-Y	5100	"		107 AA C	"	29
	1004		288-O	5000	"		2 AA C	"	29

EXTRACT FROM RADIO LOG

Date	Time From	Time To	Ref. Para. No. Act. Rept.	Targets	Spots
6/19/44	1540	1624	10	115-R
				Salvo 1	No Spot
				Salvo 3	Out 500 NC
				Salvo 5	NC Left 150
				Salvo 6	Out 1000 NC
				Salvo 9	Down 200 NC
				Salvo 11	NC Right 550
6/20/44	1241	1310	14	164-F
				Salvo 1	No Spots
				Salvo 2	Lower bursts NC NC
				Salvo 3	Lower bursts NC NC
				Salvo 10	Out 100 NC
				Salvo 12	NC Left 100
				Salvo 13	Lower bursts NC NC
				Salvo 14	Lower bursts NC NC
				Salvo 15	Out 150 NC
				Salvo 18	In 300 NC
				Salvo 21	Lower bursts NC NC
				Salvo 22	Out 200 NC NC
6/20/44	1409	1420	16	165-C
				Salvo 1	No Spot
				Salvo 4	In 100 NC
				Salvo 5	In 200 NC
				Salvo 7	NC Right 15 Ft.
				Salvo 9	Fire Common
				Salvo	Out 200 NC
6/20/44	1435	1500	16	166-N
				Salvo 1	No Spot
				Salvo 2	NC Left 50
				Salvo 4	NC NC Fire again in Common
				Salvo 9	Out 50 NC
				Salvo 13	In 100 Left 25
				Salvo 14	In 50 NC
				Salvo 15	In 50 NC
				Salvo 16	In 100 NC
				Salvo 17	In 50 NC Fire AA Common
				Salvo 18-21	No spot
6/20/44	1510	1527	17	166-G
				Salvo 1	Target 75 yds. left of reference point
				Salvo 2	NC Left 200, NC Right 50
				Salvo 3	In 100 NC Fire 2 guns Common
				Salvo 8	In 100 NC
				Salvo 9	In 100 NC
				Salvo 12	Out 50 right 50
				Salvo 13	NC Left 25
				Salvo 14	Out 50 NC
				Salvo 15	Out 100 NC Fire all AA Common
				Salvo 16	Out 50 NC
				Salvo 18	In 300 NC
6/21/44	0902	0919	18	108-L
				Salvo 1	No spots
				Salvo 2	In 50 NC
				Salvo 14	In 50 NC, Fire 2 guns Common
				Salvo 14-18	NC NC
6/21/44	1019	1029	19	108-G
				Salvo 1	No spots
				Salvo 2	NC Left 200
				Salvo 3	NC Right 100
				Salvo 4	NC Left 50
				Salvo 7	Out 50 Right 50
				Salvo 9	NC Right 50
7/2/44	0818	0847	25	221-R
				Salvo 1	No spots
				Salvo 2	NC Left 100
				Salvo 3	In 300 NC
				Salvo 4	In 200 Right 200
				Salvo 5	In 300 NC
				Salvo 10	NC Right 300
				Salvo 11	Out 200 Right 300
				Salvo 12	Out 300 NC
				Salvo 16	NC Left 100
				Salvo 19	Out 100 Left 100
				Salvo 23	NC Left 300
7/2/44	0849	0917	25	239-L
				Salvo 1	No spot
				Salvo 2	NC Left 400
				Salvo 6	Out 100 NC
				Salvo 7	NC Left 100
				Salvo 8	In 100 NC
				Salvo 9	NC Left 200
7/2/44	0929	0942	25	239-L
				Salvo 1	No spot
				Salvo 2	In 100 right 100
				Salvo 3	NC right 100
				Salvo 4	In 100 NC
				Salvo 5	In 100 Right 100
				Salvo 10	Out 200 Left 200
				Salvo 11	In 50 NC
7/2/44	0942	1010	25	239-G
				Salvo 1	Out 150 Right 500
				Salvo 3	In 50 NC
				Salvo 4	In 100 NC
				Salvo 5	Out 50 NC
				Salvo 6	In 50 NC
				Salvo 9	In 100 Left 500
				Salvo 13	In 50 NC - Air bursts
				Salvo 14	Out 100 NC
				Salvo 18	NC Right 100
				Salvo 21	Out 200 NC
7/2/44	1018	1043	25	239-G
				Salvo 1	No spot
				Salvo 2	Out 100 Right 300
				Salvo 3	NC right 250
				Salvo 4	NC Left 500
				Salvo 11	In 100 NC
				Salvo 12	Out 200 NC
				Salvo 15	NC NC Raise bursts
				Salvo 17	Out 100 Left 200
7/2/44	1057	1105	25	238-X
				Salvo 1	No spot
				Salvo 3	Out 100 right 200 raise bursts
				Salvo 4	Out 100 Right 100
				Salvo 5	NC Right 50
				Salvo 7	NC NC Raise bursts
7/6/44	0842	0915	27	262-E
				Salvo 1	No spot
				Salvo 2	In 100 Left 100
				Salvo 3	In 200 NC
				Salvo 4	In 100 Left 100
				Salvo 5	In 200 NC
				Salvo 6	In 200 NC
				Salvo 7	In 300 NC
				Salvo 8	In 200 NC
				Salvo 12	In 100 NC
				Salvo 13	In 100 NC
				Salvo 14	NC Right 100
				Salvo 20	NC Right 100
				Salvo 23	In 100 NC
				Salvo 26	In 100 NC
				Salvo 28	In 100 NC
				Salvo 32	NC Left 100
7/6/44	0915	0952	27	262-C
				Salvo 1	No spot
				Salvo 6	NC right 200
				Salvo 9	Out 100 Right 100
				Salvo 10	Out 100 NC
				Salvo 11	Out 200 NC
				Salvo 12	Out 100 NC
				Salvo 13	Out 100 Left 200
				Salvo 14	In 100 NC
				Salvo 15	In 100 Left 100
7/6/44	0952	1015	27	270-F
				Salvo 1	NC Right 200
				Salvo 2	Out 100 Left 100
				Salvo 3	In 100 Right 50
				Salvo 9	In 100 Left 50
				Salvo 10	In 100 Left 25
				Salvo 11	In 200 Left 100
				Salvo 12	In 100 NC
				Salvo 13	In 200 Left 100
				Salvo 14	NC Left 200
				Salvo 15	In 100 Left 100
				Salvo 16	NC Left 250
				Salvo 17	NC Right 600
				Salvo 18	Out 100 NC
				Salvo 19	Out 100 NC
				Salvo 20	NC Right 100
7/6/44	1316	1326	27	270-A
				Salvo 1	No spot
				Salvo 2	In 400 right 300
				Salvo 3	In 100 NC
				Salvo 4	In 200 NC
				Salvo 5	In 200 Right 100
				Salvo 6	In 100 Right 200
				Salvo 7	Out 100 NC
7/6/44	1326	1336	27	270-A and F
				Salvo 1	No spot
				Salvo 2	NC Left 200
				Salvo 3	Out 200 Left 100
				Salvo 4	Out 200 Left 100
				Salvo 5	Out 200 NC
				Salvo 6	Out 200 NC
7/6/44	1340	1340	27	269-E
				One Salvo	No spot
7/6/44	1348	1418	27	270-A
				Salvo 1	No spot
				Salvo 2	In 600 Right 400
				Salvo 3	NC Right 500
				Salvo 4	In 800 Right 100
				Salvo 5	In 1000 Right 100
				Salvo 6	In 100 Right 100
				Salvo 7	All back to zero
				Salvo 8	NC right 500
				Salvo 9	In 100 Right 100
				Salvo 10	Out 100 Left 100
				Salvo 11	Out 1000 Right 500
7/9/44	0840	1004	29	292-V
				Salvo 1	No spot
				Salvo 2	In 300 Right 100
				Salvo 3	NC Left 200
				Salvo 4	NC Left 200
				Salvo 5	Up 100 left 100
				Salvo 6	Up 200 NC
				Salvo 7	NC Left 200
				Salvo 8	NC Left 200
				Salvo 9	In 100 Left 200
				Salvo 10	NC Left 200
				Salvo 16	In 200 Right 600
				Salvo 17	In 200 Right 200
				Salvo 18	In 200 Right 50
				Salvo 20	In 200 NC
				Salvo 21	In 100 Left 200
				Salvo 22	NC Left 100
				Salvo 23	Out 100 Left 200
				Salvo 24	Up 200 NC
				Salvo 25	Up 50 Left 50
				Salvo 26	Up 200 NC
7/9/44	1007	1007	29	288-O	No spots one (1) two gun salvo.

USS SAUFLEY - AA Act Reps, 6/17,18,19 & 26/44, off Saipan Island, Marianas

7 July 1944

1. In accordance with reference (a), Enclosures (A), (B), (c) and (D) are forwarded herewith.

REVISED FORM FOR REPORTING A.A. ACTION BY SURFACE SHIPS

• Location of ship (area): Fire support sector #6, Saipan Island
• U.S.S. SAUFLEY (DD465)
• Zone Time: 1907
• Date: June 17, 1944
• 1. Surprise attack: Yes, Twilight
• 2. Method picking plane up: Binoculars
• 3. Range plane was picked up: Less than 5 miles
• 4. Total number of planes observed: Two Types: Tonys
• 5. Number of planes attacking own ship: Two Types: Tonys
• 6. Number of planes taken under fire by own ship: Two
• 6. (a) Of those attacking own ship: Two, Types Tonys
• 6. (b) Others: None
• 7. Speed and altitude of approach in knots and feet: 200 Kts. 3000 ft.
• 8. Number of guns firing-by caliber: Two Twin 40MM
• 9. Ammunition expended-by caliber: 79 rounds of 40MM
• 10. Percent service allowance expended: Almost 1% 40MM
• 11. Method of Control: Mk49 Director Control 40MM, #1 Local control, 40MM #2. Method of spotting: No spotting-estimate-rapid continuous
• 12. Approximate time tracking to first shot: About 10 second tracking time for 40MM
• 13. Approximate time of first hit: No hits
• 14. Approximate time first shot to last shot: 30 seconds first attack, 30 seconds second attack
• 15. Approximate position angle open fire: 55 degrees
• 16. Approximate position angle cease fire: 85 degrees
• 17. Approximate bearing first shot: Port Quarter
• 18. Approximate bearing last shot: Port Quarter
• 19. Approximate range first shot: 4800 yds, Altitude of plane: 3000 ft
• 20. Approximate minimum range aircraft approached: 4000 yds., Altitude: 3000 ft.
• 21. Approximate range last shot: 4600 yds, Altitude of plan: 3000 ft.
• 22. Approximate altitude of bomb release: None
• 23. Approximate range torpedo release: None
• 24. Number hits on ship by bombs: None, by torpedoes: None
• 25. Number near bomb misses damaging ship: None
• 26. Planes shot down: None
• 27. Best estimate of size of gun or guns responsible for each "Sure": None
• 28. Performance of ammunition: excellent
• 29. What failures in material occurred in this section: None
• 30. Sketch: These two Japanese fighters came in over the transport ares. The visibility was poor and the transports were firing wildly. First approach at 1900 was warded off by 40107 battery which discovered the plane, determined its identity, and opened fire. The second attack at 1907 was also discovered and warded off by the 40MM battery. We were not under direct attack as the planes were evidently retiring from strafing the beach.

REVISED FORM FOR REPORTING A.A. ACTION BY SURFACE SHIPS

• Location of ship (area): Fire support sector #6, Area 6 of Saipan Island
• U.S.S. SAUFLEY (DD465)
• Zone Time: 1818
• Date: June 18, 1944
• 1. Surprise attack: No, Afternoon
• 2. Method picking plane up: Search Radar (SC1)
• 3. Range plane was picked up: 12 miles on FD
• 4. Total number of planes observed: Squadron of more than 12, Types: Tonys and Zeros
• 5. Number of planes attacking own ship: Three, Type Tonys
• 6. Number of planes taken under fire by own ship: Three
• 6. (a) Of those attacking own ship: Three, Types Tonys
• 6. (b) Others: Rest of squadron under fire by own fighters
• 7. Speed and altitude of approach in knots and feet: 250 Kts. 10,000 ft.
• 8. Number of guns firing-by caliber: Two 5"/38 Cal. guns - Two twin 40MM
• 9. Ammunition expended-by caliber: Fire 5"/AA Common Mk 18 Fuze, Fifty seven 40MM
• 10. Percent service allowance expended: 2% 5" Ammunition - 9% 40MM
• 11. Method of Control: Optical, Method of spotting: No spotting, Method of ranging: Radar then Stereo, Method of firing: Rapid continuous.
• 12. Approximate time tracking to first shot: Four minutes
• 13. Approximate time of first hit: No hits
• 14. Approximate time first shot to last shot: Tow minutes
• 15. Approximate position angle open fire: 35 degrees
• 16. Approximate position angle cease fire: 45 degrees
• 17. Approximate bearing first shot: Port bow - 350 R.
• 18. Approximate bearing last shot: Port bow - 340 R.
• 19. Approximate range first shot: 6000 yds, Altitude of plane: 10,000 ft
• 20. Approximate minimum range aircraft approached: 3000 yds., Altitude: 6000 ft.
• 21. Approximate range last shot: 4,000 yds, Altitude of plan: 8,000 ft.
• 22. Approximate altitude of bomb release: None
• 23. Approximate range torpedo release: None
• 24. Number hits on ship by bombs: None, by torpedoes: None, Was ship strafed? None
• 25. Number near bomb misses damaging ship: None
• 26. Planes shot down: None
• 27. Best estimate of size of gun or guns responsible for each "Sure": None
• 28. Performance of ammunition: excellent
• 29. What failures in material occurred in this section: None
• 30. Sketch: Our fighters were seen by rangefinder operator to scramble with raid at about 12,000 yards. The leader of three enemy planes still in formation and coming toward us was tracked. The first burst caused two fighters to turn away from this ship into clouds, but the leader(which control was tracking) turned toward this ship, lost altitude on the turn, then went out. Cease firing was given when the target approached a formation of friendly fighters. Lookouts reported seeing our fighters shoot down six enemy planes.

REVISED FORM FOR REPORTING A.A. ACTION BY SURFACE SHIPS

• Location of ship (area): Fire support sector #6, Saipan Island
• U.S.S. SAUFLEY (DD465)
• Zone Time: 0921
• Date: June 19, 1944
• 1. Surprise attack: Yes
• 2. Method picking plane up: Binoculars
• 3. Range plane was picked up: Less than 5 miles
• 4. Total number of planes observed: One, Types: Zero
• 5. Number of planes attacking own ship: One, Type: Zero
• 6. Number of planes taken under fire by own ship: One
• 6. (a) Of those attacking own ship: One, Types: Zero
• 6. (b) Others: None
• 7. Speed and altitude of approach in knots and feet: 180 Kts. 300 to 500 ft.
• 8. Number of guns firing-by caliber: Three 5"/38 Cal. Guns - Two Twin 40MM
• 9. Ammunition expended-by caliber: AA Common Three with Mk 32 fuze Eight with Mk 18 fuze
• 10. Percent service allowance expended: 3% AA Common - about 1% 40MM
• 11. Method of Control: Optical, Method of spotting: No spotting, Method of ranging: Stereo Ranges, Method of firing: Rapid continuous.
• 12. Approximate time tracking to first shot: 20 Seconds
• 13. Approximate time of first hit: No hits
• 14. Approximate time first shot to last shot: One minute
• 15. Approximate position angle open fire: Three degrees
• 16. Approximate position angle cease fire: three degrees
• 17. Approximate bearing first shot: Port Quarter
• 18. Approximate bearing last shot: Starboard Quarter
• 19. Approximate range first shot: 3000 yds, Altitude of plane: 500 ft
• 20. Approximate minimum range aircraft approached: 3000 yds., Altitude: 300 ft.
• 21. Approximate range last shot: 3000 yds, Altitude of plan: 500 ft.
• 22. Approximate altitude of bomb release: None
• 23. Approximate range torpedo release: None
• 24. Number hits on ship by bombs: None, by torpedoes: None, Was ship strafed? None
• 25. Number near bomb misses damaging ship: None
• 26. Planes shot down: None
• 27. Best estimate of size of gun or guns responsible for each "Sure": None
• 28. Performance of ammunition: excellent
• 29. What failures in material occurred in this section: None
• 30. Sketch: Zero approached ship from starboard quarter and was taken under fire by 40MM battery which caused plane to turn away. After the turn both 5" and 40's opened fire. Cease firing was given to prevent firing over friendly task force.

REVISED FORM FOR REPORTING A.A. ACTION BY SURFACE SHIPS

• Location of ship (area): Transport Area Screening Station #19, Saipan Island
• U.S.S. SAUFLEY (DD465)
• Zone Time: 2240
• Date: 26 June 1944
• 1. Surprise attack: Yes
• 2. Method picking plane up: Radar
• 3. Range plane was picked up: Less than 5 miles
• 4. Total number of planes observed: One, Types: Betty
• 5. Number of planes attacking own ship: One, Type: Betty
• 6. Number of planes taken under fire by own ship: One
• 6. (a) Of those attacking own ship: One, Types: Betty
• 6. (b) Others: None
• 7. Speed and altitude of approach in knots and feet: 170 Kts. - 7,000 Ft
• 8. Number of guns firing-by caliber: Five 5"/38 Cal. Guns
• 9. Ammunition expended-by caliber: Eighty 5"/AA Common Mk 18 Fuze
• 10. Percent service allowance expended: 5%
• 11. Method of Control: Full Radar Control, Method of spotting: No spotting, Method of ranging: Radar Ranging, Method of firing: Rapid continuous.
• 12. Approximate time tracking to first shot: One minute
• 13. Approximate time of first hit: None
• 14. Approximate time first shot to last shot: Two minutes
• 15. Approximate position angle open fire: 15 degrees
• 16. Approximate position angle cease fire: 15 degrees
• 17. Approximate bearing first shot: Starboard Bow
• 18. Approximate bearing last shot: Starboard Quarter
• 19. Approximate range first shot: 5,000 yds, Altitude of plane: 4000 ft
• 20. Approximate minimum range aircraft approached: 4000 yds., Altitude: 5000 ft.
• 21. Approximate range last shot: 13000 yds, Altitude of plan: 7000 ft.
• 22. Approximate altitude of bomb release: None
• 23. Approximate range torpedo release: None
• 24. Number hits on ship by bombs: None, by torpedoes: None, Was ship strafed? None
• 25. Number near bomb misses damaging ship: None
• 26. Planes shot down: None
• 27. Best estimate of size of gun or guns responsible for each "Sure": None
• 28. Performance of ammunition: excellent
• 29. What failures in material occurred in this section: Gun #4 failed to match in automatic train due to failure of valve control arm from high speed synchro to TV3 control valve in train receiver regulator. It was necessary to match pointers.
• 30. Sketch: There were several planes in this raid. Enemy planes had been in the area for about two hours many of which this ship tracked. A few of the planes were lost as they dropped radar deception and changed course. At 2238 an undetected plane paralleled the ship's course to starboard at an estimated altitude of one hundred feet. The 40mm battery fired a few rounds at this plane, but due to poor visibility and rapid bearing change fire was ineffective. it 2239 the main battery picked up one enemy plane flying high and coming through a deception area, The bursts caused the plane to change course, climb and increase speed. At no time was the plane seen therefore effectiveness of fire could not be determined.

USS SAUFLEY - Report of Bombardment of New Ireland Areas, Night of 2/29/44-3/1/44

2 March 1944

1. At 1730 Love 26 February 1944, this ship got underway from Port Purvis, Florida Island as a part of Tusk Group 34.2 composed of the following ships; Group "A": U.S.S. CONWAY, U.S.S. SIGOURNEY, U.S.S. PRINGLE and U.S.S. EATON. Group "B": U.S.S. WALLER, (Captain W.F. Peterson, Commander Destroyer Squadron Twenty-Two, Officer in tactical command) U.S.S. RENSHAW, U.S.S. SAUFLEY and U.S.S. PHILIP and proceeded to Treasury Islands where all ships fueled. Upon completion Group "A" proceeded toward St. George Channel in compliance with part 1 of reference (b). Group "B" departed from Treasury Islands at 1300 29 February 1944 and arrived west of Cape st. George at 2250 the same day.

2. At this time the formation came to course 090 (T), reduced speed to 15 knots and made all preparations to bombard Cape St. George Radar Station. Order of chips in column was: U.S.S. WALLER, U.S.S. SAUFLEY, U.S.S. RENSHAW, and U.S.S. PHILIP, distance between ships, 1000 yards. At about 2305 the WALLER commenced firing and at 2307 this ship opened fire followed very shortly thereafter by the other ships in column. The opening range and bearing for the SAUFLEY was 6950 yards bearing 0150 (T). This ship ceased firing at 2317 the target range was 8250 yards bearing 334 (T) having expended 150 rounds of AA Common. No spotting plane was available because of weather conditions. Therefore results of this bombardment are unknown although shells were observed to land in the target area. Weather conditions were unfavorable for spotting. The skies were heavily overcast with sporadic rain squalls. The SC Radar and IFF were secured from the time of departure Treasury Islands until bombardment commenced.

3. The search for enemy shipping enroute to Borpop was conducted without results. At 0310 arrived off Borpop and came to course 005 (T) speed 15 knots in preparation for second bombardment. At 0334 this task unit was ordered to commence firing and at 0335 the SAUFLEY opened fire, range 7950 yards bearing 293 (T). Course was changed to 321 (T) at 0343. At 0347 this ship ceased firing with target bearing 252 (T) range 0000 yards, having expended 276 rounds of AA Common, Again results were undetermined because task unit had no spotting plane and target was obscured due to topography and weather as described in paragraph 2.

4. The search for enemy shipping enroute to Nabuto Bay was again conducted without results. Hereafter a chronological summary of events is listed for simplicity and clarity. Times listed as thought to be correct; however, they are not infallible:

0556 -

off Cape Manarodu basis unit came to course 250° (T) and reduced speed to 15 knots. Commented preparations for the bombardment of Masatania Airfield and area.

0612 -

Assigned spotting plane reported on station.

0622 -

Bombardment course was changed to 242 (T).

0653 -

Small caliber shore battery on coast line at Cape Vasarodu commenced firing at formation. Battery believed to have consisted of 2, three inch guns. Splashes were about 2/100 yards over track line and between the SAUFLEY and USS RENSHAW.

0656 -

Executed Turn 3 (278°T), opened 5 - 25 knots. The MAILE opened fire at whore battery.

0657 -

The SAUFLEY opened fire at shore battery.

0659 -

Formation increased speed to 30 knots.

0704 -

The SAUFLEY checked fire.

0706 -

Formation changed course to 115 (T).

0710 -

The SAUTLEY resumed firing at same shore battery.

0713 -

Formation increased speed to 25 knots. - Spotting plane gave an up spot of 500 yards - no addressee. Spot was applied and shortly thereafter spotting plane reported fall of shot so be landing in area of shore battery.

0716 -

Formation changed course to 145 (T).

0717 -

spotting plane reported above battery silenced. SAUFLEY ceased firing having expended 100 rounds of AA Common.

0718 -

Formation changed course to 275° (T) and reduced speed to 15 knots. Made all preparations to commence bombardment.

0720 -

Formed column 1000 yards distance between ships. order of ships - USS WALLER, USS SAUFLEY - USS RENSHAW and USS PHILIP.

0723 -

one ship opened fire on small boat near beach. (believed to have been the USS PHILIP)

0725 -

The USS WALLER commenced firing on assigned bombardment area.

0730 -

The SAUFLEY commenced firing. bearing 196 (T), range 9100 yards.

0732 -

The commenced firing. - The USS PHILIP commenced firing. - The spotting plane reported SAUFLEY to be on target area

0737 -

All units checked fire, bearing 172 (T), range 9000 yards.

0737.5 -

Formation executed 18 Turn. (095° T)

0742 -

The PHILIP resumed firing. - The USS RENSHAW resumed firing.

0743 -

The SAUFLEY resumed firing, bearing 171 (T), range 7800 yards. - Spotting plane gave up spot of 250 yards. Spot was applied. Spotting plane gave another up 250 yards. Spot was applied. Soon thereafter spotting None reported fall of shot to be in target area.

0751 -

The SAUDLEY ceased firing, bearing 206 (T). range 8400 yards. Expended 360 rounds of AA Common.

0756 -

Small caliber shore batteries commenced firing at formation. - The USS PHILIP and USS RENSHAW returned fire and shore batteries were soon silenced.

0759 -

Large fire observed in target area.

0804 -

The WALLER resumed firing on shore bombardment area.

0607 -

Explosion seen in WALLER'S target area.

0009 -

shore battery opened fire. The WALLSH ceased firing.

0813 -

changed course to 330 (T).

0816 -

Formation changed speed to 25 knots.

0818 -

Formation changed course to 0000 (T).

0625 -

the RATTER opened fire at small boat near beach, bearing 260 (T).

0826 -

The SAUFLEY and USS RENSHAW commenced firing at same target.

0829 -

The SAUFLEY ceased firing. Results undetermined. Boat could not be seen, being dark in color it could have easily blended with the shore background. Expended 35 rounds or AA Common.

0830 -

Formation changed course to 320 (T). aposing please was sent north to search for energy shipping.

0836 -

Formation changed speed to 30 knots. - Plane returned and reported no enemy shipping 50 miles north of bombardment area.

0855 -

Changed course to 113 (T). Commenced retirement to pass east of Feni Island and Green Island enroute Purvis Bay, Florida Islands.

5. The general performance of this ship's ordnance material and equipment was satisfactory. No casualties occurred during the first two bombardments. During the third bombardment the following minor casualties lessened fire power to some extent and hampered communications:

• (a) Unlocated short caused master firing circuit to remain continuously energized. Battery was shifted to pointer fire of salvo signal.
• (b) Improper adjustment of breech operating spring on Gun #5 resulted in breech block not closing sufficiently to complete firing circuit. This required that a mallet be used to close the breech.
• (c) The failure of the Gunnery Officer's sound powered telephone at the commencement of the third bombardment necessitated the use of a talker for battery control
• (d) Several jams occurred due to dented cases. Use or extractors and short cases at each gun facilitated clearing.
• (e) The shook of gun fire ruptured hydraulic oil line in Gun #2 hindering movements of personnel by coating gun and handling room decks with oil. Gun control was not affected. Rupture was repaired and decks cleaned during lull in firing.

6. As the target area was obscured for all source bombardments, the effectiveness of gunfire could not be observed from this A fire started in the target area at Namatanai Airfield was blue only observed result. A spotting plane was available for this last bombardment, and spotted fall of shot to target error. For the first two bombardments no spotting plane was was available and navigational information was used to place full of shop on target. An arbitrary out spot was used in the bombardment of Cape St. George to raise point of impact to target area, which was between 65 to 70 feat above sea level.

7. The ammunition expenditure was 921 AA Common projectiles, 495 rounds of smokeless powder and 426 rounds of flashless powder.

8. Performance of the Sail George Radar is excellent for plotting navigational track. It has been found on this ship that a more accurate track can be maintained by the use or Sail George ranges end bearings to plot the navigational track than to use the DRT, because of its inherent errors. On all bombardments simultaneous ranges and bearings were taken from plot and Sail George Radar. From ship's navigational position plot's ranges and bearings were plotted to bombardment area. In this way a continuous plot or salvos could be made on grid chart and corrections applied from time to time by CIC to more effectively cover target area. Spots for third bombardment, as sent to plot by CIC, were verified by simultaneous spots received from spotting plane. Therefore this method of fire control is recommended when target area is obscured from gun control and when no spotting plane is available.

USS SAUFLEY - Rep of AA acts Off West coast of Luzon Is, Philippines on 1/8, 10 & 12/45

16 January 1945

1. Enclosures (A), (B), (c) and (D) are forwarded herewith in compliance with references (a), (b) and (c).

U.S.S. SAUFLEY ANTI-AIRCRAFT ACTIONS, 6-12 JANUARY 1945 INCLUSIVE, REPORT OF.

On the evening of 6 January 1945, the U.S.S. SAUFLEY was a screening unit of Attack Group Able of the Lingayen Attack Force then enroute to Lingayen Gulf and scheduled to arrive in the transport area the morning of 9 January. Attack Group Baker was steaming five miles ahead of this group. Air cover was provided by escort carriers of Task Group SEVENTY SEVEN POINT FOUR.

No enemy surface forces were known to be in the immediate vicinity. There were, however, strong possibilities of attack by enemy submarines and aircraft. Reports of contacts on enemy aircraft were frequent. Ship was in condition of readiness I-E and material condition A was set.

6 January	1710	Japanese Zeke closed formation from starboard quarter followed by friendly fighters. These shot him down close aboard this ship.
8 January	1807	"Flash Red" reported; set condition of readiness I.
	1820	Task Force attacked by approximately ten Japanese aircraft.
	1900	Japanese Zero made run on formation from port quarter. Commenced Firing. (See enclosure (B))
	1902	Ceased firing.
	1905	Zero crashed into water off starboard bow in Transport Area.
	1935	"Flash white" set condition of readiness I-K.
10 January	0433	Screening north east corner of Lingayen Transport Area. Condition of Readiness I set. Enemy torpedo boats reported to be in area.
	0605	"Flash Red" reported.
	0700	Observed AA fire in Transport Area.
	0704	Commenced firing at Japanese Val on starboard been. (See enclosure (0))
	0715	Val crashed in water close aboard to starboard with bomb load intact. Ceased firing.
12 January	0613	"Flush Red" reported. Set condition of Readiness I-3.
	0808	Opened fire on Japanese Val.

In general own ordinance material was good except as noted in enclosures (B), (C) and (D). Total ammunition expenditure is as follows:

• 5"/38 AAC - 52 rounds
• 5"/38 Special - 12 rounds
• 40 Millimeter - 864 rounds
• 20 Millimeter - 930 rounds

This vessel received no battle damage.

Communications were excellent. There were no material failures. A listening watch on the Fighter Director and Combat Air Patrol circuits proved to be of value to Air Plot in that it supplemented own ships radar search. It was found that this type information, when relayed to Control and Air Defense, stimulated interest among lookout personnel thereby promoting greater efficiency.

During the air attack on 8 January radar interception analyzed as being produced by a Japanese air search radar operating on a frequency of 155 megacycles was detected. This, however, aid not interfere with own ship's air search radar.

Coaching control on target by means of automatic bearing designation direct from the air search radar PPI cursor provided to be more efficient than the hand target designation system.

Distinguishing between bogey and friendly aircraft Was S made difficult in many instances because certain friendly aircraft failed to show IFF indications. This was partially overcome by the listening watch on the Fighter Director circuits together with a running geographical plot of the location of the Combat Air and Anti-Submarine patrols.

Casualties to personnel consisted of small shrapnel wounds to two machine gunners causing no serious injury. All hands performed in an excellent and commendable manner.

REVISED FORM FOR REPORTING A.A. ACTION BY SURFACE SHIPS

• Location of ship (area): West of Luzon
• U.S.S. SAUFLEY (DD465)
• Zone Time: 1900 (I)
• Date: 8 January 1945
• 1. Surprise attack: No, Dusk
• 2. Method picking plane up: Binoculars
• 3. Range plane was picked up: Less than 5 miles
• 4. Total number of planes observed: Five, Types: Vals (3), Zekes (2)
• 5. Number of planes attacking own ship: One, Type: Zeke
• 6. Number of planes taken under fire by own ship: One
• 6. (a) Of those attacking own ship: One, Types: Zeke
• 6. (b) Others: None
• 7. Speed and altitude of approach in knots and feet: 400 knots, 7500 feet
• 8. Number of guns firing-by caliber: 4-5"/38, 5-20MM, 3-40MM
• 9. Ammunition expended-by caliber: 18-5"/38, 336-40MM, 270-20MM
• 10. Percent service allowance expended: 1%-5"/38, 1%-40MM, 1%-20MM
• 11. Method of Control: Director, Method of spotting: Optical, Method of ranging: Optical, Method of firing: Rapid continuous.
• 12. Approximate time tracking to first shot: 20 seconds
• 13. Approximate time of first hit: 1901 (I)
• 14. Approximate time first shot to last shot: 2 minutes
• 15. Approximate position angle open fire: 80
• 16. Approximate position angle cease fire: 15
• 17. Approximate bearing first shot: 160
• 18. Approximate bearing last shot: 140
• 19. Approximate range first shot: 7,000 yards, Altitude of plane: 20,000 feet
• 20. Approximate minimum range aircraft approached: 1200 yds., Altitude: 1000 feet
• 21. Approximate range last shot: 2,000 yards, Altitude of plan: 500 feet
• 22. Approximate altitude of bomb release: None
• 23. Approximate range torpedo release: None
• 24. Number hits on ship by bombs: None, by torpedoes: None, Was ship strafed? No
• 25. Number near bomb misses damaging ship: None
• 26. Planes shot down: Was suicide diver apparently hit by own ship's gunfire prior to crashing astern of nearby transport
• 27. Best estimate of size of gun or guns responsible for each "Sure": Not determined
• 28. Performance of ammunition: 5"/38-good, 40MM-bad
• 29. What failures in material occurred in this section: Guns 44 & 45 jammed by enlarged cases

REVISED FORM FOR REPORTING A.A. ACTION BY SURFACE SHIPS

• Location of ship (area): Lingayen Gulf
• U.S.S. SAUFLEY (DD465)
• Zone Time: 0710 (I)
• Date: 10 January 1945
• 1. Surprise attack: No, Dawn
• 2. Method picking plane up: Naked Eye
• 3. Range plane was picked up: Less than 5 miles
• 4. Total number of planes observed: Two, Types: Vals
• 5. Number of planes attacking own ship: One, Type: Val
• 6. Number of planes taken under fire by own ship: One (Attempted suicide dive)
• 6. (a) Of those attacking own ship: One, Types: Val
• 6. (b) Others: One, Type: Zeke
• 7. Speed and altitude of approach in knots and feet: 10,000 feet, 170 knots
• 8. Number of guns firing-by caliber: 5-5"/38, 5-40MM Twins, 7-20MM (See Track Chart)
• 9. Ammunition expended-by caliber: 23 rds 5"/38, 528 rds 40MM, 600 rds 20MM
• 10. Percent service allowance expended: 2%-5"/38, 528 rds 40MM, 2%-20MM
• 11. Method of Control: Director, Method of spotting: Optical, Method of ranging: Optical, Method of firing: Rapid continuous.
• 12. Approximate time tracking to first shot: 20 seconds
• 13. Approximate time of first hit: 0713 (I)
• 14. Approximate time first shot to last shot: 9 minutes
• 15. Approximate position angle open fire: 70
• 16. Approximate position angle cease fire: 20
• 17. Approximate bearing first shot: 065 True
• 18. Approximate bearing last shot: 245 True
• 19. Approximate range first shot: 7,000 yards, Altitude of plane: 10,000 feet
• 20. Approximate minimum range aircraft approached: 25 feet, Altitude: 25 feet
• 21. Approximate range last shot: 25 feet, Altitude of plane: 25 feet
• 22. Approximate altitude of bomb release: None
• 23. Approximate range torpedo release: None
• 24. Number hits on ship by bombs: None, by torpedoes: None, Was ship strafed? No
• 25. Number near bomb misses damaging ship: None
• 26. Planes shot down: Apparently was suicide diver hit by own ship's gunfire prior to crashing in water,
• 26. (a) Those attacking own ship: SURE (by own ship alone): One
• 27. Best estimate of size of gun or guns responsible for each "Sure": 5"/38, 40MM, 20MM
• 28. Performance of ammunition: Excellent
• 29. What failures in material occurred in this section: Short circuit in electric lead from power unit to sight of Mk 51 Director

REVISED FORM FOR REPORTING A.A. ACTION BY SURFACE SHIPS

• Location of ship (area): Lingayen Gulf
• U.S.S. SAUFLEY (DD465)
• Zone Time: 0808 (I)
• Date: 12 January 1945
• 1. Surprise attack: No, Day
• 2. Method picking plane up: Radar
• 3. Range plane was picked up: 5 miles
• 4. Total number of planes observed: One, Types: Val
• 5. Number of planes attacking own ship: One, Type: Val
• 6. Number of planes taken under fire by own ship: One
• 6. (a) Of those attacking own ship: One, Types: Val
• 6. (b) Others: None
• 7. Speed and altitude of approach in knots and feet: 6300 feet, 180 knots
• 8. Number of guns firing-by caliber: 5-5"/38 Cal.
• 9. Ammunition expended-by caliber: 23 rds 5"/38 AAC
• 10. Percent service allowance expended: 1%
• 11. Method of Control: Director, Method of spotting: Optical, Method of ranging: Optical, Method of firing: Rapid continuous.
• 12. Approximate time tracking to first shot: 2 1/2 minutes
• 13. Approximate time of first hit: none observed
• 14. Approximate time first shot to last shot: 30 seconds
• 15. Approximate position angle open fire: 25
• 16. Approximate position angle cease fire: 25
• 17. Approximate bearing first shot: 320 True
• 18. Approximate bearing last shot: 190 True
• 19. Approximate range first shot: 5500 yards, Altitude of plane: 6300 feet
• 20. Approximate minimum range aircraft approached: 5000 yards, Altitude: 1000 feet
• 21. Approximate range last shot: 700 yards, Altitude of plane: 500 feet
• 22. Approximate altitude of bomb release: None
• 23. Approximate range torpedo release: None
• 24. Number hits on ship by bombs: None, by torpedoes: None, Was ship strafed? No
• 25. Number near bomb misses damaging ship: None
• 26. Planes shot down:
• 26. (a) Those attacking own ship: DAMAGED: One
• 28. Performance of ammunition: Excellent
• 29. What failures in material occurred in this section: Projectile hoist in gun #3 failed momentarily.

USS SAUFLEY - Summary Rep of enemy air attacks off Green Island, night of 2/14-15/44

16 February 1944

1. On the night of 14 February 1944, ship picked up single bogey on port quarter at 2319, ship went to general quarters. Bogey was tracked in to 7 miles before it retired. At 2340 ship set Condition 1 Easy.

2. At about 0135, 15 February 1944, picked up bogey bearing 0920, distance 17 miles. Bogey was closing formation and ship went to general quarters at 0140. Bogey closed to 71 miles before retiring on a southeasterly course. Shortly thereafter another bogey was picked up bearing 3200, distance 18 miles. Bogey approached formation sharply on the port bow, circled the formation to port and came in for an attack up moon, dropping approximately six bombs near the convoy at about 0230. From this time until dawn several bogies remained in area of the three transport groups, only one of which attacked our group. This bogey made his attack after dropping occulting flares along and ahead of the track line. After dropping the flares he circled the formation from port to starboard at a distance of about 8 miles and made an attack from the rear of the formation, dropping approximately five bombs at about 0243 near the convoy.

3. At about 0300 an attempt at radar deception was noted. This fact was established after plotting the pip which revealed no apparent motion and had the characteristics described in enclosure (A)

4. At 0643 without previous radar detection by us the Task Force was attacked by about six VALS. We attribute the cause for not detecting the enemy planes to the fact that our IFF is non-directional and that there were 42 friendly planes covering the Task Force which made it practically impossible for us to detect a bogey. This ship saw two planes definitely shot down.

5. During the night attacks all planes coming within gun range and making definite attacks on our formation approached from our port quarter and up moon. In the morning it is believed that all attacking planes came in from the north and west over Green Island. The only attacking plane which came within a clear firing sector and gun range crossed astern of this ship and was being chased by a P-39. Due to the above remarks and policy of not shooting at snoopers unless they were making a definite attack this ship did not fire at any planes throughout the operation.

ENCLOSURE (A)

The deception pip was picked up bearing 180° (T) at a range of 23 miles and persisted for about fifteen minutes. There was land on the approximate reciprocal bearing of the deception pip and at about the same range; however the radar operator was convinced that the pip was not a side echo. The deception pip differed from the ordinary plane pip in the following respects:

1. The deception pip's amplitude was less than that of the ordinary pip and did not reach saturation.

2. The deception pip was noticeably greater in width than the ordinary pip.

USS SAUFLEY - Rep Of Action, 8/23/43

28 August 1943

1. The SAUFLEY in company with USS RENSHAW, USS CONY, and Destroyer Division FORTY-ONE got underway from PURVIS BAY at 1540, 22 August 1943, to proceed up the slot and intercept one Japanese heavy cruiser and three destroyers reported by our aircraft to be off northwest tip of BOUGAINVILLE on course 160°, speed 28 knots. Commander Destroyer Squadron TWENTY-ONE on USS NICHOLAS was O.T.C., Commander Destroyer Squadron THIRTY-TWO was on SAUFLEY.

2. SAUFLEY and USS RENSHAW formed column 7000 yards astern of Destroyer Division FORTY-ONE. USS CONY was 11000 yards astern of this unit because of engine trouble. At 2300 while north of KOLOMBANGARA, a surface radar contact was reported on two objects by Commander Destroyer Squadron TWENTY-ONE. Targets were reported on course 060, speed 5 knots, then on 325, speed 5 knots. This unit was ordered to attack and advised to use torpedoes. Speed was reduced to 25 knots and the USS CONY closed to standard distance. The reported targets were never picked up on radar by any ships of this unit. They could not be seen as the night was dark and overcast. Reported targets may have been rain squall or water echoes.

3. At 2312 the SAUFLEY, USS RENSHAW, and USS CONY proceeded to patrol between VELLA LAVELLA and CHOISEUL BAY, with Destroyer Division FORTY-ONE patrolling further to the westward. 0009 on the 23rd, bogies were picked up by SC radar and were continually on the screen until 0400. During this time there were never less than five bogies on the screen. Moonrise was at 0043. The ship was then about 20 miles south of CHOISEUL BAY. The planes apparently operated individually but circled the ships almost continuously, maintaining ranges of 10000 - 20000 yards. At 0110 commenced making smoke and zig-zagging radically at 30 knots, the ships astern following in a close column.

4. At 0206 a plane came in to 3000 yards and main battery commenced firing, using full radar control. No results were observed. Planes were dropping float lights in pairs of red and white flares around the formation. AS 0235 SG radar reported a plane easing in over the USS RENSHAW, range 1500 yards. At 0237 this plane come in from port bow and crossed to starboard, flying very low, passing about 200 yards ahead of ship. SAUFLEY was turning right to avoid torpedoes. Plane was taken under fire by 40mm and 20mm guns at about 600 yards range when he would be seen. A 20mm was seen to hit as he passed ahead but evidently inflicted no serious damage to plane. About 0240 an underwater explosion was heard. The plane was apparently an Mitsubishi type 97, single engine land plane.

5. At 0300 commenced steering southeasterly courses to proceed to TULAGI. At 0305 a plane came in low on the starboard bow and dropped a torpedo about 200 yards from ship. Torpedo was seen hitting the water. 40mm and 20mm's opened fire but did not hit. Both engines were backed full and rudder put over hard left. At 0310 another plane cause in on starboard bow, the first warning being the sound of his engine. He was taken under fire by 40mm's and 20mm's and was hit by 20mm after be had passed over to port side. This please dropped a torpedo about 200 yards off starboard bow. The rudder was put over hard right and starboard engine backed full. Observers report seeing torpedo wake pass astern about 20 yards.

6. Planes seemed to fly at an altitude low enough to make it difficult to pick them up on SC radar and high enough that they could not be picked up on SG continuously. When the planes approached low to attack they were always picked up on SG radar, however. CIC kept the bridge and machine guns continually informed when low flying planes were approaching using relative bearings. On all but the third attack warning was given before the plane was in to torpedo release range.

7. It is believed that the SAUFLEY was the only ship attacked, the other two destroyers being in the smoke screen astern. 40mm's and 20mm's aft were hampered by smoke most of the time, the forward 20mm's usually spotting the planes at about 500 yards and opening fire first. Planes continued to orbit the formation until 0400 but none attacked.

8. A total of 92 rounds of 5"/38 antiaircraft continue ammunition with MK XVIII, Mod. 2 and 3 time fuzes, 96 rounds of 40mm, and 450 rounds of 20mm was expended.

USS SAUFLEY - Rep Of Action, 8/31/43

2 September 1943

1. The SAUFLEY in company with Taste Group THIRTY- ONE point SIX left KOKUMBONA, GUADALCANAL at 0400, 30 August 1943, in accordance with Commander Task Force THIRTY-ONE'S secret despatch 290040 of August, to proceed to BARAKOMA, VELLA LAVELLA. Tank Group consisted of USS RENSHAW, USS CONY, USS DENT, USS MCKEAN and LST's #398, 341 and 353. Commander Task Group, Captain W. R. COOKS, U.S. Navy, Commander Destroyer Squadron TWENTY-TWO, was in the SAUFLEY.

2. At 1830 on the 30th just after sunset, bogies were picked up at 12 miles bearing 350° (T). Destroyers commenced making smoke and patrolling at 25 knots. At 1850 no bogies could be picked up and destroyers returned to normal screening.

3. At 0145 on the 31st, five IGI's joined Task Group. While in MUNDA STRAIT, at 0250, two bogies were picked up at 15 miles coming in from the south. Planes never did come in close however, and circled 5-10 miles to westward, heading north at 0305. Exhaust flames could be seen at times. The night was very dark and it is believed that Task Group could not be Been except at a very close range. All batteries had been ordered not to fire on planes unless they were very close to ship.

4. At 0417 a bogie was picked up at 6 miles and stayed in the vicinity until 0450. ranging between 2 and 10 miles. At 0435 plane passed directly over the formation at about 1000 feet. Plane's engine could be heard as it passed overhead and exhaust flames could be seen. At 0443 the USS CONY took the plane under fire but apparently did not hit.

5. At 0600 the USS DENT and USS MCKEAN left formation to proceed to BARAKOMA and unload before LST's and LCI's arrived. At 0600 Task Group arrived at BARAKOMA and destroyers commenced patrolling 2-4 miles offshore at 20 knots. At 0839 the USS CONY reported a large group of bogies at 43 miles bearing 290°(T). At this time 16-20 fighters from MUNDA were providing air coverage. The morning was bright and clear with very few high clouds. At 0842 the SAUFLEY picked up bogies at 34 miles bearing 2600 (T) ship went to full general quarters and was maneuvered radically at 25 knots.

6. At 0851 speed was increased to 30 knots and at 0853 LCI's were underway, having completed unloading. Destroyers prepared to escort LCI's to RENDOVA. At this time bogies were 25 miles away bearing 230 (T). Bogies were apparently orbiting to the south closing slowly and at 0858 were reported by CIC at 18 miles bearing 190 (T). At 0859 a dive bomber was seen diving on ship from starboard bow, slant range about 500 yards, position angle about 45. Plane was taken under fire by forward 20mm's but was not hit. Several bombs landed on port side amidships about 20 yards from ship. Three other dive bombers followed in a loose column and bombs landed about 10-20 yards from ship on both sides. Machine gunners apparently kept firing at the leading dive bomber and did not take others under fire until they had pulled out. Planes came within about 400 feet of ship. Five inch and 40mm batteries did not open up until planes had pulled out of dives and were heading north. A total of 9-12 planes participated, attacking only the three destroyers.

7. Places were apparently Aichi 99 dive bombers a a it is believed that each plane dropped three bombs, one about 500 pounds and two about 100 pounds. Bombs were released at about 1000 feet. Bombs had delay fuzes, otherwise fragment damage would have been considerable. Bomb fragments struck the ship but caused no casualties among personnel except for three men who received miner scratches. One fragment penetrated the hull six feet above the waterline art leaving a two inch hole end other fragments struck after gun mounts, torpedo tubes, and forward stock resulting in negligible damage. Three rounds of 5" 125 rounds of 40mm and 420 rounds of 20mm were fired at the dive bomber with no apparent hits. Our fighters engaged them as they headed north and one dive bomber was seen to crash by northeast VELLA LAVELLA.

8. LCI's were escorted to within 15 miles of RENDOVA. At 1215 destroyers headed for BARAKOMA at 30 knots to escort LST's, having received word by voice radio that they would be unloaded by 1400. AC 1336 LST's cleared beach and Task Group proceeded at 10 knots through GIZO STRAIT, destroyers patrolling at 25 knots. At 1445 a torpedo plane was reported over RANONGGA ISLAND on the fighter circuit. other bogies were also reported but turned out to be friendly.

9. At 1934, while in MUNDA STRAIT, a bogie was picked up at 42 miles, bearing 295 (T), closing rapidly. At 1945 bogie was 11 miles, bearing 300°(T). At 1950 MUNDA Airfield opened up with searchlights and antiaircraft fire. Plane was apparently a search plane as it followed our route down as far as MUNDA.

10. Test Group arrived at KUKUM, GUADALCANAL at 1430 Love, 1 September 1943.

USS SAUFLEY - Rep Of Action, 8/26/43

2 September 1943

1. Task Group THIRTY-ONE point SIX, consisting of SAUFLEY, USS RENSHAW, USS CONY, SC 733 and LST's 339, 397 and 399 departed KOKUMBONA, GUADALCANAL, for BARAKOMA, VELLA LAVELLA at 0450 Love August 25, 1943, in accordance with Commander Task Force THIRTY- despatch 240258 of August. Captain W. R. COOKE, U.S. Navy, Commander Destroyer Squadron TWENTY-TWO and Commander Task Group THIRTY-ONE point SIX embarked in SAUFLEY. SAUFLEY also had Fighter Director Group on board.

2. Full general quarters set at 1913 that evening and modified at 1940. Upon SC radar report of two objects bearing 327 (T) at 14000 yards, full general quarters was set at 2155, then modified at 2203 as objects were identified as friendly ships.

3. At 0252, 26 August, SC radar operator reported bogie bearing 255 (T), range 19 miles. Set Condition I. Bogie withdrew apparently not having made contact with this group.

4. At 0320 bogie picked up on SC radar bearing 290 (T), range 29 miles approaching formation. Set Condition I as bogie was closing rapidly. Bogie came directly in toward the ships. At 0340 commenced firing at a range of 2800 yards and bogie withdrew. At this time the bogie gave the correct emergency identification. "Cease Fire" was given just after plane dropped flares, after having fired twenty-five rounds 5"/38 antiaircraft common with no observed results. At no time did a friendly signal appear on so radar screen, and visual identification of plane was impossible. After "cease firing" was given, the plane was tracked out to ten miles bearing 225 (T) and then lost.

5. According to Commander Task Force THIRTY-ONE'S despatch 260748 of August, this plane was one of our own Black Cats which was forced down as a result of damage caused by gunfire of this group.

6. At 0607 bogie reported bearing 237 (T), distance 5 1/2 miles and the order was given to cover LST's with funnel smoke screen. Ceased making smoke at 0617. At 0620 anti-aircraft fire was observed at BARAKOMA and escorting destroyers commenced making smoke. At 0630 one enemy plane was seen diving on LST's apparently having come in above and behind our fighter coverage before making his dive. This ship opened fire immediately and expended 30 rounds 5"/38 antiaircraft common with no observed results. Enemy plane withdrew low over the water after having dropped one bomb which aid no damage to any ships in group. At 0637 ceased making smoke. Ships at this time were starting north through GIZO STRAIT.

7. During the remainder of the operation and during the return from BARAKOMA to KOKUMBONA, Task Group THIRTY-ONE point SIX had several SC radar contacts but at no time aid bogies close the formation.

USS SAUFLEY - Act Rep, Surface & Air, off Kolombangara Is K 7/18/43

19 July 1943

1. The SAUFLEY proceeded in accordance with Commander Third Fleet's despatch 170032 (NPM 996) in company with Commander Destroyer Squadron TWENTY-TWO in the USS WALLER, with USS PRINGLE, Commander Destroyer Division FIFTEEN in the USS LANG, and USS STACK, with orders to act as covering force for landing operations in the Enogai, New Georgia area. At 2150 an enemy snooper plane was picked up on the SC radar and one or more snoopers remained with this formation continuously until about 0415. The moon was full and sky was partly cloudy, visibility was excellent. At 0112 Love the covering Black Cat reported three (3) enemy destroyers dead in the water at latitude 07-58 South, 156-58 East. At 0132 proceeded. to investigate contact report. At 0138 visual contact made with three (3) apparently small destroyers believed to be approximately three hundred (300) yards off shore. Due to the target's proximity to land neither the SG nor the FD radars were able to pick up these targets.

2. At 0148 commenced firing 5" main battery at a range of five thousand five hundred (5500) yards, on course 255 degrees (T), speed thirty-four (34) knots, thereafter changing course radically by turn signals received over T.B.S. The left hand ship was taken as the target. Enemy's proximity to shore made him difficult to see clearly, despite excellent visibility. Spotting was done by the stereo rangefinder operator. An eight hundred (800) yard continuous ladder was used in one hundred (100) yard steps. What was believed to be three (3) white smoke screens from smoke floats appeared about one thousand (1000) yards northward of the targets, who were first on a northerly and then turned to a southwesterly course, making approximately twenty-five knots. At 0152 ceased firing, having expended one hundred thirteen (113) rounds of 5" ammunition. No firing from the enemy ships was observed. Two (2) hits were observed by the rangefinder operator and Control officer. The enemy destroyers remained close inshore and were approaching the entrance to Blackett Strait. The SAUFLEY retired on a northwesterly course with the USS WALLER, to resume patrol of Kula Gulf, having reached a position well down in the Vella Gulf and approaching the region where our own PT boats were operating. At no time during this engagement were PD radar ranges or bearings on the target obtainable. Instead, the director was kept on the target by the coaching of the stereo rangefinder operator, who was able to see the target at all times, while the radar range to land, minus an estimate of the target's distance from land was used. Although the SG radar picked up the target shortly before the signal to commence fire was given, C.I.C. was unable to get an accurate plot due to shock caused by sun fire, especially when the forward guns were firing well abaft the beam to port. Both before and after commencing fire we were illuminated by several flares from the snoopers.

3. Throughout the evening snooper planes were on the SC radar screen, shadowing the formation at ranges of five to ten miles. At 0245 what appeared to be two (2) signal flares, green and red, were dropped ahead while the sir attack was in progress. At about 0310, while on patrol at twenty-five (25) knots outside Kula Gulf, a stick of three (3) bombs landed astern, from port to starboard, at a distance of about two hundred (200) yards. Commenced radical maneuvering generally on easterly courses. At 0320 commenced firing at plane coming in, range four thousand (4000) yards. At 0325 forward guns ceased firing, and speed was changed to twenty (20) knots. At 0326 after guns ceased firing. Expended seventy-three (73) rounds of 5" ammunition. At 0329 speed changed to twenty-five (25) knots. At 0347 after guns commenced firing at approaching plane. At 0349 ceased firing. Expended eighty-four (84) rounds of 5" ammunition. At 0400 commenced firing at plane coming in from starboard, range eight thousand (8000) yards. At C404 ceased firing, expended one hundred nine (109) rounds of 5" ammunition. The times given above are approximate. This was the plane seen by several members of the crew, to explode and disintegrate. During the above period two (2) more sticks of three (3) or four (4) bombs were dropped close aboard this ship. One stick landed ahead and about one hundred fifty (150) yards on starboard bow. The other stick landed about fifty (50) yards astern, straddling the wake.

4. Throughout this air action, full radar control was used, the director being coached on by the SC radar. The performance of the SC equipment was hampered by nearby land masses and gunfire shock of the preceding engagement which necessitated retuning of the duplexing unit and the transmitter. Other undetermined damage to the SC radar was sustained which limited its maximum plane range to about ten (10) miles, and generally lowered the effectiveness of the equipment. Mark XVIII Mod 3 fuzes were used throughout due to proximity to land. It is believed that about six (6) planes participated in the attack, occasionally making their runs in groups of about three (3), but for the most part, coming over singly, preferably from over land at an altitude of from twelve thousand (12000) to thirteen thousand (13000) feet. It is further believed that from twenty (20) to twenty-four (24) bombs were dropped, the main target being the USS WALLER, USS SAUFLEY, USS PRINGLE section. It is understood that a total of three (3) planes were reported to have fallen by persons on the USS LANG. One of these were claimed by the USS PRINGLE, one by the USS WALLER, and it is believed that the SAUFLEY fire accounted for the third.

USS SAUFLEY - Rep of opers in support of the assault landings at Balipapan, Borneo, 7/1-19/45

19 July 1945

U.S.S. SAUFLEY ACTION REPORT, BALIKPAPAN OPERATION, 23 JUNE 1945 TO 19 JULY 1945.

This report covers the USS SAUFLEY's participation in the naval operations surrounding the capture of Balikpapan from the rehearsal exercises on 23 June 1945 to this ship's departure from the objective area on 19 July 1945.

Own forces consisted of the units composing the Attack Group in addition to the Support and Covering Group. Air cover was provided by Royal Australian Air Force and the 13th Air Force augmented for the initial phase of the operation by three (3) carrier escorts with their planes.

The SAUFLEY's mission was to screen and escort the Attack Group during the sortie from the staging area at Morotai and during the advance of the group toward Balikpapan. At the objective area the mission consisted of providing anti-submarine and anti-aircraft protection for the shipping in the transport area. When not thus occupied, the ship was called upon to provide fire support and night illumination for the advance of the troops ashore.

Enemy forces of any considerable strength were not known to exist. Attack by enemy submarines, suicide and Motor Torpedo boats were considered to be both possible and probable. A possibility of suicide attacks from the air also existed. Mines, both enemy and Allied, were known to exist in the vicinity of Balikpapan, and the progress of the minesweeping units were made the subject of information disseminated to participating units.

A conference of all Commanding Officers on board the Attack Group Flagship prior to departure summed up and drove home the doctrines and aspects of what was set forth in detail by the operation plan. Benefit was derived from this and seemingly necessary information was further disseminated to key personnel of this command. Recognition instruction on current Allied aircraft expected to be seen in the area was given to personnel in exposed stations. Control Officers and Gun Captains were instructed by means of photographs and charts on the terrain expected to be seen should direct fire become a necessity. All hands were instructed not to throw floating trash over the side which would hamper any air-sea rescue operations. Communication personnel were instructed to eliminate call ups after good communications had been established and to draft outgoing voice traffic in such a manner as to enable the recipient to answer "affirmative" or "negative". Lookouts were cautioned to be on the alert for floating mines as well as the possibilities of attacks by suicide boats. As an extra protection against this form of attack, armed sentries were stationed on deck during such times as the ship was anchored. Speeds of two knots or below were to be used in areas where the possibility of acoustic magnetic mines existed; SAUFLEY did not knowingly enter any such areas.

With the exception of an anti-aircraft sleeve firing practice enroute, no firing was done by this ship until July 2nd. Bogies had been reported and picked up by own radar enroute but had repeatedly turned out to be friendly planes. At 1514 on July 2nd, having been in the A/S screen outside of the transport area, this ship received its first fire support mission. Fire was directed at an AA gun position Northeast of Balikpapan Town, with the aid of a spotting plane from the USS PHOENIX, until 1705. At 2008 of the same day, harassing and interdiction fire were provided until 2030 when illumination with starshells was called for until 0351 the following morning. During this time the SAUFLEY assisted in retrieving the lost sweep gear of the YMS 314. Illumination ceased when it was reported that enemy planes were in the area. At 0625 on the morning of July 3rd, a plane, presumed to be hostile, was observed to fall enveloped in flames. At 1150 a counter battery fire mission was ordered but before opening fire the SAUFLEY was relieved by the WALLER and ordered to replenish ammunition. At 1855 on July 4th, the SAUFLEY took station astern of the USS BELL which was patrolling off the mouth of the Manggar River, Borneo. Both ships were awaiting orders to open fire in support of own troops, which had advanced to the Eastern edge of the Manggar Airstrip. At 0004 on July 5th, the previously arranged harassing fire commenced in an area ahead of the Australian front lines. This was repeated at 0400. At dawn enemy planes were in the area. At 0812 call fire was requested to destroy a heavy machine gun pit 1000 yards ahead of own troops. Fire was later shifted by the SFCP to a coast defense gun and continued until a scheduled air strike began. The following evening the SAUFLEY received a call fire mission to destroy enemy AA guns in approximately the same area. At 1842 fire was shifted to another coast defense gun. White Phosphorus was used, primarily for burning out personnel and foliage. On the morning of July 6th at 0932, AA guns and another coast defense gun were taken under fire. These were worked on until 1349. Own air strike interfered for an hour during which time fire was checked. In the evening at 1922 call fire was requested to silence twin 27 millimeter guns which were believed to be shelling own troops. They were reported to have been silenced at 1957. At 0027 on July 7th illumination was provided to aid in preventing a counter attack North of the Manggar Airstrip. This was followed up with harassing fire for ten minutes at 0124 and again for five minutes at 0600. The SAUFLEY, having been relieved by the USS PHILIP, proceeded to take on ammunition. Fire support duties were again resumed in the evening when call fire was provided on a gun position commencing at 1527 and continuing for one hour. The last firing mission was call fire against another machine gun position commencing at 1745. Fire was ceased at 1754 and two hours later the SAUFLEY commenced patrolling a screening station.

Until retirement from the objective area on July 19th, duties were divided between screening the transport area and awaiting a fire support assignment at anchor in fire support station off the Manggar River. On July 19th, the SAUFLEY, in company with the PHILIP, departed for Morotai escorting the USS CHEPACHET.

The performance of own ordnance equipment was excellent. Two starshells burst prematurely. All starshells were fired from the same gun with fuze setters in automatic. Illuminating projectiles which prematured were assembled with Mk 18 Mod 2 fuzes, Lot # 296. In both instances the burst occurred 1000 to 1500 yards from the ship, the time of flight being approximately two seconds.

Ammunition expended was as follows (* fired during sleeve practice enroute to the objective area):

• 5"/38 cal. AA Common - 1010 + 47*: 1057 rounds
• 5"/38 cal. Illuminating: 110 rounds
• 5"/38 cal. White Phosphorus: 17 rounds
• 40 millimeter: *116 rounds
• 20 millimeter: *138 rounds

Fire discipline was good and gunnery communications presented no problems.

From reports received from Shore Fire Control Parties it is believed, for the most part, that this ship's fire was both timely and effective.

Training deficiencies were evident during the AA sleeve practices enroute to the objective area. Frequent loading and tracking drills were held daily.

No battle damage was inflicted on this vessel by the enemy. Battle damage to enemy installations or units is unknown.

All shore bombardment was conducted by indirect fire. Navigation was greatly simplified by the use of special hydrographic charts having scales of 1:36,000 and 1:72,000. The 1000 meter grid which was overlayed on these charts enabled fine pinpointing of target areas. The scales simplified the use of the ship's DRT in that the settings were less complicated than those used with the 1:25,000 and 1:50,000 scale U.S. Army grid maps. Local current conditions made the underway indirect firing problem interesting and when a definite set and drift were established, target course and speed were set into the computer. The dissemination of information in regard to mine fields and swept areas was superior to any previously experienced by this command in other operations.

Communications were both well organized and well handled. It is believed this was due in part to the briefing given at the conference prior to departure for the objective area. It seemed that circuit discipline was of an unusually high standard. This ship experienced one material failure when a TBL transmitter broke down during a fire support mission. The circuit, however, was transferred to another transmitter, TBK with speech input modulater, until the necessary repairs could be effected. The Australian BLO assigned this vessel handled all communications with the Shore Fire Control Parties in an efficient manner, thereby releasing ship's personnel for other duties in CIC, and avoiding the embarrassment of not always understanding the Australian version of the King's English.

Air and surface search radars were used continuously and effectively. The well executed movement plan included in the operation order provided CIC with timely information concerning incoming and approaching convoys or resupply echelons thereby reducing to a minimum the number of "skunk" reports. Plane tracking by both air search and fire control radars presented little or no problem in this area.

The only radar pulse not easily identified as Allied during the operation was picked up by RCM gear at 0400 (I), on 1 July, in latitude 01-07-00 S, longitude 117-10-10 E. It was a frequency of 86.0 megacycles with a pulse repetition rate of approximately 50 cycles, a pulse width of 17.5 or 18.0 microseconds and an indicated train rate of 4 R.P.M's. No data on enemy or Allied radar held by this vessel conformed to all of these particular specifications, although it seems likely that the gear was the British type 281 being used by the Australians. The only respect in which the received signal failed to correspond to the type 281 was train rate, a factor which cannot be determined with precise accuracy.

In conclusion: (1) It is recommended that firing ships in all operations requiring shore bombardment be complemented with Bombardment Liaison Officers. Greater understanding of the problem ashore and speedier execution of requests are gained thereby. (2) During heavy rain squalls similar to those experienced several times during this operation, all Shore Fire Control Party circuits are blocked by rain and static. At one time during a cloud burst the Shore Fire Control Party urgently tried to request harassing fire in a previously spotted enemy area. Communications were not established because the Shore Fire Control Party radio was flooded. It is suggested that if harassing fire is needed during such periods a systematic use of pyrotechnics, as a secondary means of communications, be employed by the Shore Fire Control Party. (3) Vessels due for night illumination missions should be provided with an increased allowance of starshells in order to fulfill frequent and large demands on this source.

In regard to supply, it is the wish of this command to express appreciation for the efficient cooperation shown by the U.S.S. POLLUX in respect to prompt issue of General Stores and the U.S.S. AREQUIPA for equally prompt issue of fresh provisions. The only important shortages felt by this vessel were condensed milk and yeast, which were not available in sufficient quantity in the staging area.

The foresight and planning of this operation is fully appreciated by this vessel, especially in regard to replenishment of fuel, ammunition, the relieving of ships on fire support duty, and the dissemination of mine sweeping data immediately prior to the assault.

There were no casualties to personnel. All hands performed their duties in a highly commendable manner.

VOICE RADIO LOG EXTRACTS APPENDIX 1 TO PART II OF ENCLOSURE (A).

1557	Union V Gayblade	How do you hear me: 5 x 5. Wildbeast is yours.
1600	Ace Wildbeast V Union	Hear you 5 X 5. Target bearing 007 5300 feet. 36 seconds time of flight. Enemy AA position in Area 6166 N.
1755	Mackinaw V Union	Expended Charlie (RV) Fox (B). On hand Charlie (MXSG) Fox (JC) BT.
1825	Union V Mackinaw	At (IFWP) take station at Point Lulu.
1915	All Stations This Circuit	Units not assigned mission may secure this frequency until (GRKW) tomorrow.
1920	Union V Mackinaw	You are assigned to Charlie 2. Come up on his frequency. Did you get my message regarding ammo report?
	Mackinaw V Union	Roger and out.
	Union V Mackinaw	Does your transmission of 1755 Item still hold good?
	Mackinaw V Union	Affirmative. Over.
	Union V Mackinaw	Roger and out.
1930	Mackinaw V Union	Charlie 6 has requested illumination for tonight. Request instructions. Union is still in contact with Charlie 6.
	Union V Mackinaw	You are assigned to Charlie 2. Charlie 6's firing ship will be Partner.
	Mackinaw V Union	Roger and out.
1955	Union V Charlie 2	Can you give fire for twenty minutes solid target 606 ack ack guns? Over.
	Charlie 2 V Union	Wilco out.
2107	Union V Charlie 2	Bring star 400 yards south.
2112	Union V Charlie 2	That was a dud, fire again. No change. Over.
2119	Union V Charlie 2	The flare burst 200 yards north.
2200	Mackinaw V Union	Charlie 2 requests 8 Easy per hour. Allowance (OG). On board (TYL). Unless otherwise directed will comply with Charlie 2's request.
2201	Union V Mackinaw	You can comply with Charlie 2's request. Ship available tomorrow to replenish you.

0617	Linseed 15 V Mackinaw	Request you relieve Union with Mainmast and Partner with Malta. Union and Partner to replenish supply. Gayblade now under your control.
0623	Mackinaw V Union	Mission with Charlie 2 completed successfully. Expended (AI), on hand (JA). I intend to check in with Charlie 3 at (YAPL) as previously arranged with you and Charlie 7. Time 0622.
	Union V Mackinaw	Roger and out.

0607	Charlie 7 V Mackinaw	I would like to reduce number of Seahawks in use today. How many do you need? Over.
0608	Mackinaw V Charlie 7	I require 3 Seahawks and 1 Buffalo.
0609	Charlie 7 V Mackinaw	Roger, out.
0617	Linseed 15 V Mackinaw	Request you tell Union to relieve Partner after (ATWB).
0723	Charlie 7 V Union	Union will be in vicinity of Lulu, Meteor at Ruth, Challenger remain at Bessie. All of these ships can be moved to suit the situation.
1050	Mackinaw V Union	We are in communications with own spotter and have relieved Partner. Over.
1051	Union V Mackinaw	Roger.
1619	Union V Mackinaw	Get underway and go to area in which Destiny is. He is in trouble. He is working with Charlie 4 on net 7.
0620	Mackinaw V Union	Roger, out.
1623	Union V Mackinaw	What is ETA at new position?
1632	Mackinaw V Union	My ETA is (VT) minutes.
1633	Union V Mackinaw	Roger, out.
1847	Mackinaw V Union	Action Mackinaw, Information Linseed 15 V Union. Charlie 3 has no use for Union tonight. He will call us at (TQBF) tomorrow if we are still assigned to him. Do you wish us to remain here with Charlie 3?
1849	Union V Mackinaw	Remain in present area and maintain contact with Charlie 4.
2205	Union V Mackinaw	At 0730 tomorrow morning in area 786/ Linseed 8 with 4 lobsters will report to take on your BLO. He will then come up on Charlie 4's net and await instructions. At this time, unless needed by Charlie 4, you may return Linseed 15. If area unsatisfactory you may arrange with Linseed 8 directly.

0345	Union V Mackinaw	Transfer BLO party to Linseed 8 upon arrival. When relieved by Wildbeast. report to Linseed 15 for instructions.
0346	Mackinaw V Union	Roger, out.
0931	Mackinaw V Union	Mission with Charlie 3 just completed. Call fire reports target 656 engaged by Charlie 3, heavy machine guns at 747-677. 3 rounds fell close to target. Ammunition expended (AK) Charlie target 657 coast defense gun 739-677, ranging not completed because of air strike. Ammunition expended (K) Charlie. A munition report to Linseed at 1014. Total expenditure for harassing and call fire missions follow: Charlie (HMB), on hand Charlie (HMTI) Others remain unchanged. Union has been relieved by Wildbeast. Shall BLO on Union transfer to Linseed 8 now?
0940	Union V Mackinaw	Affirmative. Now.
1009	Mackinaw V Union	Transfer of BLO team to Linseed 8 has been effected.
1010	Union V Mackinaw	Roger, out.
1710	Union V Charlie 4	Target 713, AA guns in defended area 748-679. Danger own troops 210, 1100 yards.
1715	Union V Mackinaw	Your allowance for future bombardments is (KEJ) Charlie, and is not to exceed that amount.
1832	Union V Charlie 4	No change - left 400 yards, 1 round.
1838	Union V Charlie 4	Down 100, - left 400, over.
1839	Charlie V Union	Down 100 - left 400, out.
1840	Union V Charlie 4	No change - right 400, over.
1842	Mackinaw V Union	We have relieved Partner and have commenced mission with Charlie 4 on target 750-678.
1845	Union V Charlie 4	No Change - Left 200, Commanding Officer Bumper wants to range on beach guns and 'use W.P. to burn them out, over.
1849	Union V Charlie 4	Up 1600 - No change, over.
1852	Union V Charlie 4	Down 400 - No change, air burst.
1855	Union V Charlie 4	1 round, down 200 - right 800, over.
1858	Union V Charlie 4	Down 400 - right 800.
1901	Union V Charlie 4	Down 200 - right 400.
1904	Union V Charlie 4	Up 400 - No change.
1909	Union V Charlie 4	Up 400 - No change, over.
1911	Union V Charlie 4	Down 200 - No change impact, over.
1913	Union V Charlie 4	Down 100 - No change, over.
1915	Union V Charlie 4	Down 200 - No change, over.
1917	Union V Charlie 4	Up 400 - No change.
1919	Union V Charlie 4	Up 800 - No change.
1922	Union V Charlie 4	No change - left 400.
1924	Union V Charlie 4	No change - right 200.
1926	Union V Charlie 4	Up 400 - No change.
1928	Union V Charlie 4	Will have to abandon shooting. Target blinded by artillery fire. Cease fire.
2015	Mackinaw V Union	Expended Charlie (T), Fox (MF). Remaining on board, Charlie (MBNH), Fox (WQ). All other unchanged. Time: 052015 I.

0837	Union V Charlie 4	Bumpers night patrol report enemy ground forces guarding defense gun positions. Observation of those guns with powerful telescope shows apparent destruction. Our field guns now engaging other coastal guns over open sights also our field guns engaging mortar and machine gun positions. No enemy fire as yet.
0927	Union V Charlie 4	We have target (705) coast defense guns and MA guns in target area 743-680. Damage to own troops bearing 2000, 1100 yards, over.
	Charlie 4 V Union	Roger, out.
0934	Union V Charlie 4	No change - left 800
0936	Union V Charlie 4	Up 400 - No change.
0938	Union V Charlie 4	Left 400, over.
0939	Union V Charlie 4	Right 200, over,
0941	Union V Charlie 4	Up 200 - No change.
0942	Union V Charlie 4	Down 100 - No change, over.
0944	Union V Charlie 4	No change - right 100, over.
0945	Union V Charlie 4	No change - right 200, over,
0947	Union V Charlie 4	No change - left 50, over.
0949	Union V Charlie 4	No change - No change.
0952	Union y Charlie 4	No change - No change.
0955	Union V Charlie 4	No change - right 100, 1 salvo, over.
0956	Union V Charlie 4	We will want intense fire on this target for 2 minutes.
0957	Union V Charlie 4	No change, 5 guns converged, over,
0959	Union V Charlie 4	Right 100, 1 - 5 gun salvo, over.
1001	Union V Charlie 4	Left 50, 1 salvo, 5 guns, over,
1036	Union V Charlie 4	No change - up 200, 1 - 5 gun.
1037	Union V Charlie 4	No change - up 400, 1 - 5 gun.
1058	Union V Charlie 4	Up 400 - No change, 1 salvo, 5 guns.
1059	Union V Charlie 4	No change - right 400, 1 salvo, 5 guns.
1100	Union V Charlie 4	Down 400 - right 400, 1 salvo, 5 guns
1101	Union V Charlie 4	No change - left 200, 1 salvo, 5 guns
1102	Union V Charlie 4	Up 100 - No change, 1 salvo, 5 guns.
1103	Union V Charlie 4	Check fire.
1117	Union V Charlie 4	Aircraft coming in now, up 400 - No change, 1 salvo, 5 guns.
1120	Union V Charlie 4	Check fire, planes are coming in.
1124	Charlie 4 V Union	Can you give us a rough estimate of time fire is to be resumed?
1126	Union V Charlie 4	Planes are coming in, we do not know anything further.
1136	Union V Charlie 4	Target was obscured by clouds: Planes are making another run,
1146	Union V Charlie 4	Things have altered a bit. H-hour may not be when bombs fall, but will still give you that one minute notice.
1150	Charlie 4 V Union	Can you give me an estimate of time of H-hour ?
1151	Union V Charlie 4	No. Clouds are very low and it all depends on the planes.
1210	Union V Charlie 4	Liberators cannot see target. Supporting fire will be held until they can.
1215	Union V Charlie 4	P-38 coming to drop fire bombs.
1224	Union V Charlie 4	When P-38 is clear of area, we will bombard No. 1 position.
1225	Union V Charlie 4	It will be at the rate of 3 rounds per minute.
1226	Union V Charlie 4	When you fire, you will fire 1 salvo up 400, fire when ready (5 gun salvo).
1227	Union V Charlie 4	Check fire, wait one minute.
1228	Union V Charlie 4	Fire (5 guns).
1229	Union V Charlie 4	No change, right 200.
1230	Union V Charlie 4	Down 200 - No change.
1231	Union V Charlie 4	Down 400 - No change, 1 salvo.
1233	Union V Charlie 4	Up 200 - No change, 1 salvo.
1234	Union V Charlie 4	Up 100 - No change, 1 salvo.
1236	Union V Charlie 4	Up 100 - No change, 1. salvo.
1238	Union V Charlie 4	No change - No change, 3 salvos per minute for three minutes, 1 gun firing short.
1240	Charlie 4 V Union	How far is gun short?
1242	Union V Charlie 4	No change - No change, rapid fire for three minutes.
1243	Union V Charlie 4	Check fire.
1244	Union V Charlie 4	Up 400 - No change, 1 salvo.
1245	Union V Charlie 4	Change target, Up 800 - right 600.
1246	Union V Charlie 4	Down 400 - No change; 3 salvos per minute for 8 minutes.
1248	Union V Charlie 4	Up 800 - No change, same rate of fire.
1250	Charlie 4 V Union	What is target?
1251	Union V Charlie 4	No change - No change, 2 salvos per minute for 8 minutes.
1252	Union V Charlie 4	Gun Mortar Area is target.
1252	Charlie 4 V Union	Is gun still firing short.
1253	Union V Charlie 4	No change -right 200 same rate, gun alright now.
1257	Union V Charlie 4	No change - No change ,continue same rate of fire for 8 minutes.
1259	Union V Charlie 4	Cease fire for 15 minutes.
1300	Union V Charlie 4	Down 200 - No change same rate of fire.
1302	Union V Charlie 4	No change - right 400.
1304	Union V Charlie 4	No change - No change, same rate of fire.
1305	Union V Charlie 4	Up 400 - No change, same rate of fire.
1307	Union V Charlie 4	No change - right 400, same rate of fire.
1309	Union V Charlie 4	No change - No change, 3 gun salvo.
1312	Union V Charlie 4	No change - right 400, 2 salvos per minute, 3 guns.
1317	Union V Charlie 4	No change - No change, same rate of fire.
1320	Union V Charlie 4	No change - No change, 1 salvo per 2 minutes - 3 guns.
1325	Union V Charlie 4	Up 400 - No Change, same rate of fire.
1327	Union V Charlie 4	This is only harassing fire to cover our troops.
1333	Union V Charlie 4	Up 200 - No change, same rate of fire.
1334	Mackinaw V Union	(BLO) We are engaging guns and machine gun in area 757-689 at slow rate of fire. Our troops now in area 743-680.
1335	Union V Charlie 4	Up 200 - No change, same rate of fire.
1336	Union V Charlie 4	No change - left 200, same rate of fire.
1343	Union V Charlie 4	Up 200 - right 400, same rate of fire.
1348	Union V Charlie 4	Up 400 - right 400, same rate of fire.
1349	Union V Charlie 4	Check fire.
1355	Union V Charlie 4	Cease fire.
1356	Charlie 4 V Union	Message from Captain. Would like to move in closer to the shore, so we can give you a better line of fire.
1357	Union V Charlie 4	Roger, that will be Okay.
1411	Mackinaw V Union	Expended Charlie (WDI). Remaining Charlie (GKA). All other remain unchanged as of my 051950 I. Time 061411 I.
1420	Linseed 15 V Union	(Same message as above).
1421	Charlie 4 V Union	We are now in position and will be on call.
1627	Union V Charlie 4	Our own FDL unchanged, our OP outfit unchanged. Artillery still firing at non defensive area and covering our troops and exploding in area 739-676. Enemy mortar fire inflicting casualties. Charlie 3 is also engaging this target.
1641	Union V Charlie 4	Firing mission target 716 coast defense guns. Damage to own troops 743-680, 200° - 1100 yards over Roger out.
1643	Union V Charlie 4	Regarding target, we shall have to wait until we get info about our patrol.
1730	Union V Charlie 4	Are you in communication with spotting aircraft?
	Charlie 4 V Union	No, is he supposed to be on this net?
1740	Mackinaw V Union	Charlie 4 requests you furnish a spotting plane to be available in half hour. If not available in time it will not be needed.
1742	Oregon V Mackinaw	Did you receive that request from Union? Charlie 4 and Union request use of an ace within 30 minutes. Could you comply?
1750	Mackinaw V Oregon	Ace Oregon will be airborne within one half hour.
1833	Union V Charlie 4	Cease fire. Sorry but will have to cease fire as damage to own troops does not permit us to fire on last target. Thank you very much for your cooperative response.
1925	Union V Charlie 4	A twin 27MM gun at target area 746-678 over. Roger V Union.
1926	Union V Charlie 4	No change - left 400.
1927	Union V Charlie 4	Down 400 - No change.
1929	Union V Charlie 4	No change - No change, 2 - 5 gun salvos.
1931	Union V Charlie 4	Up 400 - No change, 1 - 5 gun salvo.
1932	Union V Charlie 4	Down 400 - right 200, still being shelled by twin 27MM gun.
1934	Union V Charlie 4	No change - No change, 2 - 5 gun salvos.
1935	Union V Charlie 4	No change - left 200, 2 - 5 gun salvos.
1937	Union V Charlie 4	Cease fire, enemy gun silenced. Cease fire. Believe it has been silenced. Thanks very much for your quick response.
1946	Mackinaw V Union	Twin twenty-seven millimeter guns at target coordinates 746-678 assigned by Charlie 4 engaged at 1919 I and reported to be silenced at 1937. Expended (OX), on hand Charlie (GHE). Others remain tho same. Time 1946 I.
2100	Union V Charlie 4	We will have those harassing fire tasks for you in about half hour.
2113	Union V Charlie 4	Am closing down until 2130 hours.
2209	Union V Charlie 4	Will give you a call at 2230. No info on fire tasks.
2350	Union V Charlie 4	Harassing fire in area 747-678 at 0100 - 0105 and 0600 - 0605. 5 2 gun salvos per minute for five minutes.

0029	Union V Charlie 4	First starshell fired, counter attack developing on beach area 747-678.
0032	Union V Charlie 4	No change - No change, 2 illuminating shells for ten minutes.
0037	Mackinaw V Union	We are illuminating area 747-678 for Charlie 4 because an enemy counter attack is developing.
0040	Union V Charlie 4	No change - No change, 3 rounds for two minutes.
0042	Charlie 4 V Union	Illumination completed; do you need further illumination?
0043	Union V Charlie 4	Continue illumination, 3 rounds per two minutes for ten minutes.
0047	Union V Charlie 4	Check fire for five minutes.
0050	Union V Charlie 4	Harassing fire can be postponed until after illumination.
0055	Union V Charlie 4	Enemy fire was ceased as soon as illumination began. We are now waiting to see if he is going to fire again.
0100	Union V Charlie 4	No change - No change, 2 stars per minute for 5 minutes.
0105	Charlie 4 V Union	We have one salvo to go to complete last firing order.
0106	Union V Charlie 4	No change - No change, same rate of fire for 5 minutes.
0110	Union V Charlie 4	Forward infantry reports machine guns on road. Will need many stars.
0111	Charlie 4 V Union	You know amount we have on board. Present rate of fire too expensive. We will soon run out. You will call for more later on. Suggest this may be good time to provide harassing fire and scare the Christ out of them.
0124	Charlie 4 V Union	Commenced harassing firing, 2 guns salvos.
0127	Union V Charlie 4	Harassing fire as ordered. 5, 2 gun salvos for five minutes.
0130	Mackinaw V Union	Union is carrying out harassing fire mission on target at 747-678 with Charlie 4 as previously ordered.
0135	Union V Charlie 4	Thanks a lot for harassing fire. All rounds landed in area. Standby, we may need more stars shortly.
0136	Union V Charlie 4	Thanks a lot for quick response with starshells in emergency. Excellent shooting.
0137	Charlie 4 V Union	Roger, thank you, if you cannot get us by voice switch to CW.
0143	Mackinaw V Union	Harassing fire completed. Expended Charlie (VK). On hand Charlie (FYK). Am standing by for call fire illumination from Charlie 4.
Q611	Mackinaw V Union	Completed harassing fire mission. Expended Charlie (OB) remaining Charlie (IJA). All others unchanged.
1319	Mackinaw V Union	Ammo report completion replenishment C(DJLF) E(TBU). Others unchanged. Time 1319 I.
1455	Union V Showboat	Please report when you are ready to relieve me.
1504	Showboat V Union	I relieve you.
1510	Union V Showboat	Roger, out.
1520	Union V Charlie 3	Target 666 gun area 738-684, first salvo 2 guns high explosives. First shot right 400 - Up 400.
1531	Union V Charlie 3	No change - left 200.
1533	Union V Charlie 3	Down 200 - No change.
1540	Union V Charlie 3	Down 200 - No change.
1543	Union V Charlie 3	Up 400 - loft 800.
1544	Union V Charlie 3	No change - right 400.
1546	Union V Charlie 3	Down 200 - No change.
1549	Union V Charlie 3	Down 200 - No change.
1551	Union V Charlie 3	Up 100 - No change.
1554	Union V Charlie 3	Guns converged, no change - right 100.
1555	Union V Charlie 3	Up 50 - right 50. 1 - 2 gun salvo.
1557	Union V Charlie 3	No change - left 50.
1601	Union V Charlie 3	No change - No change.
1604	Union V Charlie 3	Down 50 - No change.
1605	Union V Charlie 3	No change - No change, 1 salvo until further orders.
1608	Union V Charlie 3	Rounds falling Okay.
1616	Union V Charlie 3	I am going to give one last spotting correction and I will then check fire.
1619	Union V Charlie 3	Down 400 - right 1200, 1 salvo 2 guns,
1621	Union V Charlie 3	Check fire, we do not expect to shoot for another 90 minutes.
1642	Union V Charlie 3	Enemy has opened up on us about 1830 hours from different positions each evening. If nothing happens before then I'm supposed to shoot again about 1830.
1643	Academy V Lehigh	I am assuming command of this circuit, am taking Mackinaw's place. Assume voice call of Mackinaw on net if 8 and # 11 - 070737.
1730	Union V Charlie 3	Sunray Bumper will require fire in vicinity area 748-678 before dark to support a (ICLN). I will range about 1800 hours or earlier. Time fire is required is not known.
1736	Charlie 3 V Union	I have just talked to Lehigh and we will not be relieved from fire support.
1740	Union V Charlie 3	Target 667, 748-678, danger own troops 2600 - 1000 yards.
1745	Union V Charlie 3	Down 400 - No change.
1747	Union V Charlie 3	Down 400.
1747	Union V Charlie 3	No change - No change, 1 salvo 5 guns.
1751	Union V Charlie 3	Down 400 - left 400, 1 salvo.
1752	Union V Charlie 3	No change - No change, 1 salvo.
1753	Union V Charlie 3	No change - No change, 1 salvo.
1754	Union V Charlie 3	Continue firing for another 7 minutes.
1755	Charlie 3 V Union	Arc you going to give us a time rate for salvos?
1756	Union V Charlie 3	We leave that to you.
1757	Union V Charlie 3	Check fire, check fire.
1758	Union V Charlie 3	No change - No change, 2 salvos.
1800	Union V Charlie 3	Check fire - check fire.
1802	Union V Charlie 3	Standby on target. Could not observe exactly where rounds were falling as other ships and artillery were shooting, but you got there just in time I think. Your shooting was extremely good and we were lucky. Could you tell me where your rounds fell in relation to Partner's fire?
1808	Charlie 3 V Union	Our rounds appeared about 200 left and a little short of Partners.
1809	Union V Charlie 3	You made it just where we wanted it.
1905	Mackinaw to Union and Partner	Time 071855 Item. Instruct Charlie 4 and Charlie 3 to come up on Net 6. Use Halfbreed for fire support tonight. Halfbreed will supply illumination fire for both of these parties. Halfbreed come up on Net 6 when Charlie 3 or Charlie 4 has closed down on own spotting net.
1926	Mackinaw V Union	We are proceeding to screening station in accordance with your 071807. Machine gun in target (ZUG) silenced according to Charlie 3. Expended Charlie (DLS). On hand Charlie (DLYI). Others unchanged. Time 071026.
1930	Sitrep from Charlie 7	The enemy withdrew under Union's illumination last night leaving casualties behind.